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Crimes
Crimes; alcoholic beverages-beer kegs
Business and Professions Code § 25659.5 (new).
AB 8 (Connolly); 1993 STAT. Ch. 270
Under existing law, it is a misdemeanor to sell, furnish, or give away
any alcoholic beverage to any person under the age of twenty-one years.'
Existing law also provides that for the purpose of preventing a violation,
a licensee may refuse to sell or serve alcoholic beverages to any person
who is unable to produce sufficient written evidence establishing age.z
Chapter 270 requires retail licensees selling keg3 beer for consumption off
1. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25658 (West Supp. 1993); see Sagadin v. Ripper, 175 Cal. App. 3d 1141,
1158, 221 Cal. Rptr. 675, 685 (1985) (stating that to furnish alcohol under California Business and Professions
Code § 25658, the offender need not pour the drink, but once having control of the alcohol, need only take some
affirmative step to supply it to the drinker); see also Lacabanne Properties v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 261 Cal. App. 2d 181, 188, 67 Cal. Rptr. 734, 739 (1968) (stating that the purpose of provisions
prohibiting certain transactions with minors by liquor licensees is to protect minors from harmful influences);
Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 272 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that any person who commits any act or omits the
performance of a duty that either encourages or contributes to the delinquency of a person under 18 years of age
is guilty of a misdemeanor); People v. Deibert, 117 Cal. App. 2d 410, 417, 256 P.2d 355, 359 (1953) (stating
that the Alcoholic Beverages Control Act does not affect the applicability of other provisions which punish
conduct that tends to contribute to the delinquency of minors, and such acts constitute an independent offense
by legislative design); City of Dickinson v. Mueller, 261 N.W.2d 787, 789 (N.D. 1977) (holding that intentional,
knowing, or reckless conduct is not an element of the offense of selling alcoholic beverages to persons under
the age of 21). See generally Bass v. Pratt, 177 Cal. App. 3d 129, 137, 222 Cal. Rptr. 723, 729 (1986) (holding
that a social host is statutorily immunized against civil liability for furnishing alcoholic beverages to an
intoxicated minor); Maria E. Odum, Woman Arrested at Teen Party; Beer Drinking by "Several Hundred"
Alleged, WASH. POST, June 26, 1993, at D3 (stating that a 48-year old woman was arrested and charged with
contributing to the delinquency of minors after police found "several hundred" juveniles drinking beer from cans
and kegs).
2. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25659 (West 1985); see Lacabanne Properties, 261 Cal. App. 2d at 189,
67 Cal. Rptr. at 739 (stating that the burden of proof is on the licensee to establish that documentation of identity
and majority was demanded from and shown by the purchaser); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25660
(Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that a document issued by a federal, state, county, or municipal government, or
subdivision or agency thereof which contains the following is bona fide evidence of identity and majority: (1)
Name; (2) date of birth: (3) description; and (4) picture of the person); Pastime Cafe v. Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control, 159 Cal. App. 2d 114, 116, 323 P.2d 551, 552 (1958) (holding that a birth certificate is not
bona fide documentation of identification and majority under California Business and Professions Code §
25660); Dethlefsen v. State Bd. of Equalization, 145 Cal. App. 2d 561, 567, 303 P.2d 7, 11-12 (1956) (stating
that the purpose of California Business and Professions Code § 25660 is to provide a readily applicable standard
upon which a vendor could rely as a defense if in fact a purchaser was under 21); People v. Garrigan, 137 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 854, 858, 289 P.2d 892, 895 (1955) (holding that California Business and Professions Code §
25660 required the demand and showing of evidence of identity and majority before each sale, even if the seller
had previously examined documentary evidence of identity and age).
3. See CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 25659.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 270) (defining keg as any brewery-
sealed container with a liquid capacity of six gallons or greater); cf. IDAHO CODE § 23-1018(5) (Supp. 1993)
(defining keg as any brewery-sealed container having a liquid capacity of seven and three-fourths gallons or
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the licensed premises to attach an identification tag
4 to the keg of beer
and requires the purchaser to sign a receipt5 to enable the keg to be traced
back to the vendor and purchaser if the contents are ultimately used in
violation of the law.6 Additionally, Chapter 270 prohibits a retailer from
more); 1993 Neb. Laws ch. 332, (requiring labelling on beer containers with a capacity of five or more gallons);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7B-12(C) (Michie Supp. 1992) (definin' keg as a package of beer which contains more
than six gallons when it is sold); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-02-07.2 (1987) (requiring a distinctive 
marking of
containers with liquid capacity greater than six gallons); 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 21, (requiring identification 
on
malt liquor containers of four gallons or more).
4. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25659.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 270) (specifying that the numbered
identification label which identifies the seller shall be prescribed and supplied by the department); 
id. §
25659.5(e) (enacted by Chapter 270) (specifying that the identification label shall be constructed 
so as to make
the label easily removable for cleaning and reusing by a beer manufacturer).
5. See id. § 25659.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 270) (specifying that the receipt prescribed and 
supplied
by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control shall include: The name and address of the purchaser, 
and
the purchaser's driver's license number or similar identification number); see also id. § 25659,5(d) 
(enacted by
Chapter 270) (specifying that it is a misdemeanor to knowingly provide false information on a receipt); 
cf.
IDAHO CODE § 23-1018(4) (Supp. 1993) (providing that it is a misdemeanor to knowingly provide 
false
information on a receipt).
6. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25659.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 270); see SENATE COMMITTEE 
ON
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 8, at 2 (June 15, 1993) (stating that this measure
was introduced to assist law enforcement agencies in identifying individuals who purchase and supply keg 
beer
for consumption by minors at "keg-parties"); Dana Wilkie, New Keg Law to Tag Adults Who Buy Beer 
for
Minors, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 3, 1993, at B3 (quoting Assemblyman Connolly as stating 
that
although Chapter 270 will not completely solve the teen drinking problem, it will provide the police 
with an
important enforcement tool and remind adults that it is illegal to purchase alcohol for minors); see, e.g., 
Kristan
Metzler, Parents of Dead Girl Sue; Action Targets Seller of Beer, WASH. TIroI, Aug. 26, 1993, at 
B3
(discussing how a teenage girl was killed in a car crash after attending a keg party); Records of Sunday, May
23, 1993, LE sroN MORNING TRIBUNE, May 24, 1993, at A6 (reporting the arrest of a 38-year old woman after
the police found approximately 20 high school students drinking in her backyard from a keg of beer); cf IDAHO
CODE § 23-1018 (Supp. 1993) (setting forth provisions concerning keg beer, including: (I) Requiring numbered
keg labelling which is removable or obliterated when the keg is refilled; (2) requiring the registration of the
purchaser; and (3) providing for suspension of a seller's license for failure to comply with the labelling and
registration requirements); 1993 Neb. Laws ch. 332 (requiring: (1) Numbered keg identification by retail alcohol
licensees; (2) registration of the purchaser; (3) criminal penalties for violations; and (4) a yearly report 
by the
commission to the legislature on the effectiveness of keg registration on deterring alcohol consumption 
by
minors); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7B-12 (Michie 1992) (providing that a retailer shall assign each keg a control
number to be recorded along with specified information pertaining to the purchaser, and requiring the retailer
to retain the registration forms until the keg is returned or for six months, whichever is less); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 5-02-07.2 (1987) (requiring retail beverage licensees: (1) To place a unique label, approved and registered with
the attorney general, on kegs of beer; (2) to register specified information pertaining to the purchaser; and 
(3)
to store the records on the licensed premises for a period of no less than six months); 1993 Wash. Laws ch. 
21
(requiring: (1) Identification labels to be placed on kegs of beer; (2) the purchaser to sign a declaration and
registration form under penalty of perjury at the time of purchase; and (3) the purchaser to maintain of copy of
the registration form visible from the keg and in no event at a distance greater than five feet). See generally
DeNeen L. Brown, Teen Drinkers Cited as a Serious Problem; Study Blames La' Laws, Poor Enforcement; Area
Violations Most Prevalent in N.Va., WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1993, at DI (detailing the startling results of a survey
regarding alcohol consumption by minors which showed that the average age at which youths begin to drink
is 14, that 72% of youths reported having been drunk at a party, and that 8 million of the 20 million Americans
in grades 7 through 12 drink weekly); Howard Manly, State Tag-a-Keg Rule Unveiled in Move on Underage
Drinking, BOSTON GLOBE, July 3, 1993, at Metro/Region 25 (reporting that the State Consumer Affairs Office
announced a statewide rule requiring a metal tag to be attached to all kegs and liquor stores to register beer kegs
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refunding any deposit for a returned keg that is missing the identification
label and makes it a misdemeanor to knowingly possess a keg which
contains beer and is not properly identified.7
CJK
Crimes; animal control officers and humane society officers as
mandated child abuse reporters
Penal Code § 11165.16 (new); §§ 11166, 11166.5, 11172
(amended).
SB 665 (Russell); 1993 STAT. Ch. 510
Existing law requires any child' care custodian,2 health care
practitioner,3 employee of a child protective agency,4 child visitation
monitor,5 or film print processor, who reasonably suspects 6 child abuse7
sold); id. (stating that one town which adopted its own tag-a-keg policy has only collected approximately one
or two kegs in two years from minors, compared to one or two per week prior to adoption of the policy); id.
(stating that a recent survey indicated that over 20% of the deaths among 16 to 20 year-olds were a result of
alcohol related automobile accidents); Dr. Antonia Novello, Address by Dr. Antonia Novello, U.S. Surgeon
General, FEDERAL NEws SERVICE, April 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (addressing
underage drinking and including an explanation of her overall grade of C+ with respect to the efforts of various
groups to reduce illegal underage drinking); Rene Sanchez, D.C. Targets Underage Drinkers; Council Passes
Bill to Discourage Sales, Punish Violators, WAsH. POST, May 5, 1993, at Al (describing how a selected group
of minors were successful in 97 out of 100 attempts to purchase alcohol in the District of Columbia, a city with
some of the nation's weakest underage drinking laws).
7. CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE § 25659.5(a),(c) (enacted by Chapter 270); cf. IDAHO CODE § 23-1018(3)
(Supp. 1993) (providing that knowing possession of an unidentified keg is a misdemeanor).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165 (West 1993) (defining child as anyone under the age of 18).
2. See id. § 11165.7 (West Supp. 1993) (defining child care custodian).
3. See id. § 11165.8 (West 1992) (defining health practitioner).
4. See id. § 11165.9 (West 1992) (defining child protective agency).
5. See id. § 11165.15 (West Supp. 1993) (defining child visitation monitor).
6. See id. § 11166(a) (amended by Chapter 510) (defining reasonable suspicion to mean that it is
objectively reasonable for a person to entertain a suspicion, based upon facts, that could cause a reasonable
person in a like professional position to suspect child abuse).
7. See id. § 11165.6 (West 1992) (defining child abuse as nonaccidental physical injury, sexual abuse,




to report the abuse to a child protective agency.' Existing law provides
that persons must sign a statement when entering into such employment
that they will comply with the child abuse reporting requirement.9 Existing
law further provides that these individuals will not be criminally or civilly
liable for complying with the reporting requirement.'0
Chapter 510 adds animal control officers," humane society
officers, 12 and firefighters to the list of persons required to comply with
8. Id. § 11166 (amended by chapter 510); see id. § 11 164(a)-(b) (West 1992) (stating that California Penal
Code §§ 11164-11176.5 may be cited as the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act and the purpose of the
article is to protect children from abuse); id. § 11 166(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 510) (listing the professionals
who must submit a written report of any known or suspected child abuse to a child protective agency within 36
hours); id. § 11172(e) (West 1992) (stating that noncompliance with the reporting requirements will result in
a misdemeanor punishable by confinement in a county jail for a maximum of six months and/or a maximum
fine of one thousand dollars); see also id. § 17(a) (West 1988) (defining misdemeanor); DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep't of Social Serv. 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989) (holding that a state's failure to protect an individual
against private violence did not create a duty and, thus, did not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution); Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 415, 551 P.2d. 389, 397-98, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69,
77-73 (1976) (holding that a physician, as a mandated reporter of child abuse, could only be held liable for not
reporting child abuse if he actually observed the injuries and believed they had been intentionally inflicted upon
the child); Troy D. v. Kelly D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889,902, 263 Cal. Rptr. 869, 876 (1989) (holding that a social
worker had a reasonable suspicion of child abuse when she suspected that a new mother had used illegal drugs
during the prenatal state of her pregnancy which caused her newborn child to be born under the influence of a
dangerous drug); People v. Battaglia, 156 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 1065,203 Cal. Rptr. 370.375 (1984) (holding that
a suspect of child abuse did not have his Fifth Amendment rights violated when he was reported to child abuse
authorities without having the Miranda warnings read to him first); People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811,
817-18, 202 Cal. Rptr. 907, 911 (1984) (holding that a suspect of child abuse did not have his Constitutional
right to privacy or against self-incrimination violated when a mandated child abuse reporter, the suspect's
physician, reported suspected child abuse); cf IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.69(l)-(3) (Supp. 1993) (mandating
specified individuals to report child abuse within 24 hours); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.556(3) (Supp. 1993)
(designating certain professionals as child abuse reporters and requiring the information to be immediately
reported to the appropriate officials). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5107 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (establishing
the National Center for Child Abuse and Neglect); 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts §
283(aa) (9th ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the history and requirements of California's Child Abuse
Reporting Act); Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CAL. L. REV. 521, 522-28
(1987) (describing the difficult balance between state intervention of family privacy rights and prosecution of
child abuse cases).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11166.5(a) (amended by Chapter 510); see id. (listing professionals who must
sign an agreement to comply with child abuse reporting).
10. Id. § II 172(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 510); see Storch v. Silverman, 186 Cal. App. 3d 671, 681,
231 Cal. Rptr. 27,33 (1986) (holding that medical practitioners are granted absolute immunity from civil liability
for reporting suspected child abuse to a protective agency).
i1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 165.16(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 510) (defining animal control
officer).
12. See id. I 165.16(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 510) (defining humane society officers).
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the child abuse reporting measure and affords them immunity from liability




Penal Code § 245 (amended).
AB 1344 (Epple); 1993 STAT. Ch. 369
Existing law provides that any person1 who commits an assault2 upon
another person with a deadly weapon or an instrument3 other than a
firearm,4 or by any means which is likely to result in great bodily harm,5
may be punished by two to four years imprisonment in the state prison or
one year in the county jail, or by fine not exceeding $10,000, or both.6
13. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11166, 11166.5, 1l172(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 510); see id. 11165.16(b)
(amended by Chapter 510) (stating that no firefighter, animal control officer, or humane society officer shall be
subject to the reporting requirements of this article unless they have received training in identification and
reporting of child abuse equivalent to that received by teachers and child care custodians); SENATE COMMITTEE
ON JUDICIARY, ComMITEE ANALYSIS OF SB 665, at 5 (Apr. 20, 1993) (providing that the amendments to
sections 11166, 11166.5, and 11172 are in response to the fact that many child abuse victims are not exposed
to child care custodians because they are not of school age; and, thus, animal control officers, humane officers
and firefighters are public employees who have access to a child's home within the scope of their employment
and can witness child abuse as it occurs). See generally Infants and Drug Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1989,
Metro at 6 (reporting on how children are victims of child abuse through the umbilical cord when their mothers
use drugs during the prenatal stage).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 240 (West 1988) (defining assault as an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability,
to commit a violent injury on the person of another).
3. See People v. Autry, 232 Cal. App. 3d 365, 368, 283 Cal. Rptr. 417, 418 (1991) (holding that
hypodermic needles in possession of a suspected drug user presented a possible threat and, as such, were deadly
weapons); People v. Nealis, 232 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 5, 283 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1991) (defining deadly
weapon or instrument as one that could and is likely to produce death or great bodily injury).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (defining firearm as any device used as a
weapon which expels a projectile by the force of any explosion or other form of combustion through a barrel);
cf 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1993) (including within the definition of a firearm, the frame or receiver of any
explosive weapon, and firearm muffler or firearm silencer, or any destructive device, but not including antique
firearms); id. § 921(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1993) (defining destructive device).
5. See People v. Armstrong, 8 Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1066, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 841 (1992) (stating that
great bodily injury as meant by the statute is bodily injury which is significant or substantial, not injury which
is insignificant, trivial, or moderate).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1)-(b) (amended by Chapter 369); see People v. Moore, 178 Cal. App.
3d 898, 904, 224 Cal. Rptr. 204, 207 (1986) (recognizing that prior to the enactment of 1982 CAL. STAT. Ch.




Under existing law, an assault with a semiautomatic rifle7 is a felony,8
punishable by three, six, or nine years in state prison, a fine not exceeding
$10,000, or both.9 Existing law also provides that any person who
commits an assault on a peace officer 0 or firefighter" with a
semiautomatic rifle is guilty of a felony, punishable by five, seven, or nine
years in state prison."2
Chapter 369 mandates that the punishment for an assault on another
person with a semiautomatic firearm will be imprisonment in state prison
for three, six, or nine years.'3 Chapter 369 mandates that punishment for
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276 (West Supp. 1993) (identifying and listing tradenames of prohibited
semiautomatic firearms and assault weapons, and including semiautomatic rifles within this list),
8. See id. § 17 (West 1988) (defining felony).
9. Id. § 245(b) (amended by Chapter 369). See generally John Woolfolk, Machine Guns Proliferating
in California, S.F. CHRON., May 10, 1993, at Al (describing the growing numbers of automatic and
semiautomatic weapons in California).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830-832.6 (West Supp. 1993) (defining peace officer).
11. See id. § 245.1 (West 1988) (defining firefighter).
12. Id. § 245(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 369); see In re Cline, 255 Cal. App. 2d 115, 123, 63 Cal. Rptr.
233, 239 (1967) (holding that an offense of assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer requires that the
defendant have reasonable awareness that his victim is a police officer engaged in the performance of his duties);
People v. Baca, 247 Cal. App. 2d 487, 496, 55 Cal. Rptr. 681, 687 (1966) (stating that an offense under this
section, which provides for punishment of every person who commits an assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument, or by any means likely to produce great bodily injury upon a peace officer, is created for public
benefit).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(b) (amended by Chapter 369); see ASSEMBLY COI.iIr-EE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMmrrrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1344, at 2 (Apr. 13, 1993) (stating that the purpose of the bill is to
impose greater penalties on those who commit assaults with semiautomatic weapons because currently crimes
with .22 caliber rifles, primarily used by hunters, have stricter penalties); Mark Arax, Gunmen Kill 7 in Fresno
Bar; Crime: Shooting is the Deadliest in City's History, L.A. ThiEs, May 17, 1993, at A3 (describing how two
men, toting semiautomatic weapons, opened fire on a crowded nightclub, killing seven people); Lori Olszewski,
Downtown Rampage Renews Debate on Gun Control, S.F. CHRON., July 3, 1993, at A13 (reporting that the
gunman responsible for the June 30, 1993, shooting on a San Francisco law firm which killed nine people,
purchased the semi-automatic guns in Las Vegas, thereby circumventing the California ban on specified weapons
and the 15-day waiting period imposed on other weapons); Jenifer Warren & Patt Morrison, At Least 9 Die in
California Shooting; They're Only Used to Kill People; Ban All Seniaiitoniatic Guns in the State. Period, L.A.
TIMEs, July 12, 1993, (Editorial) at B6 (commenting on the loophole that gun manufacturers used to bypass the
assault weapons ban provided by the Assault Weapons Act of 1989); 3rd State Bans Sale of Assault Weaponv,
L.A. TMIES, June 10, 1993, at A12 (stating that Connecticut has joined California and New Jersey by banning
the sale of semiautomatic weapons); Gunnnan Opens Fire ii San Francisco Law Office, Then Kills Himsely July
2, 1993, at Al (describing the massacre on a San Francisco law firm by a man wielding semiautomatic
weapons). See generallv Keith R. Fafarman, State Assault Rifle Bans and the Militia Clauses of the United States
Constitution, 67 IND. L.J. 187 (1991) (detailing the development of legislation on assault weapons).
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an assault on a police officer or firefighter with a semiautomatic firearm
will be imprisonment in state prison for five, seven, or nine years.,4
JCB
Crimes; carjacking and drive-by shooting-first degree murder
Government Code § 6254 (amended); Penal Code §§ 209.5, 215
(new); §§ 27, 186.22, 189, 520, 653f, 653j, 666, 667.5, 667.7,
667.9, 786, 868.5, 999e, 1170.1, 1192.7, 1202.5, 1203, 1203.055,
1203.06, 1203.075, 1203.08, 1203.09, 1601, 3057, 11105.3, 12022,
12022.5, 13853 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 676,
707, 4514, 5328.4, 6500, 8103 (amended).
SB 60 (Presley); 1993 STAT. Ch. 611
Penal Code § 190 (amended).
SB 310 (Ayala); 1993 STAT. Ch. 609
Under existing law, the felonious taking' of a motor vehicle2 in the
possession3 of another by force4 or fear,5 is robbery.6 Chapter 611
provides that the felonious taking of a vehicle7 of another with the intent8
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 369).
1. See People v. Salcido, 186 Cal. App. 2d 684, 687, 9 Cal. Rptr. 57, 59 (1960) (stating that although
some movement is required for a taking, the distance of a taking may be very small).
2. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 415 (West Supp. 1993) (defining motor vehicle); Di Guilio v. Rice, 27 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 775, 778, 70 P.2d 717, 719 (1937) (distinguishing between a motor vehicle and a vehicle by
stating that a motor vehicle is self-propelled while a vehicle is propelled by some other force); see also Williams
v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 158 Cal. App. 2d 506, 510, 322 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1958) (defining automobile
as any form of self-propelled vehicle for use on the streets and highways).
3. See People v. Miller, 18 Cal. 3d 873, 880, 558 P.2d 552, 557, 135 Cal. Rptr 654, 659 (1977)
(recognizing that a store employee, janitor, night watchman, and a visitor of a store can be victims of a robbery
in a store because they have constructive possession of the goods involved in the robbery).
4. See People v. Roberts, 57 Cal. App. 3d 782, 787, 129 Cal. Rptr. 529, 531 (1976) (stating that the
determination of whether there is force or fear in a robbery is a factual question to be answered by the jury).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 212 (West 1988) (defining fear).
6. Id. § 211 (West 1988); see also id. § 487 (West Supp. 1993) (defining grand theft to include the
taking of an automobile); CAL. VEH. CODE § 10851 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that it is unlawful to take the
vehicle of another without consent); State v. Hayes, 518 S.W.2d 40, 46 (Mo. 1975) (declining to recognize the
taking of the keys of an automobile as a symbolic taking of the automobile itself).
7. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 670 (West 1987) (defining vehicle).
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to deprive that person9 of possession of the vehicle, by fear or force, is
carjacking.' °
Under existing law, murder of the first degree" includes a murder
committed in the perpetration 2 of, or the attempt 3 to commit, specified
felonies. 4 Chapter 611 adds both carjacking and the discharging of a
8. See People v. Butler, 65 Cal. 2d 569, 573,421 P.2d 703, 706, 55 Cal. Rptr. 511, 514 (1967) (stating
that the intent to steal can be inferred from the taking of another's property, unless the taker has a bona fide
belief, mistaken or not, that he or she has a claim to the property).
9. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11022 (West 1991) (defining person).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 215 (enacted by Chapter 611); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1993) (imposing
punishment for the taking of a vehicle, which has been shipped interstate, from the person of another by force
while in possession of a firearm); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 21A (Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-58.1
(Michie Supp. 1993) (establishing the crime of carjacking). See generally Anthony Duignan-Cabrera, 2 Convicted
Under U.S. Carjacking Law, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at B8 (describing the carjacking crime of the first two
men in L.A. County convicted under the federal carjacking statute); Man Shot to Death in Heights After 4
Carjackers Steal his Auto, THE HOUSTON CHRON., July 23, 1993, at 38 (describing a violent carjacking resulting
in the death of the victim); Protect & Defend: Turning the Tables on Carjackers, PR NEWSWIRE, Apr. 1. 1993,
available in LEXIS, Tran. Library, Auto File (explaining an anti-carijacking device which sounds an alarm and
disables the vehicle within minutes after the carjacker has taken the car); Safe-T-Man Auto Passenger Helps
Discourage Potential Carjackings, PR NEWSWIRE, June 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Tran Library, Auto File
(introducing a portable male dummy to place in the passenger seat of a vehicle to discourage carjackers by
making it appear that the driver is not alone).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE §. 189 (amended by Chapter 61 1) (defining first and second degree murder);
id. § 187 (West 1988) (defining murder as the unlawful killing of a human being, or a viable fetus with malice
aforethought).
12. See People v. Harrison, 176 Cal. App. 2d 330, 332, 1 Cal. Rptr. 414, 416, (1960) (holding that
perpetrate means to do or perform, to carry through or commit an offense).
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 21a (West 1988) (stating that the term "attempt" consists of two elements:
A specific intent to commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission); People v.
Jentry, 69 Cal. App. 3d 615,629, 138 Cal. Rptr. 250,258 (1977) (holding that a defendant who killed the victim
before the act of mayhem could be committed may still be tried under the felony-murder doctrine pursuant to
the crime of attempted mayhem); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 979 (6th ed. 1990) (defining mayhem).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (amended by Chapter 611); see id. (enumerating the specified felonies);
Usher v. Gomez, 775 F. Supp. 1308, 1311 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (holding that malice is not an element of felony-
murder and prosecution need only prove specific intent to commit a particular felony); People v. Johnson, 5 Cal.
App. 4th 552, 559-60. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23, 28 (1992) (holding that the prosecution must only prove defendant
intended to commit the underlying offense for a felony-murder prosecution); cf ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.11 0(a)(3)
(Supp. 1993) (stating that a death caused while participating in arson, kidnapping, sexual assault, burglary,
escape, robbery, or flight from a crime is murder in the second degree); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)
(Michie 1993) (defining capital murder as a crime in which a killing occurs during the commis,,ion of rape,
kidnapping, vehicular piracy, robbery, burglary, a violation of the Uniform Controlled Substance Act, or escape);
id. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (1992) (defining felony-murder as murder in the first degree); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54c
(1990) (stating the felonies that are applicable to felony-murder as robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault,
and escape); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(c) (Michie 1992) (stating that when, in the commission of a felony, one
causes the death of another, it is murder regardless of malice); IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (Supp. 1993) (stating
that murder committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate aggravated battery on a child, arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or mayhem is murder in the first degree); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/9-1
(Michie 1993) (stating that it is first degree murder to cause a death while attempting or committing a forcible
felony); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.316 (1991) (stating that it is murder of the first degree if murder is
committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, criminal sexual conduct, robbery, breaking and
entering of dwelling, larceny, extortion, or kidnapping); MIsS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(e) (1991) (stating that it
is capital murder to commit murder while engaged in rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery,
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firearm 5 from a motor vehicle intentionally 6 at another person 7
outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death, to this list of specified
felonies.
18
Under existing law, a person guilty of murder in the second degree is
punishable by confinement in the state prison for fifteen years to life,
unless the victim is a peace officer.19 Chapter 609 provides that if a
person is guilty of second degree murder for a murder perpetrated by
discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, the person must be confined
in the state prison for twenty years to life.
20
Existing law provides that an additional term of five years must be
imposed on a person convicted of a felony2 or an attempted felony if the
person discharged a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle and caused great
bodily injury22 or death.23 Chapter 611 provides that an additional term
or unnatural intercourse with a child); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303(2) (1989) (stating that it is murder in the first
degree to kill during the attempted or actual perpetration of sexual assault, arson, robbery, kidnapping, hijacking,
or burglary).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining firearm as any device, designed to
be used as a weapon, from which is expelled through a barrel a projectile by the force of any explosion or other
form of combustion); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 921(3) (1983) (defining firearm as: (1) Any weapon, including starter gun,
which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive; (2)
the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (3) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (4) any destructive
device).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12034(c) (West 1992) (stating that a person who willfully and maliciously
discharges a firearm from a motor vehicle at another person, other than an occupant of a motor vehicle, is guilty
of a felony).
17. See id. § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
18. Id. § 189 (amended by Chapter 611). See generally People v. Flores, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1350, 1355,
9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 754, 756 (1992) (including testimony from a gang expert regarding drive-by shootings); Paul
Feldman, Gang Member Sentenced in Drive-by Slaving of Girl, L.A. TtMES, Jan. 25, 1989, Metro, at 3
(discussing a first degree murder conviction resulting in a 27-year to life sentence for a drive-by shooting); John
Makeig, Baytown Gang Leader Gets 20 Years for Two Shootings, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 30, 1993, at 26
(discussing the sentence of 20 years for attempted murder during a drive-by shooting).
19. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 609); see id. § 190(b) (amended by Chapter
609) (stating that if the victim was a peace officer, a person guilty of second degree murder must be confined
in state prison for 25 years to life).
20. Id. § 190(c) (amended by Chapter 609); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 310, at 3 (1993) (stating the purpose of Chapter 609 is to reduce random killings from motor
vehicles). See generally Daryl Kelley, Crime Levels Off After Two Years of Jumps, L.A. TIMES, VENTURA CO.
ED., February 14, 1993, at BI (reporting that during 1992 in Ventura County, gang drive-by shootings tripled
from the previous year); Crackdown on Gangs: New Laws Would Aid Law Enforcement, SAN DIEGO UNION
TRIB., May 2, 1993, at G2 (discussing drive-by shootings as a menacing problem).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (\Vest Supp. 1993) (defining felony).
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West 1992) (defining great bodily injury); id. § 243(0(5) (West
Supp. 1993) (listing injuries severe enough to be classified as serious bodily injuries); People v. Armstrong, 8
Cal. App. 4th 1060, 1066, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839, 841 (1992) (defining great bodily injury as bodily injury which
is significant or substantial); People v. Johnson, 104 Cal. App. 3d 598, 609, 164 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75 (1980)
(finding that a jaw fracture constituted great bodily harm); People v. Kent, 96 Cal. App. 3d 130, 136, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 35, 38 (1979) (holding that where a victim's hand was swollen to twice its normal size after being struck,
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of five years must be imposed on a person convicted of murder if the
person discharged a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another
person with the intent to inflict great bodily injury or death.2
Existing law provides that the sentence enhancement for the use25 of
a firearm26 in the commission of a felony is three, four, or five years.
27
Chapter 611 provides that the use of a firearm in the commission of a
carjacking is subject to a sentence enhancement of four, five, or six
years.28
Under existing law, robbery of the first degree 29 is punishable by
three, four, or six years imprisonment.3° Chapter 611 provides that
carjacking is punishable by imprisonment for three, five, or nine years.
31
Existing law provides that the sentence enhancement
32 for the use 33
of a deadly weapon 4 in the commission of a felony is one year.
35
Chapter 611 provides that the sentence enhancement for the use of a
deadly weapon in the commission of a carjacking is one, two, or three
years.36
Under existing law, a person sixteen years of age or older is presumed
to be unfit to be dealt with under juvenile court law for specified
the victim had suffered great bodily harm).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 611).
24. Id. § 12022.5(d) (amended by Chapter 611).
25. See People v. Walls, 85 Cal. App. 3d 447, 454, 149 Cal. Rptr. 460, 465 (1978) (stating that the use
of a firearm for purposes of sentence enhancement statutes includes striking someone with the weapon).
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining firearm); People v. Steele, 235 Cal.
App. 3d 788, 791, 286 Cal. Rptr. 887, 889 (1991) (holding that for purposes of California Penal Code § 12022
a firearm includes one that is unloaded or even inoperable); People v. Talkington, 140 Cal. App. 3d 557, 562,
189 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737 (1983) (finding that a tube sealed at one end with thirty match heads in it and a hole
cut in the sealed end to ignite the match heads was a firearm).
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.5(a) (amended by Chapter 611).
28. Id.
29. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 212.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining robbery of the first degree).
30. Id. § 213 (amended by Chapter 611); see id. § 1168 (West 1985) (regulating criminal sentences
requiring imprisonment in a state prison).
31. Id. § 215(b) (enacted by Chapter 611); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1993) (imposing a prison sentence of
15 years, 25 years, or life for carjacking).
32. See CAL. R. CT. 405(c) (defining enhancement).
33. See People v. Funtanilla, I Cal. App. 4th 326, 331, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875, 877 (1991) (stating that use
of a weapon only requires that displaying the weapon produces a fear of harm in the commission of a felony,
but does not require that actual harm come to the victim); People v. James, 88 Cal. App. 3d 150, 160, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 354, 360 (1978) (finding no error in a trial court's jury instruction which defined one's use of a deadly
weapon as displaying the weapon in a menacing manner).
34. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100(e) (West Supp. 1993) (defining deadly weapon); Janes, at
160, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 360 (upholding a trial court's jury instruction defining a deadly weapon as an object that
is capable of being used to inflict great bodily harm).
35. Id. § 12022(b) (amended by Chapter 611).
36. Id.
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crimes.37 Chapter 611 adds carjacking while armed38 with a dangerous
and deadly weapon to the list of specified crimes.3 9
Under existing law, plea bargaining4 for serious felonies4' is
prohibited, except under certain conditions.42 Chapter 611 adds carjacking
to the list of serious felonies.43
Under existing law, probation4 will not be granted to persons
convicted45 of certain felonies while armed with a deadly weapon unless
it would be in the best interest of justice.46 Chapter 611 adds carjacking
to the list of felonies.47
Under existing law, probation will not be granted under any
circumstance if: (1) The offender used a firearm during the commission of
certain crimes; (2) there was an intentional infliction of great bodily injury
during the commission of certain crimes; (3) there have been two
convictions of a violent felony offense within ten years; or (4) if great
bodily harm was committed upon elderly or disabled persons during the
37. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(c) (amended by Chapter 611); see id. (including murder, arson of
an inhabited building, and armed robbery within the list of crimes); Sheila 0. v. Superior Court, 125 Cal. App.
3d 812, 817, 178 Cal. Rptr. 418, 421 (1981) (upholding the constitutionality of California Welfare and
Institutions Code § 707).
38. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11370.1(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining armed as having a
weapon immediately available for offensive or defensive use); People v. Miley, 158 Cal. App. 3d 25, 32, 204
Cal. Rptr. 347, 351-52 (1984) (holding that a defendant was not armed during the solicitation of a crime where
the defendant was only transferring the firearm to the person he was soliciting, and did not have the firearm
available for immediate use).
39. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(b)(25) (amended by Chapter 611).
40. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(b) (amended by Chapter 611) (defining plea bargaining).
41. See id. § 1192.7(c) (amended by Chapter 611) (listing serious felonies including murder, voluntary
manslaughter, and rape).
42. Id. § 1192.7(a) (amended by Chapter 611); see id. (stating that plea bargaining is allowable where
the state has insufficient evidence, a material witness' testimony can not be obtained, or where there would not
be a substantial change in the sentence); People v. Arauz, 5 Cal. App. 4th 663, 668, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 145, 148
(1992) (stating that the court will determine if there will be a substantial reduction in sentence in plea bargaining,
for purposes of California Penal Code § 1192.7); People v. Brown, 177 Cal. App. 3d 537, 547 n.1 1, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 66,72 n.1 1 (1986) (finding that California Penal Code § 1192.7 did not limit plea bargaining in municipal
or justice courts concerning charges contained in complaints).
43. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (amended by Chapter 611).
44. See id. § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining probation).
45. See People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 514, 71 P.2d 214, 217 (1937) (stating that a conviction for the
purposes of a second offense statute includes any prior conviction where the offender received a pardon); cf.
United States v. Jones, 910 F.2d 760,761 (1 th Cir. 1990) (holding that a nolo contendere plea with adjudication
withheld could be used as a conviction in classifying a defendant as a career offender); State v. Rose, 325
S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo. 1959) (holding that conviction means a final determination of a person's guilt, and
finding that a person's plea of guilty constituted a conviction). But see State v. Weinberger, 205 N.E.2d 306,
306 (N.Y. 1965) (affirming a lower court holding that a plea of guilty standing alone did not constitute a
conviction).
46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 611); see id. (including arson, robbery,




commission of certain crimes.48 Chapter 611 adds carjacking to the list
of specified crimes in these statutes.49
Chapter 611 provides that other statutes relating to robbery will be
expanded to include carjacking. 0
AMP/TLS
Crimes; counterfeiting of registered marks
Penal Code §§ 350, 12022.6 (amended).
SB 862 (Hughes); 1993 STAT. Ch. 703
Existing law makes it a crime for a person' to willfully 2 manufacture
or sell a counterfeit mark3 registered4 with the Secretary of State without
48. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.06, 1203.075, 1203.08, 1203.09 (amended by Chapter 61 1); see id. §§
1203.06, 1203.075, 1203.09 (amended by Chapter 611) (including murder, robbery, and kidnapping in their lists
of specified crimes).
49. Id. §§ 1203.06, 1203.075, 1203.08, 1203.09 (amended by Chapter 611).
50. Id. § 27 (amended by Chapter 611); see id. (including carjacking as a crime that is punishable if it
is committed outside of California); id. § 186.22 (amended by Chapter 611) (including carjacking in the Street
Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act); id. § 189 (amended by Chapter 611) (including carjacking in the
felony murder rule); id. § 653f (amended by Chapter 611) (including carjacking in the solicitation statute); id.
§ 666 (amended by Chapter 611) (including a conviction of carjacking as a prior conviction for purposes of
determining punishment for a conviction of petit theft); id. § 667.7 (amended by Chapter 611) (including
carjacking in the habitual offender statute); id. § 667.9 (amended by Chapter 611) (including carjacking as a
crime applicable for a sentence enhancement if it is committed against an elderly or disabled person); id. § 999e
(amended by Chapter 611) (including carjacking in the career criminal statute).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF CODE § 14204
(West Supp. 1993) (defining person for the purposes of the California Trademark Law, California Business and
Professions Code §§ 14200-14342).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willfully).
3. See id. § 350(f)(2) (amended by Chapter 703) (defining counterfeit mark as a spurious mark which
is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a registered mark, used in connection with the same
type of goods or services for which the genuine mark is registered); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14203
(West 1987) (defining mark to include trademark and service mark); id. § 14206 (West 1987) (defining service
mark to mean a mark used in the sale or advertising of services to distinguish the service of one person from
another); id. § 14207 (Vest 1987) (defining trademark to mean any word, name, symbol, device, or any
combination thereof adopted and used by a person to identify goods made or sold by that person and to
distinguish them from the goods of others); Cytanovich Reading Center v. Reading Game, 162 Cal. App. 3d 107,
112, 208 Cal. Rptr. 412, 461 (1984) (holding that the telephone number "321-READ" could not be used as a
trademark or service mark because the word "read" is too common); Cebu Ass'n of Cal., Inc. v. Santo Nino de
Cebu Ass'n of U.S.A., 95 Cal. App. 3d 129, 137, 157 Cal. Rptr. 102, 106 (1979) (holding that the name of a
patron saint, "Santo Nino de Cebu," could not be used as a trade name or service mark); cf. 18 U.S.C. §
2320(d)(1) (1988) (defining counterfeit mark to mean a mark used in connection with the trafficking in goods
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the consent of the registrant.5 Chapter 703 extends the application of
existing law to offenses involving counterfeiting marks on the principal
register6 of the United States Patent and Trademark Office, and to the
knowing possession7 for sale8 at the point of sale9 of such marks.'"
2320(d)(1) (1988) (defining counterfeit mark to mean a mark used in connection with the trafficking in goods
or services, that is substantially indistinguishable from a mark registered in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office and in use, whether or not the defendant knew that the mark was registered, where it is likely
to cause confusion, mistake, or to deceive); United States v. McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1172 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that watches which bore marks virtually identical to the
registered trademarks of Rolex, Piaget, and Gucci, and which consumers frequently confused with the registered
marks, were counterfeit), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 902 (1987); United States v. Gonzalez, 630 F. Supp. 894, 896
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (stating that because watches were sold at an excessively cheap price did not prevent a finding
that the watches were counterfeit); Dollcraft Co. v. Nancy Ann Storybook Dolls, 94 F. Supp. 1, 4 (N.D. Cal.
1950) (stating that the purpose of a trademark is to distinguish the goods of one person from those of another,
and to identify the origin or ownership of the article to which it is attached); Morse-Starrett Products Co. v.
Steccone, 86 F. Supp. 796, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1949) (stating that a trademark must be physically attached to the
good it is designed to identify).
4. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14270 (West 1987) (providing that the Secretary of State will keep
a record of all registered marks for public examination); id. § 14220 (West 1987) (listing marks which are
excluded from the registration requirement); id. §§ 14230-14280 (West 1987 & West Supp. 1993) (detailing the
procedures for registering a mark).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(a) (amended by Chapter 703); see id. § 350(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 703)
(providing that violators will be fined a maximum of $5,000, imprisoned in the county jail for a maximum of
one year, or both, and, if the violator is a corporation, it will be fined a maximum of $100,000); CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 14205 (West 1987) (defining registrant); see also id. § 14300 (West 1987) (providing that a
person who fraudulently registers a mark is liable for damages); id. § 14320 (West Supp. 1993) (providing the
owner of a registered mark with a right to institute a civil action against an infringer); id. § 14340 (West Supp.
1993) (providing the owner of a registered mark with the right to an injunction of the counterfeit goods); cf. 18
U.S.C. § 2320(a) (1988) (providing that a person who traffics in counterfeit goods or services and knowingly
uses a counterfeit mark will be fined a maximum of $250,000, or imprisoned for five years, or both, and that
if the person is not an individual, that person shall be fined a maximum of $1,000,000); id. § 2320(d)(2) (1988)
(defining traffic as to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of, to another, as consideration for anything of
value, or to obtain control of, with intent to transport, transfer, or dispose of). But see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 14342 (West 1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(g) (amended by Chapter 703) (providing that no action will be
taken against a party who has lawfully adopted and used the same or confusingly similar mark in rendering like
services, or manufacturing or selling like goods from a date prior to the effective date of registration of the
service mark or trademark).
6. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1072 (1988) (providing the procedures for registering a trademark); id. § 1052
(1988) (providing exceptions to the registration requirement).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(f)(3) (amended by Chapter 703) (defining knowingly possess to mean
that the person possessing the article knew that the article was not genuine); see also id. § 7(5) (West 1988)
(defining knowingly as having knowledge of the existence of the facts which bring the person's act or omission
within the provisions of the Penal Code, but not necessarily knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act or
omission); United States v. Ocampo, 937 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining possession as having dominion
or control);
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(f)(4) (amended by Chapter 703) (defining sale to include resale).
9. See id. § 350(f)(1) (amended by Chapter 703) (defining "at the point of sale" to include the entire
building, structure, container, or vehicle in which the sale or attempted sale of an article has occurred).
10. Id. § 350(a) (amended by Chapter 703); see SENATE RULES COMMiTrEE, COMMtTrEE ANALYSiS OF
SB 862, at 3-4 (July 2, 1993) (stating that Chapter 703 closes a loophole under existing law, through which
counterfeiters escaped prosecution merely because they infringed on trademarks which were registered with the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office but were not registered with the Secretary of State, for example, Levi Strauss
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Chapter 703 also imposes harsher penalties for violations involving more
than 1,000 articles."
Under existing law, upon subsequent convictions for the above
offenses, individuals are fined or imprisoned. 2 Chapter 703 increases the
specified prison sentence for subsequent convictions to sixteen months, two
years, or three years.
13
jeans). See generally, Trish Donnally, Fashion's Assault on Counterfeiters, S.F. CHRON., May 20, 1992, at D3
(reporting that since January 1991, Levi Strauss seized almost two million pairs of counterfeit Levi's jeans in
China); Levi Strauss Recognizes U.S. Customs for Second-largest Counterfeit Seizure in History, PR NEWSWIRE,
February 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (stating that between 1990 and 1991, Levi's
501 jeans were the most frequently copied U.S. apparel product, and that over two million pairs of counterfeit
501 jeans had been confiscated over the past two and one-half years).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 703); see id. (providing that if the violator is
an individual, the individual will be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a maximum term of one year,
or in the state prison for 16 months, two or three years, or by a fine up to a maximum of $250,000, or by both,
and, if the violator is a corporation, the corporation will be fined a maximum of $500,000); see also SENATE
RULES COMMrrFEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF7 SB 862, at 2-3 (July 2, 1993) (stating that prior law had no
deterrent value because it would have allowed an individual who sold one counterfeit handbag for $45 to be
charged with the same criminal offense as a person who manufactured 20,000 counterfeit shirts valued at
$200,000); id. at 4 (stating that the State is losing millions of dollars in tax revenue because the sales of
counterfeit goods often involve cash transactions, and that the existence of a strong anti-counterfeiting statute
would make California more attractive for businesses); Interview with Michael C. Ross, Consumer Advocate,
Creative Card Congress, in Sacramento, Ca. (Aug. 4, 1993) (stating that the then existing law only provided for
civil penalties, which were ineffective because the counterfeit products could still be sold while the counterfeiter
was fighting the civil suit, and calling for criminal penalties to correct the situation) (notes on file with the
Pacific Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Michael C. Ross, Consumer Advocate, Creative Card Congress
(July 27, 1993) (stating that companies, especially sports teams, lose substantial amounts of money due to the
work of counterfeiters, that low revenues from sports products will eventually drive sports teams away from
California, and that counterfeit sports collectibles will be worthless in 10 or 20 years, thus hurting many people
who invest in collectibles) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal). See generally Counterfeit Software:
Series of Police Raids Uncover Vast Amounts of Counterfeit Microsoft Products, EDGE WOPK-GRouP
COMPUTING REP., Mar. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curmt File (stating that counterfeit
Microsoft Products have been produced under the tradenames of OEM's, Spring Circle, and BTI, that counterfeit
software often contains viruses and are defective, and that consumers should call the Microsoft Piracy Hotline
at (800) NOCOPYN for information relating to counterfeit Microsoft products); Donnally, supra note 10, at D3
(reporting that the International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition estimates that counterfeit goods cost the United
States $61 billion and more than 210,000 jobs every year); Jim Doyle & Don Clark, Firms Pirated Software,
U.S. Says Executives Also hIdicted as Authorities Crack Down, S.F. CHRON., July 8, 1993, at A13 (reporting
that the Business Software Alliance estimates that U.S. Companies lost $12 billion in 1992 due to counterfeiters);
LA. Gear Joins Coalition to Support Sporting Goods Industry Anti-Counterfeiting Effort, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug.
27, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (reporting that counterfeit products look identical to
genuine products, but are poorly made, and would ruin the reputation and market for legitimate brands, and
reporting how the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association (SGMA), comprised of such companies as Reebok,
Prince, Wilson, and Spalding have found that industry-wide efforts are effective in stomping out international
counterfeiting rings); see id. (stating that the SGMA can be contacted for more information at (202) 775-1762).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(b) (amended by Chapter 703); see id. (providing that individuals will be
fined not more than $50,000 or be imprisoned for not more than one year, or be punished by both a fine and
imprisonment); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (1988) (providing that, upon subsequent convictions, if the person is an
individual, the person will be fined a maximum of $1,000,000, imprisoned for a maximum term of 15 years, or
both, and if the person is a corporation, the corporation will be fined a maximum of $5,000,000).
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(b) (amended by Chapter 703).
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Under Chapter 703, it is a public offense 4 to knowingly possess a
counterfeit article for sale at a place other than the point of sale. 5
Chapter 703 imposes different levels of punishment, depending on whether
the person possessed less than 100 counterfeit articles, 6 between 100 and
1,000 articles, 7  or 1,000 articles or more." Chapter 703 provides,
however, that a person who leases or sells real property where counterfeit
marks are sold, manufactured, or possessed for sale will not be subject to
criminal penalty unless the person personally sells, manufactures, or
possesses for sale the articles bearing the marks.' 9
Under prior law, once a court determined that a mark was counterfeit,
it could have ordered the mark destroyed and the articles once bearing the
mark transferred to the state, to a charity, or to the owner of the
14. See id. § 15 (West 1988) (defining public offense); Burks v. United States, 287 F.2d 117, 122 (9th
Cir. 1961) (stating that public offense is synonymous with "crime," and a crime includes both felonies and
misdemeanors), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 841 (1962); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(defining felony); id. § 17(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(d) (amended by Chapter 703); see SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, COMMITrEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 862, at 3 (July 2, 1993) (stating that since prior law only addressed the sale or manufacture
of counterfeit goods, it made law enforcement very difficult because the criminal had to be caught in the act of
manufacturing or selling, and that by prohibiting possession for the sale or resale of counterfeit goods, large
distributors of counterfeit products would be able to be prosecuted). But see id. at 4 (stating that the ACLU
opposes this portion of Chapter 703 because it imposes severe penalties for the mere possession for sale of a
counterfeit good, for example, a t-shirt).
16. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 350(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 703) (providing that a person who possesses
fewer than 100 counterfeit articles will be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a maximum term of
six months, by a maximum fine of $5,000, or by both, and if the person has been previously convicted of this
offense, the person will be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term of one year, or in
the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years, by a maximum fine of $25,000, or by both).
17. See id. § 350(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 703) (providing that a person who possesses between 100
and 1,000 articles will be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a maximum term of one year, by a
maximum fine of $10,000, or by both, and if the person has been previously convicted of this offense, the person
will be punished by imprisonment in the county jail for a maximum term of one year, or in the state prison for
16 months, or two or three years, by a maximum fine of $25,000, or by both).
18. Id. § 350(d) (amended by Chapter 703); see id. § 350(d)(3) (amended by Chapter 703) (providing
that a person who possesses over 1,000 articles will be punished by imprisonment in a county jail for a
maximum term of one year, or in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years, by a maximum fine of
$100,000, or by both).
19. Id. § 350(h) (amended by Chapter 703); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF SB 862, at 4 (July 13, 1993) (stating that it would be unfair to require property owners, such as
the owners and operators of swap meets, to check the authenticity of every item being sold on their premises).
But see Interview with Michael C. Ross, Consumer Advocate, Creative Card Congress, in Sacramento, Ca. (Aug.
4, 1993) (stating that many swap meet merchants run "fly-by-night" operations and cannot be caught after they
depart, and that technology is making it easier for counterfeiters to manufacture unauthorized products) (notes
on file with the Pacific Law Journal). See generally Glendale Police Seize Bootleg Compact Discs, UPI, Oct.
16, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (stating that many counterfeit compact discs are sold
in swap meets and music stores); John Woolfolk, 8 Arrested on Counterfeit Apparel Charges, S.F. CHRON., May
4, 1993, at A12 (reporting that police seized over 4,000 articles of counterfeit sports apparel from seven booths
at flea markets in San Jose).
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trademark." Chapter 703 instead provides that, in an action involving
violations of Chapter 703 resulting in a conviction or a plea of nolo
contendere, the court must order the forfeiture and destruction of all the
marks, the goods bearing the marks, the means of making the marks, and
all electric, mechanical, or other devices for manufacturing, reproducing,
transporting, or assembling these marks.2 Chapter 703 exempts from this
forfeiture certain specified vehicles.23
Existing law provides that a person who takes, damages, or destroys
any property in the commission of a felony, with the intent to cause the
taking, damage, or destruction, will be punished by an additional term of
imprisonment consecutive to the punishment for the felony or attempted
felony, depending on the amount of the loss. 24  Chapter 703 makes
existing law applicable to prosecutions for the manufacture or sale of
counterfeit marks,25  the misappropriation of recorded music, 26  the
20. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 828, sec. 23.3, at 2585 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 350).
21. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1016(3) (West 1985) (providing that the legal effect of a plea of nolo
contendere to a felony is the same as a plea of guilty).
22. Id. § 350(e) (amended by Chapter 703).
23. Id.; see id. § 350(e)(l)-(3) (amended by Chapter 703) (prohibiting the forfeiture of class 3 or class
4 vehicles that are any of the following: (1) Community property of a person other than the defendant; (2) the
sole vehicle available to the immediate family of the defendant; or (3) reasonably necessary for the defendant
to earn a living or to use for any other reasonable and lawful purpose); see also CAL. VEIl. CODE § 12804(b)(3)
(West Supp. 1993) (defining Class 3 vehicles): id. § 12804(b)(4) (West Supp. 1993) (defining Class 4 vehicles).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.6 (amended by Chapter 703); see id. § 12022.6(a) (amended by Chapter
703) (providing that if the loss exceeds $50,000, the person will be punished by an additional year of
imprisonment); id. § 12022.6(b) (amended by Chapter 703) (providing that if the loss exceeds $150,000, the
person will be punished by two additional years of imprisonment); id. § 12022.6(c) (amended by Chapter 703)
(providing that if the loss exceeds $I,000,000, the person will be punished by three additional years of
imprisonment); id. § 12022.6(d) (amended by Chapter 703) (providing that if the loss exceeds $2,500,000, the
person will be punished by four additional years of imprisonment).
25. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 350 (amended by Chapter 703) (describing the offense of manufacturing
or selling counterfeit marks).
26. See id. § 653h (West Supp. 1993) (describing the offense of the misappropriation of recorded music
for commercial advantage of private financial gain).
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transportation of unauthorized recordings of live performances,27 and the
failure to disclose the origin of a recording or audiovisual work.28
MDL
Crimes; criminal street gangs
Penal Code § 186.26 (new).
AB 514 (Gotch); 1993 STAT. Ch. 557
Under existing law, any person convicted of a public offense
punishable as a misdemeanor or felony that is committed for the benefit
of, at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal street gang'
will be punished by imprisonment.2 Chapter 557 provides that any adult
who uses physical violence, or threatens to use physical violence on two
27. See id. § 653s (West Supp. 1993) (describing the offense of transporting unauthorized recordings of
live performances); id. (defining live performances).
28. Id. § 12022.6(d) (amended by Chapter 703); see id. § 653w (West Supp. 1993) (describing the offense
of failing to disclose the origin of a recording or an audiovisual work). But see id. § 12022.6(d) (amended by
Chapter 703) (providing that California Penal Code § 12022.6 is not limited to property taken, damaged, or
destroyed in violation of Penal Code §§ 502, 350, 653h, 653s, or 653w).
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(f) (West Supp. 1993) (defining criminal street gang as an ongoing
organization, or group of three or more persons that has as one of its primary activities any of the acts
enumerated in § 186.22(e), and has a common name, sign, or symbol); see also id. § 186.22(e) (West Supp.
1993) (defining pattern of criminal gang activity as the commission or solicitation of two or more of the
following offenses: (1) Assault with a deadly weapon or means likely to produce great bodily harm; (2) robbery;
(3) unlawful homicide or manslaughter; (4) sale, possession, transportation, or manufacture of controlled
substances; (5) shooting at an inhabited dwelling or occupied motor vehicle; (6) arson; or (7) the intimidation
of witnesses and victims).
2. Id. § 186.22(c) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (mandating that the imprisonment be in the county jail for
up to one year, or in the state prison for one, two, or three years); In re Nathaniel C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 990,
1002, 279 Cal. Rptr. 236, 244 (1991) (stating that the statute does not require two different offenses to the
exclusion of proof of two instances of the same offense); In re Lincoln J., 223 Cal. App. 3d 322, 328, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 852, 855 (1990) (holding that the defendant could not be found in violation of § 186.22 without evidence
showing that the offense enumerated in § 186.22(e) occurred within three years after a prior offense); In re
Leland D., 223 Cal. App. 3d 251, 258, 272 Cal. Rptr. 709, 713 (1990) (maintaining that evidence that the
defendant had been arrested for an offense, without more, was not sufficient to show that the act had been
committed); see also I, re Alberto R., 235 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1322, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 356 (1991) (holding
that the phrase "in benefit of" as used in § 186.22(b) is not overbroad or unconstitutional); People v. Green, 227
Cal. App. 3d 692, 701-03, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146-48 (1991) (holding that the terms gang, as defined by §
186.22(f), and criminal gang activity, as defined by § 186.22(e), are not overbroad or unconstitutional); cf. FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 874.04 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-4(b)(1), 16-15-5 (1992 & Supp. 1993); IND.
CODE § 35-45-9-3 (West Supp. 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.2 (West 1993); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §




or more separate occasions in a thirty day period, in order to coerce a
minor to participate in criminal gang activity, will be punished by
imprisonment Chapter 557 further provides that a minor who is sixteen
years or older and commits an offense as provided above is guilty of a
misdemeanor.4
SVB
Crimes; diversion-disclosure of arrests
Penal Code §§ 1000.5, 1000.91, 1001.9, 1001.33, 1001.55, 1001.75,
13203, 13300 (amended).
SB 1206 (Hurtt); 1993 STAT. Ch. 785
Existing law sets forth procedures for the diversion' of certain offenses
including specified controlled substance offenses,2 misdemeanor domestic
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 557); see id. (providing that the person shall
be imprisoned in the state prison or county jail for one, two, or three years); id. § 186.26(e) (enacted by Chapter
557) (clarifying that speech alone is not enough to convict a person pursuant to this section, unless the speech
itself threatens violence against a specific person, the defendant has the apparent ability to carry out the threat,
and the likelihood of physical harm is imminent); see also SENATE FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 514, at 3 (Aug. 16,
1993) (quoting the bill's author in explaining that the purpose of Chapter 557 is to disrupt the methods of
intimidation and coercion that are most commonly used by gangs to recruit new members); Doris Sue Wong,
Witness: Harbour Defendant Coerced, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 18, 1991, at 59 (reporting that a man accused of
rape, robbery, and murder claimed that he was coerced by gang members into participating in the crimes).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.26(c) (enacted by Chapter 557).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.1 (West 1985) (defining pretrial diversion in misdemeanor cases as
the procedure of postponing prosecution of an offense filed either temporarily or permanently at any point in
the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until adjudication). See generally United
States v. Richardson, 856 F.2d 644, 647 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that U.S. Attorneys are authorized to use the
diversion alternative in their districts under Department of Justice guidelines and that the government has broad
discretion in determining which defendants are best suited for pretrial diversion); John R. Duree, Jr., Diversion
and the Judicial Function, 5 PAC. L.J. 764 (1974) (discussing generally California Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.5,
the diversion program with respect to drug-related offenses and the prosecutorial power of the district attorney
in the diversion process); Geoffrey Pope, California's Erperience with Pretrial Diversion, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 418
(1975) (discussing some of the problems that have arisen in the implementation of pretrial diversion programs);
Debra T. Landis, J.D., Annotation: Pretrial Diversion: Statute or Court Rule Authorizing Suspension or
Dismissal of Criminal Prosecution on Defendant's Consent to Noncriminal Alternative, 4 A.L.R.4TH 147 (1981
& Supp. 1993) (discussing state and federal cases in which courts have discussed or determined the validity,
construction, or application of a statute or court rule authorizing pretrial diversion programs subject to the
defendant's consent to treatment, rehabilitation, restitution, or other noncriminal alternative).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000-1000.5 (West 1985, Supp. 1993 & amended by Chapter 785) (setting
forth the diversion program in narcotics and drug abuse cases); id. § 1000(a) (West Supp. 1993) (specifying
certain controlled substance offenses which may be diverted including: California Health and Safety Code §§
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violence offenses,3 specified offenses filed as misdemeanors,4 offenses of
11350, 11357, 11364, 11365, 11377, or 11358 if the marijuana planted, cultivated, harvested, dried or processed
is for personal use, § 11368 if the narcotic drug was secured by fictitious prescription, was for personal use, and
was not sold or furnished to another; § 11370.1 if the amount possessed is less than the specified amount of the
substances; § 653f(d) if the solicitation was for acts directed to personal use only; California Penal Code §§ 381
and 647(f) if the offense is being under the influence of a controlled substance; or California Business and
Professions Code § 4320); id. § 1000(a)(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1993) (specifying that the defendant must meet all
of the listed requirements, including: (1) The defendant has no convictions involving controlled substances prior
to the divertible offense- (2) the offense charged did not involve a crime of violence or threatened violence; (3)
there is no evidence of a violation of sections other than those listed in § 1000; (4) the defendant's record does
not show that probation or parole was ever revoked without being completed or that the defendant was diverted
within five years of the present offense; and (5) the defendant has no prior felony convictions within five years
of the charged divertible offense); People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 61-62, 520 P.2d 405, 407, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 21, 23 (1974) (stating that the two-fold purpose of California Penal Code §§ 1000-1000.4 is: (1) To
identify the experimental user before the user becomes deeply involved with drugs, to educate the person and
to restore the person to productive citizenship without the lasting stigma of a criminal conviction; and (2) to
reduce the clogging of the criminal justice system); see also People v. Paz, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1209, 1217, 266
Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1990) (stating that the defendant's exclusion from the diversion program is automatic if a
district attorney determines that the defendant has a prior conviction for an offense involving a controlled
substance); People v. Martinsen, 193 Cal. App. 3d 843, 850, 238 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (1987) (holding that a
defendant who had not successfully completed probation was ineligible for diversion following his arrest for
cocaine possession); People v. Venghiattis, 185 Cal. App. 3d 326, 332-33, 229 Cal. Rptr. 636, 639 (1986)
(upholding the denial of diversion where evidence supported the finding that defendant's marijuana was not
being cultivated for personal use); cf. 21 U.S.C. § 844a(j) (1988) (providing that the Attorney General will
dismiss proceedings regarding possession of small amounts of controlled substances at any time after three years
if the individual: (I) Has not been previously assessed a civil penalty under § 844a; (2) has paid the assessment;
(3) has complied with any conditions imposed by the Attorney General; (4) has not been convicted of a federal
or state offense related to a controlled substance; and (5) submits to a drug test and is proven to be drug free).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.6-1000.11 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the diversion
program in cases involving domestic violence); id. § 1000.6(a)(l)-(3) (West 1985) (stating that diversion may
be granted whenever a case is before the court upon an accusatory pleading for an act of domestic violence
which is charged as or reduced to a misdemeanor and requiring that: (1) The defendant has not been convicted
for any offense involving violence within seven years prior to the divertible offense; (2) the defendant's record
does not show that probation or parole has been revoked without being completed; and (3) the defendant has
not been diverted within five years prior to the divertible offense); County of Orange v. State Bd. of Control,
167 Cal. App. 3d 660, 662-63, 213 Cal. Rptr. 440, 441 (1985) (holding that the domestic violence program
creates an alternative to criminal prosecution and conviction rather than changing the penalty). See generally
Hallye Jordan, Report Criticizes Domestic Violence Diversion Program, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 5, 1990, at 3, col.
2 (stating that critics of the domestic violence diversion program say it allows criminals a "free pass" because
probation departments do not have the resources to adequately monitor diverted defendants and discussing the
problem of defendants who are not eligible for the program being diverted).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001-1001.9 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993) (setting forth the provisions of
the misdemeanor diversion program); id. § 1001.2(a) (West 1985) (stating that diversion shall not apply to any
pretrial diversion or posttrial program for the treatment of problem drinking or alcoholism utilized for persons
convicted of one or more offenses under California Vehicle Code §§ 23152, 23153 or former § 23102, or to
programs established pursuant to California Health and Safety Code § 1000, nor shall the chapter be deemed
to authorize pretrial diversions for persons alleged to have violated California Vehicle Code §§ 23152 or 23153);
id. §§ 1001.50-1001.55 (West 1985 & amended by Chapter 785) (setting forth the provisions regarding diversion
of misdemeanor offenders); id. § 1001.51 (West 1985) (specifying that the diversion of misdemeanor offenders
shall apply whenever a case is before any court concerning a misdemeanor, except for violations of California
Vehicle Code §§ 23152 or 23153, and setting forth the requirements that the defendant must meet, including:
(1) The defendant's record does not show that probation or parole has ever been revoked without being
completed; (2) the defendant has not been diverted within five years of the filing of the accusatory pleading; and
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a parent or legal guardian with respect to his or her minor child,5 and
offenses committed by a developmentally disabled person.6 Existing law
further specifies that once the person successfully completes the diversion
program, the arrest will be considered as having never occurred, and the
person may reply to any question regarding his or her prior record as if he
or she was never arrested or diverted for the offense.7
Under Chapter 785, the person arrested must be advised that even if
that person successfully completes a diversion program, the arrest on
which the diversion was based may be disclosed by the Department of
(3) the defendant has never been convicted of a felony, and has not been convicted of a misdemeanor within
five years prior to the filing of pleadings regarding the divertible offense); Davis v. Municipal Court, 46 Cal.
3d 64, 78, 757 P.2d 1I, 19, 249 Cal. Rptr. 300, 307 (1988) (finding that California Penal Code § 1000.2, which
gives the local district attorney the authority to approve or disapprove a pretrial diversion program for
misdemeanants, does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the district attorney);
People v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 1209, 1218, 241 Cal. Rptr. 322, 329 (1987) (holding that a defendant
in a county which has not established a diversion program for misdemeanor offenders was not denied equal
protection by the county's decision not to adopt such a program).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1001.70-1001.75 (West Supp. 1993 & amended by Chapter 785) (setting
forth the provisions of the parental diversion program); id. § 1001.71 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that parental
diversion shall apply whenever a case is before any court alleging the parent or legal guardian to have violated
§ 272 with respect to the parent's or legal guardian's minor child and if the defendant's record shows that
probation or parole has never been revoked without being completed and that the defendant has not been
previously diverted).
6. Id. §§ 1000(a) (West Supp. 1993), 1000.6(a) (West 1985), 1001.21 (West 1985), 1001.51 (West
1985), 1001.71 (West Supp. 1993); see id. §§ 1001.20-1001.34 (West 1985) (setting forth the provisions of the
Developmentally Disabled Persons Program); see also id. § 667.9(e)(1)-(3) (West Supp. 1993) (defining
developmentally disabled as a severe, chronic disability which is attributable to a mental or physical impairment
or a combination of mental or physical impairments, that is likely to continue indefinitely and results in
substantial functional limitations in three or more of the following areas of life activity: self-care,
receptive/expressive language, learning, mobility, self-direction, capacity for independent living or economic self-
sufficiency); id. § 1001.21 (West 1985) (stating that diversion of mentally retarded defendants shall apply
whenever a case is before any court upon an accusatory pleading at any stage in criminal proceedings, for any
person who has been evaluated and is determined to be developmentally disabled and stating that this applies
to any misdemeanor offense, except if the defendant has been diverted within two years prior to the present
proceeding); People v. Weatherill, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1569, 1580, 264 Cal. Rptr. 298, 305 (1989) (holding that
a developmentally disabled defendant charged with driving under the influence is ineligible for diversion),
7. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1000.5(a) (amended by Chapter 785), 1000.10 (West 1985), 1001.9(a)
(amended by Chapter 785), 1001.33(a) (amended by Chapter 785), 1001.55(a) (amended by Chapter 785),
1001.75(a) (amended by Chapter 785); see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-7-401 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
56e (Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.08 (West Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-80 (Michie 1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 853-1 (1985 & Supp. 1992): IOWA CODE § 907.1 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
2907 (1988); MiCH. ComP. LAWS § 769.4a (1982); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-130 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-3601 to -3604 (1989); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-12 (West Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-16a-1
to -8 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.36 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.886 (1990);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-15-101 to -105 (1990 & Supp. 1993); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 54.745 (Vernon Sttpp.
1993); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-2-5 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.05.010 (West 1990) (providing
examples of diversion programs adopted in other states).
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Justice8 if the person applies for a position as a peace officer9 within five
years of the arrest)t0 Additionally, the person will be obliged to disclose
the arrest if a direct question to that effect appears on an application for
a position as a peace officer."
Under existing law, any criminal justice agency 12 or local criminal
justice agency is authorized to release information regarding an arrest or
detention of a peace officer to a government agency employer of that
peace officer even if a conviction did not result.13 Information regarding
either a referral to, or participation in, a diversion program may also be
released. 4 Chapter 785 specifies that such information may be released
8. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 15000 (West 1992) (stating that the Department of Justice operates under
the direction of the Attorney General). See generally id. §§ 15000-15204 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (setting
forth the functions and duties of the Department of Justice).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1993) (defining peace officer).
10. Id. §§ 1000.5(b), 1000.91(b), 1001.9(b), 1001.33(b), 1001.55(b), 1001.75(b) (amended by Chapter
785).
11. Id. See generally Charles Austermtihl, Criminal Law-Pretrial Intervention-The Admittance of a
Police Officer to a Pretrial Intervention Program May be Conditioned on His Resignation from the Police
Force, 19 RUTGERS LJ. 1147 (1988) (discussing State v. DeMarco, 527 A.2d 417 (1987), which held that a
prosecutor may condition a police officer's admittance to a diversion program on his resignation from the police
force).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 13101 (West 1992) (defining criminal justice agencies).
13. Id. §§ 13203(a), 13300(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 785); see CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7(a) (West Supp.
1993) (stating that no employer shall ask an applicant for employment to disclose information concerning an
arrest or detention that did not result in a conviction, or concerning a referral to, or participation in, any
diversion program); id. § 432.7(b) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that nothing in § 432.7 shall prohibit disclosure
under California Penal Code §§ 13203, 13300 to a government agency employing a peace officer); id. § 432.7(e)
(West Supp. 1993) (stating that persons seeking employment or persons already employed as peace officers are
not covered under § 432.7); Central Valley Chapter of the 7th Step Found. v. Younger, 214 Cal. App. 3d 145,
165, 262 Cal. Rptr. 496. 508 (1989) (holding that the dissemination of nonconviction information to nonexempt
employers and licensing agencies is violative of the California constitutional privacy guarantee of Article I,
Section 1); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.5(a) (amended by Chapter 785) (stating that a record pertaining
to an arrest resulting in successful completion of a diversion program shall not be used in any way which could
result in the denial of any employment, benefit, license, or certificate); Sandoval v. State Personnel Bd., 225 Cal.
App. 3d 1498, 1504, 275 Cal. Rptr. 702, 706 (1990) (stating that § 1000.5 should be given prospective
application only from the time that defendants successfully complete diversion, and holding that § 1000.5 was
inapplicable to correctional officers' dismissals for possession of drugs and paraphernalia when they were
dismissed before they entered diversion programs); B.W. v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, 169 Cal. App.
3d 219, 234, 215 Cal. Rptr. 130, 138 (1985) (holding that the use of information from a person's arrest records
in disciplinary proceedings after the defendant had completed a pretrial diversion program was prohibited); id.
at 229, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 135 (stating that nothing in § 1000.5 bars an agency or other entity from properly using
information in a divertee's arrest record either before or during diversion, and concluding that § 1000.5 only
goes into effect upon the successful completion of diversion). But see Pitman v. City of Oakland, 197 Cal. App.
3d 1037, 1046, 243 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311 (1988) (holding that a plaintiff seeking to state a privacy cause of action
for damages based on dissemination and utilization of arrest data must plead and prove that the arrest did not
result in a conviction); id. at 1042, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 308 (stating that where the plaintiff's arrest later resulted
in a conviction, disclosure and use of the information did not violate California Labor Code § 432.7). See
generally CAL. CONST. art. I, § I (providing that the right to privacy is an inalienable right).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13203(a), 13300(k) (amended by Chapter 785).
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to a government agency employer of a peace officer or applicant for a
position of peace officer, but places limits on disclosure to within five
years of the arrest. 5
LTE
Crimes; domestic violence-noncohabiting relationships and subsequent
offenses
Penal Code § 243 (amended).
AB 2066 (B. Friedman); 1993 STAT. Ch. 421
Under existing law, a battery' against a noncohabiting 2 ex-husband,
ex-wife, fianc6, fianc6e, or a person3 with whom the defendant was or is
dating4 constitutes a misdemeanor.' Existing law provides that if a person
15. Id. §§ 13203(a), 13300(k) (amended by Chapter 785); see ASSEMBLY COMtImrEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, CoMMiTrEE ANALYSiS OF SB 1206, at 2 (July 6, 1993) (stating that information regarding the
disposition of cases diverted should be made available to police agencies so that the background of potential
peace officer candidates can be thoroughly checked, and stating that police officers need to be held to the highest
standard and that any history must be investigated); see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 13203(b)(l)-(3), 13300(l)-(3)
(amended by Chapter 785) (stating that a criminal justice agency shall not release information under the
following circumstances: (1) Information regarding an arrest for which diversion has been ordered without
attempting to determine whether the diversion was successfully completed; (2) information regarding an arrest
or detention followed by a release without attempting to determine whether the individual was exonerated. (3)
information concerning an arrest without a disposition without attempting to determine whether diversion was
successfully completed or the individual was exonerated).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1988) (defining a battery as an intentional use of force or
violence against another person which is against the law); id. § 243(a) (amended by Chapter 421) (stating that
a person convicted of a battery will be punished by a fine of up to $2,000, a jail term of up to six months, or
both).
2. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 542(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a cohabitant as a regular resident
of the home).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
4. See id. § 243(0(I 1) (amended by Chapter 421) (defining a dating relationship as a relationship where
the parties share intimate relations, especially affectionate or sexual relations, independent of financial
considerations).
5. Id. § 243(e) (amended by Chapter 421); see id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor);
cf. Smith v. Arkansas, 824 S.W.2d 838, 839 (Ark. 1992) (affirming a conviction of second degree battery against
the defendant where the defendant hit his ex-wife over the head with a pistol); Mike Truppa, Protection Orders
Flood Lake County, CHICAGO D. L. BULL., May 6, 1993, at 3 (stating that there have been numerous protective
orders filed in Lake County, and that the Illinois Domestic Violence Act has been amended to include assaults
within significant dating relationships). See generally Bella English, Campus Crime Deters Student, BOSTON
GLOBE, May 10, 1993, at 17 (quoting the head of the Domestic Violence Unit for the Suffolk District Attorney's
Office as claiming that dating violence is under-reported to authorities outside the school campuses); Sandy
Shore, First, the Chickens Died; Then Denver Woman's Life Careered to Horror, L.A. TIMEis, May 16, 1993,
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is convicted6 of such an offense and the defendant is given probation,7 or
the defendant's sentence is suspended,8 the defendant must, for a
minimum of one year, take part in, and finish, a treatment program for
batterers,9 or a court-designated counseling program if a batterer's
at A4 (reporting that a former live-in boyfriend, who repeatedly abused and harassed his ex-girlfriend, shot her
as she fled to a police station, clutching a restraining order that she had obtained against the assailant).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 689 (West 1985) (providing that a conviction will only be sustained upon
a jury's verdict, a court's ruling where a defendant has waived his right to a trial by jury, or by a guilty plea);
In re Brown, 68 Cal. 176, 178, 8 P. 829, 830 (1885) (defining a conviction as a jury's verdict of guilty, or a
court's final judgment); see also People v. Lapin, 138 Cal. 2d 251, 264, 291 P.2d 575, 583 (1956) (compelling
a court to ensure that a defendant is fairly convicted); cf. Smith, 824 S.W.2d at 839 (stating that a conviction
is supported where the evidence is of a sufficient force and nature that it will, with reasonable and material
certainty and precision, require a conclusion one way or another).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(2)(A)-(B) (amended by Chapter 421) (stating that if a convicted
batterer is given probation, the terms may include that the defendant pay up to $1,000 to a battered women's
shelter, pay the victim for the victim's counseling expenses resulting from the defendant's crime, or both); id.
§ 1000.7(b) (Vest 1985) (providing that once defendants agree to waive their right to a speedy trial, the court
will transfer their cases to the probation department to determine their eligibility for diversion, and the probation
department will report its findings to the court when it has completed its investigation of the defendants); see
also id. § 1001.50(c) (West 1985) (defining pre-trial diversion as the procedure by which the defendant's
prosecution is temporarily or permanently postponed sometime during the judicial process); cf ARIZ. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-3601(H) (Supp. 1993) (providing that the court, without entering a guilty judgment and with the
parties' consent, may place a domestic violence offender on probation, and require the defendant to participate
in a counseling or diversionary program); Arizona v. Aguilar, 831 P.2d 443, 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding
that a court may not enter a judgment of guilt when a defendant is put on probation under the Domestic
Violence Diversion Program); Arizona v. Sirny, 772 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a jail
term is inappropriate once a defendant has been assigned probation and diverted under the Domestic Violence
Diversion Program).
8. See People v. Atwood, 221 Cal. 2d 216, 219, 34 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1963) (stating that the legal
effect of a suspended sentence, without allowing probation, is to void the suspension, while the sentence and
judgment remain valid).
9. See CAL. FAm. CODE § 5754(c) (West Special Pamphlet 1993) (noting that the court may require the
participant in a batterer's treatment program to bear whatever cost the court deems to be reasonable for the
program); see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 547(d) (\Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that the court must find that
the defendant's cost for participating in a batterer's treatment program does not otherwise jeopardize the
defendant's other financial obligations before ordering the defendant to bear all or some of the cost of the
program); cf ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.900(4) (1991) (defining a domestic violence program as a program
providing services to victims, families, or perpetrators of domestic violence); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-
802(l)(a) (Supp. 1993) (granting the chief judge in each judicial district the power to appoint a local board to
certify and monitor domestic violence treatment programs); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-19-5-1(c)(1) to (2) (West
Supp. 1993) (stating that a defendant directed to a diversion program is required to pay a $50 initial user's fee
and $10 each month, thereafter, while in the program); MASS. ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp.
1993) (providing that a supervisor of a batterer's treatment program must certify a participant's attendance, and
keep the probation department apprised of the defendant's compliance or non-compliance with the requirements);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 576(l)(a) (Consol. 1993) (defining a batterer's program as a program which provides
battering prevention and educational services to participants to help them discontinue their abusive behavior);
People v. Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223, 1223 (Colo. 1992) (characterizing Abusive Men Exploring New Directions
as a treatment program for batterers).
10. See CAL. FAmt. CODE § 1816(a) (West Special Pamphlet 1993) (requiring that supervising counselors
of domestic violence programs participate in continuing education programs for domestic violence); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1000.8(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that the court has the power to order the divertee to pay for
some or all of the counseling costs, depending on the defendant's ability to pay).
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program is unavailable.1 Chapter 421 provides that where a defendant
with a prior conviction12 for domestic violence 3 is granted probation or
the defendant's sentence is suspended, the defendant must be imprisoned
for a minimum of forty-eight hours in addition to any other sentence
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 421); see id. § 1000.6-1000.11 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1993) (setting forth diversion procedures for domestic violence cases); id. § 1000.8(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that, once the defendant consents to further proceedings and waives the right to a speedy trial, the
court will review the pertinent information regarding the defendant, including the probation department's report,
to determine if the defendant qualifies for diversion); Davis v. Municipal Court, 46 Cal. 3d 64, 78, 757 P.2d 11,
19, 249 Cal. Rptr. 300, 307 (1988) (noting that the Legislature has implemented the eligibility criteria for
domestic violence diversion, without leaving policy questions regarding the program's design to the discretion
of the district attorney); People v. Weatherill, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1569, 1582, 264 Cal. Rptr. 298, 306 (1989)
(noting that domestic violence diversion programs focus on the offense charged, unlike diversion programs for
the mentally retarded which focus on the status of the offender); County of Orange v. State Bd. of Control, 167
Cal. App. 3d 660, 662-63, 213 Cal. Rptr. 440,441 (1985) (holding that diversion is an alternative to prosecution
and punishment, and not a type of punishment for the diverted offense); People v. Denman, 145 Cal. App. Supp.
3d 40, 49, 193 Cal. Rptr. 863, 869 (1983) (stating that where a defendant has been considered for the domestic
violence diversion program, and then subsequently denied diversion, the state will be given an additional 30 days
to prepare for trial, and such an extension does not deny the defendant's right to a speedy trial); cf. IND. CODE
ANN. § 33-19-5-1(c)(1) to (2) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a divertee is required to pay a $50 initial user's
fee and $10 each month, thereafter, while the defendant participates in the diversion program); KAN. STAT ANN.
§ 22-2907(1) (1988) (providing that the district attorney, after considering various factors, may recommend that
the defendant be diverted in the interest of justice and for the benefit of the defendant and the community);
Arizona v. Larson, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (Ariz. 1988) (holding that the trial court has the power to grant a
misdemeanor compromise in a domestic violence case based on the power given to it by the legislature, despite
the fact that the prosecutor has not recommended such a compromise). But see Martell v. County Ct. of Summit,
854 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (commenting that, although mandatory counseling may be
appropriate in domestic violence situations, it is not appropriate before a defendant has been convicted since such
a mandate violates an accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the assumption of
innocence).
12. See People v. Biggs, 9 Cal. 2d 508, 514, 71 P.2d 214, 217 (1937) (explaining that a prior conviction
includes any previous conviction where the defendant was pardoned); cf United States v. Jones, 910 F.2d 760,
761 (1 ith Cir. 1990) (stating that a nolo contendere plea, where adjudication has been withheld, is considered
a conviction for purposes of classifying a person as a career offender); State v. Rose, 325 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Mo.
1959) (equating a guilty plea with a conviction). But see State v. Weinberger, 205 N.E.2d 306, 306 (N.Y. 1965)
(maintaining a lower court's finding that a guilty plea by itself does not constitute a conviction).
13. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 542(a), (b)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1993) (defining domestic violence as
intentionally causing bodily harm, sexually assaulting, or putting any of the following persons in imminent
apprehension of harm: a wife, a husband, an ex-wife, an ex-husband, a cohabitant, a former cohabitant, a blood-
related adult, a person with whom the defendant has been engaged or dated, or a person who is the parent of
a child); see also id. § 13519(a), (b)(l)-(16) (West 1992) (designating training courses and procedures for law
enforcement officers in order to effectively handle domestic violence complaints); cf WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 70.123.130 (1992) (providing that the Social and Health Services Department will be responsible for
establishing a technical assistance grant program to help communities in learning how to deal with domestic
violence, and setting forth the goals of the program). See generally Michael C. Griffaton, Forewarned is
Foreanned: The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 and the Future of hstitutional Liability
for Student Victimization, 43 CASE W. RES. L. RE%,. 525, 588 (1993) (reporting that a Minneapolis study found
that women who called the police to report domestic violence incidents were less likely to experience a second
assault than women who did not report such an incident); Deborah Rhode, Justice and Gender, 79 CAL. L. Rtiv.
577, 585 (1991) (indicating that most states have adopted domestic violence legislation, protecting women and
imposing sanctions for violations).
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imposed.' 4 Chapter 421 further gives the court the discretion, upon a
showing of good cause, to refrain from imposing the minimum forty-eight




Penal Code § 1001.15 (amended).
AB 1165 (Polanco); 1993 STAT. Ch. 850
Penal Code § 1000.6 (amended).
AB 2211 (Goldsmith); 1993 STAT. Ch. 589
Penal Code §§ 1000.93, 1000.94, 1000.95, 1000.96 (new); §§
1000.7, 1000.8, 1000.9 (amended); § 1000.11 (amended and
renumbered).
AB 226 (Burton); 1993 STAT. Ch. 221
Under existing law, defendants who have committed domestic
violence' misdemeanors 2 are eligible for diversion.3 Existing law also
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 243(e)(3) (amended by Chapter 421).
15. Id.; see In re Mills, 55 Cal. 2d 646, 653, 361 P.2d 15,20, 12 Cal. Rptr. 483, 488 (1961) (stating that,
under the indeterminate sentence law, each term is for the maximum, unless the Adult Authority affixes a shorter
term); Olney v. Municipal Ct., 133 Cal. App. 455, 462, 184 Cal. Rptr. 78, 82 (1982) (stating that the court has
the power to independently review the facts of a particular case and exercise its discretion in determining
whether good cause exists for imposing the mandatory sentence); cf ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.080 (1990)
(providing that a court has the power to suspend the balance or portion of the defendant's sentence, and place
the defendant on probation, if the court believes that doing so would be in the best interest of the public and
the defendant).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.6(d), (e) (amended by Chapter 589) (defining domestic violence as
intentionally or recklessly attempting to, or causing bodily harm to a wife, husband, parent, a permanent resident
of the home, or a person related by blood to the abuser, or putting any one of the aforementioned persons in
imminent apprehension of bodily harm); see also id. § 273.88(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that the
Criminal Justice Planning Office will set up pilot projects in Sacramento, Los Angeles, and Humboldt counties,
which have established vertical prosecution programs for spousal abusers, in order to gather data on domestic
violence prosecutions); id. § 13519(a), (b)(I)-(16) (West 1992) (designating training courses and procedures for
law enforcement officers in order to effectively handle domestic violence complaints). See generally Michael
C. Griffaton, Forewarned is Foreanned: The Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 and the Future
of Institutional Liability for Student Victimization, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525, 588 (1993) (reporting that a
Minneapolis study found that women who called the police to report domestic violence incidents were less likely
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requires that after ordering the defendant to be diverted, the court must
determine the defendant's financial condition.4 Under prior law, upon
to experience a second assault than women who did not report such an incident); Deborah Rhode, Justice and
Gender, 79 CAL. L. REV. 577, 585 (1991) (indicating that most states have adopted domestic violence
legislation, protecting women and imposing sanctions for violations); Kenneth L. Wainstein, Judicially Initiated
Prosecution: A Means of Preventing Continuing Victimization in the Event of Prosecutorial hIaction, 76 CAL.
L. REV. 727, 733 (1988) (commenting that prosecutors routinely decline to bring charges against a husband for
domestic violence, choosing instead not to intervene in such disputes); Sandy Shore, First, the Chickens Died;
Then Denver Woman's Life Careered to Horror, L.A. TImEs, May 16, 1993, at A4 (reporting that a former live-
in boyfriend, who repeatedly abused and harassed his ex-girlfriend, shot her as she fled to a police station,
clutching a restraining order against the assailant).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (,Vest Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor).
3. Id. § 1000.8(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 221); see id. §§ 1000.7-1000.11 (amended by Chapter 221)
(setting forth the diversion procedures); id. § 1000.6 (amended by Chapter 589) (stating additional diversion
procedures); see also id. § 1000.8(a) (amended by Chapter 221) (explaining that once the defendant consents
to further proceedings and waives his right to a speedy trial, the court will review the relevant information
regarding the defendant, including the probation department's report, to determine if the defendant is eligible
for the diversion program); id. § 1001.50(c) (West 1985) (defining pretrial diversion as the procedure by which
the prosecution of a defendant is temporarily or permanently postponed, between the time that the charges are
brought against the defendant until adjudication); People v. Weatherill, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1569, 1582, 264 Cal.
Rptr. 298, 306 (1989) (noting that domestic violence diversion programs focus on the offense charged, unlike
mentally retarded diversion programs which focus on the status of the offender); Davis v. Municipal Court, 46
Cal. 3d 64, 78, 757 P.2d 11, 18, 249 Cal. Rptr. 300, 307 (1988) (noting that the Legislature has implemented
the eligibility criteria for domestic violence diversion and has not left policy questions regarding the program's
design to the discretion of the district attorney); County of Orange v. State Bd. of Control, 167 Cal. App. 3d
660, 663, 213 Cal. Rptr. 440,441 (1985) (holding that diversion is an alternative to prosecution and punishment,
and not a type of punishment for the diverted offense); People v. Denman, 145 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 40, 50, 193
Cal. Rptr. 863, 869-70 (1983) (holding that where a defendant has been considered for the domestic violence
diversion program, and then subsequently denied diversion, the state will be given an additional 30 days to
prepare for trial, and such an extension does not deny a defendant his right to a speedy trial); cf ARIZ. Rnv.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3601(H) (Supp. 1993) (providing that the court, without entering a judgment of guilty and with
the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the defendant, may place a defendant, who is found guilty of a
domestic violence offense, on probation, incorporating the terms necessary to protect the victim, such as
requiring that the defendant enter into a counseling or diversionary program); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2907(!)
(1988) (providing that the district attorney, after considering various factors, may recommend that the defendant
be diverted in the interest ofjustice and for the benefit of the defendant and the community); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 70.123.130 (West 1992) (providing that the Social and Health Services Department will be responsible
for establishing a technical assistance grant program to help communities in learning how to deal with domestic
violence, and setting forth the goals of the program); Arizona v. Larson, 764 P.2d 749, 752 (Ariz. 1938) (holding
that the trial court has the power to grant a misdemeanor compromise in a domestic violence case based on the
power given to it by the Legislature, despite the fact that the prosecutor has not recommended such a
compromise); Arizona v. Aguilar, 831 P.2d 443, 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a court may not enter
a judgment of guilt when a defendant is put on probation under the Domestic Violence Diversion Program);
Arizona v. Simy, 772 P.2d 1145, 1146 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a jail term is inappropriate once a
defendant has been assigned probation and diverted under the Domestic Violence Diversion Program); Martell
v. County Court, 854 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (commenting that, although mandatory
counseling may be appropriate in domestic violence situations, it is not appropriate before a defendant hag been
convicted since such a mandate violates an accused's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
the assumption of innocence).
4. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 1000.8(a) (amended by Chapter 221); see id. (noting that the purpose of the
inquiry is to determine whether or not the defendant can pay for some or all of the costs of the batterer's
program).
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discovering the defendant's ability to pay for counseling, the court had the
discretion to order the defendant to pay, in whole or in part, for the
counseling.' Under Chapter 221, the court must order the offender to pay
for some or all of the fees to attend a batterer's program,6 as long as the
defendant is able to do so.7
Prior law required that the defendant participate in the diversion
program for no less than six months, but no longer than two years.8
Chapter 221 increases the minimum period of participation to one year.9
Chapter 221 also requires the court to order a diverted defendant to do a
certain amount of community service work.)
Under prior law, if the defendant had been convicted of a violent
offense, criminal proceedings could be reinstated upon a hearing initiated
by the prosecutor, court, or probation officer." Chapter 221 permits the
proceedings to be reinstated whenever it is evident that the defendant has
engaged in criminal conduct, thus rendering him unfit for the diversion
program. 12
Chapter 221 requires that, beginning July 1, 1994, the probation
department (Department)13  must refer offenders only to batterer's
5. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 913, sec. 1, at 3141 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.8).
6. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.900(4) (1991) (defining a domestic violence program as a program
providing services to victims, families, or perpetrators of domestic violence); People v. Wallace, 837 P.2d 1223,
1223 (Colo. 1992) (classifying Abusive Men Exploring New Directions as a treatment program for batterers).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.8(a) (amended by Chapter 221); see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 547(d) (West
Supp. 1993) (providing that the court must find that the defendant's cost for participating in a batterer's
treatment program does not otherwise jeopardize the defendant's other financial obligations before ordering the
defendant to bear all or some of the cost of the program); CAL. FA t. CODE § 5754(c) (West Special Pamphlet
1993) (noting that the court may require the participant of a batterer's treatment counseling program to bear
whatever cost the court deems to be reasonable for the program); see also Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,
661 (1983) (holding that a state may terminate a preprosecution diversion arrangement because of a defendant's
nonwillful failure to make restitution, as long as there are no reasonable alternatives to termination which will
satisfy the state's legitimate penal objectives); cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-19-5-l(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that a defendant directed to the diversion program will be required to pay a $50 initial user's fee and
$10 each month, thereafter, while in the program).
8. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 913, sec. 1, at 3141 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.8).
9. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 1000.8(c) (amended by Chapter 221).
10. Id. § 1205.3 (West Supp. 1993); see id. (stating that the court must specify the number of hours of
community service work to be performed when a defendant is convicted of a crime and given probation).
11. 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 913, sec. 1, at 3141 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.8).
12. CAL. P. NAL CODE § 1000.9 (amended by Chapter 221); cf. Aguilar, 831 P.2d at 447 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (stating that upon violation of a term of probation, including failure to attend a diversionary program, the
court may enter an adjudication of guilt, and proceed as if the defendant's probation had been revoked).
13. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 131.3 (West 1982) (listing the duties of a probation officer, including
investigating into the character, history, and family life of the offender when called upon to do so by the court);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203c (West Supp. 1993) (stating that a probation officer is responsible for sending a report




programs which comply with certain specifications. 4 Under Chapter 221,
only the Department is authorized to approve a batterer's treatment
program, and to renew the program's approval annually. 5 In addition, the
Department is authorized to charge nongovernmental treatment programs
an annual fee of up to $250 in order to reimburse the Department for its
expenses in administering the approval process.'
6
Under prior law, a judge had the authority to order the defendant,
charged with a felony, 7 to pay an administrative fee of up to $150 to
cover the cost of any criminalistic laboratory 8 analysis, or to process the
diversion request or application.' 9 Under Chapter 850, the judge may
order the defendant to pay an administrative fee of up to $500.20 Under
Chapter 850, a judge also has the authority to require the defendant, whose
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.93(a) (enacted by Chapter 221); see id. § 1000.93(b)(l)-(16) (enacted by
Chapter 221) (providing that the goal of the batterer's program should be to discontinue the domestic violence,
and the program must provide the following: (1) Strategies for holding the defendant accountable for the
domestic violence; (2) a requirement that the offender attend group sessions comprised of people of the same
gender; (3) definitions given to the defendant, describing the various types of abuse and the techniques available
for discontinuing them; (4) methods of apprising the victim about the requirements for the defendant's
participation in the program, plus the availability of victim resources; (5) a requirement that the offender attend
sessions without being under the influence of chemicals; (6) educational programs discussing matters, such as
the effects of abuse on children and others, and the nature of violence; (7) a requirement that prohibits any
family or partner counseling; (8) procedures for assessing whether the program will be beneficial to the
defendant; (9) staff members who are knowledgeable about various types of abuses, violence, and the legal
system; (10) staff members who are encouraged to obtain assistance from domestic violence centers; (11) a
requirement that the offender enter into a written agreement with the program, outlining the program's content
and requirements: (12) a requirement that the defendant enter into a confidentiality agreement; (13) a program
that is sensitive to various cultural and ethnic backgrounds: (14) a requirement of a written referral from the
authorities in the legal system, allowing the defendant to attend the program; (15) procedures for reporting the
defendant's enrollment, progress, and evaluation in the program: and (16) a sliding fee scale).
15. Id. §§ 1000.93(c)-(e), 1000.94(a) (enacted by Chapter 221); see id. § 1000.94(b)(l)-(4) (enacted by
Chapter 221) (setting forth the procedures to be followed by the probation department for approving a new or
existing batterer's program); id. § I000.94(d)(1)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 221) (authorizing the probation
department to revoke its approval of a program for various reasons, including a program's violation of the
specified requirements, or for a program's failure to accurately represent any material fact in obtaining approval);
cf. id. § 1001.50(b) (West 1985) (providing that the county district attorney, who is responsible for annually
reviewing other misdemeanor diversion programs, must approve such programs before an offender can be
diverted to the program); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-802(l)(a) (Supp. 1993) (granting the chief judge in
each judicial district the power to appoint a local board to certify and monitor domestic violence treatment
programs).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1000.94(c) (enacted by Chapter 221); cf Browning v. Corbett, 734 P.2d 1030,
1032 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that, since victims of domestic violence originate from broken homes, it is
reasonable to raise funds for domestic violence programs by requiring parties to a divorce action to pay an
additional fee at the time of filing).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining felony).
18. See id. § 1001.15(b) (amended by Chapter 850) (defining criminalistic laboratory as a laboratory
under the supervision of a public agency which employs at least one forensic scientist and which is registered
with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration).
19. 1987 Cal. Stat. ch. 375, sec. 1, at 1503 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.15(a)).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.15(a) (amended by Chapter 850).
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charges either constitute, or have been reduced to a misdemeanor, to pay
an administrative fee of up to $300 to cover the expense of: (1) Reporting
to the court on the applicant's eligibility and suitability2' for the diversion
program; (2) supervising22 the defendant upon entering the program; and




Penal Code §§ 12070, 12076, 12078 (repealed and new); §§ 12001,
12001.6, 12026.2, 12072, 12073, 12077, 12081, 12084, 12276,
12601, 12809, 13511.5 (amended); Welfare and Institutions Code
§ 8102 (amended).
AB 166 (Hauser); 1993 STAT. Ch. 606
(Effective September 29, 1993)
Existing law defines a wholesaler as a person' who is a licensed
dealer2 pursuant to federal law, not including persons dealing exclusively
21. See People v. Denman, 145 Cal. App. Supp. 3d 40, 43, 193 Cal. Rptr. 863, 865 (1983) (stating that
the court will evaluate the following factors in order to decide whether an offender qualifies for a diversion
program: (1) The nature and magnitude of the victim's injury; (2) the defendant's prior history of domestic
violence: and (3) any additional considerations which might adversely affect the defendant's chances of
completing the program successfully).
22. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1816(a) (West Special Pamphlet 1993) (requiring that supervising counselors
of domestic violence programs participate in continuing education programs for domestic violence); cf. MASS.
ANN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 7 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a supervisor of a batterer's treatment
program must certify a participant's attendance, and keep the probation department apprised of whether or not
the defendant is complying with the requirements).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1001.15(c) (amended by Chapter 850).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(I 1) (1988) (defining dealer), United States v. Schumann, 861 F.2d 1234, 1237
(1 Ith Cir. 1988) (defining a dealer as a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as
the regular course of business with the principal object of making a profit); United States v. Redus, 469 F.2d
185, 187 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that § 922(a)(1) is directed at two classes of conduct: (1) The shipping,
transporting, or receiving of firearms or ammunition in the course of interstate commerce; and (2) the importing,
manufacturing, or dealing in firearms or ammunition without a license, whether interstate or intrastate); United
States v. Gross, 451 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1971) (identifying a person who has sold 11 weapons in a
short period of time as a dealer for the purpose of § 921(a)( 11)).
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in grips, stocks, and other nonmetal parts of firearms.3 Under Chapter 606,
a person dealing exclusively in parts of firearms that are not frames or
receivers' is not a wholesaler.5
Existing law provides specified exemptions to the prohibition on
carrying a concealed firearm, 6 including an exemption for persons going
directly to, or coming directly from, a gun show7 for the purpose of
displaying that firearm, or a recognized sporting event involving that
firearm; or persons possessing a concealed firearm at a place of
residence;9 or persons transporting a firearm to a place of business for the
purpose of a lawful transfer or repair."0 Chapter 606 expands these
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(h) (amended by Chapter 606); see id. § 12001(b)-(e), (g) (amended by
Chapter 606) (defining firearm); People v. Hale, 43 Cal. App. 3d 353, 356, 117 Cal. Rptr. 697, 698 (1974)
(stating that a disassembled firearm can still constitute an operable weapon for the purpose of the Dangerous
Weapons Control Law, California Penal Code §§ 12000-12101); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1988) (defining
firearm); United States v. Morris, 904 F.2d 518, 519 (9th Cir. 1990) (identifying a derringer pistol as a firearm
for the purposes of § 921(a)(3)); United States v. 16,179 Molso Italian .22 Caliber Winlee Derringer Convertible
Starter Guns, 443 F.2d 463, 465 (2nd Cir. 1971) (holding that a starter gun, which could be converted to shoot
live ammunition within three to twelve minutes, constitutes a firearm for the purposes of § 921(a)); cf. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1781(1) (West 1992) (defining dealers as including wholesalers and other persons dealing in
used goods).
4. See WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 902 (3d. ed. 1966) (defining a frame as a basic unit
of a handgun, which serves as a mounting for the barrel and operating parts of the arm); id. at 1894 (defining
receiver as the metal frame in which the action of a firearm is fitted and to which the breech end of the barrel
is attached); see also People v. Osterman, 4 Cal. App. 3d 763, 765, 84 Cal. Rptr. 769, 770 (1970) (utilizing
Webster's Dictionary to define gun parts as specified in the Penal Code).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(h) (amended by Chapter 606).
6. See id. § 12001(a) (amended by Chapter 606) (defining pistol, revolver, and "firearm capable of being
concealed upon the person").
7. See 27 C.F.R. § 178.100(b) (1993) (defining gun show).
8. See id. (defining event).
9. See People v. Foley, 149 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 33, 39, 197 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (1983) (stating that the
purpose of the Weapons Control Law would be frnstrated if "place of residence" were interpreted to include any
motor vehicle while in transit, and that a practical construction should be given to language employed by
draftsmen of the legislation).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12026.2(a)(1)-(12) (amended by Chapter 606); see id. (specifying exemptions
from the prohibition against carrying firearms without a license including possession of a concealed firearm by
an authorized participant in a motion picture, possession of a firearm in a locked container by a member of a
club organized for the purpose of collecting firearms, transportation of a firearm by a participant in a safety or
hunting class, transportation of a firearm pursuant to California Penal Code § 12026, transportation of a firearm
for repair, transportation of a firearm relating to a gun show, transportation of a firearm by an authorized
employee of a firearms supplier when going to or coming from a motion picture, transportation of a firearm by
a person going to or coming from a target range, transportation of a firearm to the issuing agency of licenses
to carry concealed firearms, transportation of a firearm to a law enforcement agency for purposes of a lawful
transfer pursuant to California Penal Code § 12084, and transportation of a firearm to or from a camping
facility); Cf. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2001 (West Supp. 1992) (permitting law enforcement officers,
private investigators, and licensed hunters to carry concealed firearms without holding a permit to do so); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 11-47-8, 11-47-9 (Supp. 1993) (providing that no person may, without a permit, carry a pistol
or revolver, visible or concealed, within a vehicle or on his or her person, unless that person is on his or her
property, is a member of the police force, or has a license issued by another state).
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exemptions to include transportation of a firearm by a person who takes
title to a firearm by operation of law;" transportation of a firearm by a
person when going directly to, or coming from, a gun show or event for
the purpose of lawfully transferring 12 that firearm; and transportation of
a firearm while moving out of this state. 3
Under existing law, a person must be licensed in order to transfer a
firearm, with specified exceptions. 4 Chapter 606 exempts the transfer of
firearms by persons licensed under federal law and who reside outside the
state, and transfers between wholesalers.
15
Existing law requires that, after a certain date, a purchaser present a
basic firearm safety certificate 16 before delivery of a firearm capable of
being concealed upon the person. 17 Chapter 606 delays the operative date
for this provision to apply to April 1, 1994.8
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12070(c)(2) (enacted by Chapter 606) (defining persons taking title by
operation of law as including, but not limited to: (1) The executor of an estate, if the estate includes firearms;
(2) a secured creditor, when firearms are used as collateral; (3) a levying officer or receiver; (4) a receiver
performing his or her functions as a receiver if the receivership estate includes firearms; (5) a trustee for a
bankruptcy estate, which includes firearms; (6) an assignee for the benefit of creditors, which includes firearms;
or (7) spouses when a transmutation of property has taken place between them).
12. See id. § 12072(d) (amended by Chapter 606) (listing requirements for lawful transfer of a firearm
where neither party to the transactions has a dealer's license).
13. Id. § 12026.2(a)(13)-(15) (amended by Chapter 606); see id. § 12026.2(a)(l)-(5) (amended by Chapter
606) (setting forth conditions under which a person may carry a concealed firearm without holding a license to
do so).
14. Id. § 12070(a) (enacted by Chapter 606); see id. (stating that a person not licensed pursuant to
California Penal Code § 12071, who sells, leases, or transfers a firearm without a license, is guilty of a
misdemeanor); id. § 12070(b) (enacted by Chapter 606) (specifying that such transactions as: the liquidation of
a personal firearm collection to satisfy a court judgment; or the obtaining of a firearm by intestate succession
and subsequently transferring it; the infrequent transfer of a firearm; the loan of a firearm while at a target
facility; and the transfer of a firearm to a dealer by a wholesaler, among others, are exempt from California
licensure requirements); see also id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor).
15. Id. § 12070(b)(15)-(16) (enacted by Chapter 606); see 18 U.S.C. § 923 (1988 & Supp. IT 1990)
(regulating licensure of federal firearms dealers).
16. See id. § 12801 (West 1992) (defining "a basic firearm safety certificate" as a certificate issued to
the transferee by the Department in compliance with §§ 12800-12809, encompassing Article 8 of Chapter 6 of
the California Penal Code).
17. Id. §12072 (c)(5) (amended by Chapter 606); see id. § 12802(a) (West 1992) (regulating the issuance
of basic safety certificates); id. § 12803 (West Supp. 1993) (describing course and testing requirements prior to
issuance of the certificate); id. § 12805 (West 1992) (governing basic firearm safety instructors); id. § 12809
(amended by Chapter 606) (setting forth standards for the objective test to be administered prior to the issuance
of the certificate in lieu of taking the safety course); 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1326, see. 6, at 5537 (amending
CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072)) (specifying October 1, 1993 as the date on which the presentation of a basic
firearm safety certificate was required prior to delivery).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12072(c)(5) (amended by Chapter 606).
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Existing law requires that every licensed dealer keep records of certain
firearm transactions. 19 Chapter 606 excludes from this provision the
transfer, from the dealer to himself or herself, of a firearm that is not
capable of being concealed upon the person.2"
Existing law permits the Department of Justice to charge the dealer a
fee for processing the transfer of any tiumber of firearms on the same
date.2' Chapter 606 requires the Department to charge a reduced fee for
second and subsequent transfers on the same date.22
Under prior law, transfers of firearms to or between licensed dealers
were exempted from the usual fifteen day waiting period. 3 Chapter 606
deletes this provision and subjects licensed dealers to the fifteen day
waiting period for delivery of firearms capable of being concealed upon
the person.24
Existing law states that certain transfer restrictions do not apply in
specified situations.25 Chapter 606 restricts the specified situations to
those not involving firearms capable of being concealed upon the
person. 6 Chapter 606 further provides that certain transfer restrictions do
19. Id. § 12073 (amended by Chapter 606); see id. (requiring a licensed dealer to keep a register of the
sale or transfer of firearms, but providing that no entry need be made for the transfer of an unloaded firearm that
is not capable of being concealed upon the person by a dealer to another dealer, the transfer of an unloaded
firearm by a dealer to an importer or manufacturer, the transfer of an unloaded firearm to a person licensed as
a dealer under federal law and who resides outside the state, or the transfer of a firearm by a dealer to a
wholesaler); see also id. § 12073(c) (amended by Chapter 606) (providing that a violation of California Penal
Code § 12073 is a misdemeanor); id. § 12077 (amended by Chapter 606) (detailing the information to be
included in the register).
20. Id. § 12073(b)(6) (amended by Chapter 606).
21. Id. § 12076(d) (enacted by Chapter 606); see id. § 12076(g) (enacted by Chapter 606) tdirecting the
Department to charge fees for a single firearms transaction on the same date); cf MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
140, § 131A (West 1991) (prescribing a fee of $2.00 for the issuance of a permit to purchase a firearm); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 175.35(2i) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for a fee of $5.00 to be charged by the Department for
each criminal history record search requested by the dealer). But cf HAw. REV. STAT. § 134-2(h) (Supp. 1992)
(stating that no fee is to be charged for a permit to acquire ownership of a handgun).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12076(g)(2) (enacted by Chapter 606).
23. 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 954, sec. 1, at 3445 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 12078); see CAL. PElAL
CODE § 12072(c) (amended by Chapter 606) (prohibiting delivery of a firearm to a transferee under certain
conditions, including prior to a fifteen day waiting period); id. § 12072(d) (amended by Chapter 606)
(designating lawful transfers of firearms where neither party is a licensed dealer); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. ch.
790.0655(2) (West Supp. 1993) (exempting persons holding concealed weapons permits from a three-day waiting
period before delivery of a handgun); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 175.35(2t)(b) (West Supp. 1993) (exempting
transactions between dealers from a 48 hour waiting period).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12078(k)(1) (enacted by Chapter 606).
25. Id. § 12078(k)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 606). see id. (providing that certain transfer restrictions do
not apply to the transfer of a firearm not capable of being concealed upon the person, the transfer of a firearm
by a dealer licensed under federal law to a person who resides outside of the state, or the transfer of firearms
to a wholesaler if the firearms are being returned to the wholesaler and are intended as merchandise in the
wholesaler's business).
26. Id. § 12078(g)(2) (enacted by Chapter 606).
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not apply to: (1) The transfer of a firearm by a licensed dealer to himself
or herself; (2) the transfer of firearms to a wholesaler, if the firearms are
used as merchandise in the wholesaler's business or if that transfer is made
in accordance with federal law; (3) transfers of firearms, capable of being
concealed upon the person, between dealers if they are not intended as
merchandise; or (4) transfers of assault weapons.27
Existing law permits the transfer of firearms to be completed through
a sheriff's department in a county of less than 200,000 persons upon the
completion of a Law Enforcement Firearms Transfer Form for each
21transaction. 8 Chapter 606 states that a single transfer of any number of
firearms that are not capable of being concealed upon the person between
the same two persons may be reported on a single Law Enforcement
Firearms Transfer Form.29
Under existing law, a peace officer30 may purchase any "less lethal
weapon ' 3' for official use in the discharge of that officer's official
duties.32 Chapter 606 specifies that "less lethal weapons" do not include
assault weapons.
33
Under prior law, if a licensed dealer was certified as a basic firearm
safety course instructor, the dealer could not deliver a firearm capable of
being concealed upon the person unless that dealer provided written
27. Id. § 12078(m), (n)(1)-(2), (o) (enacted by Chapter 606); see 18 U.S.C. § 926A (1988) (regulating
interstate transfers of firearms); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12276 (amended by Chapter 606) (designating certain
semiautomatic firearms as assault weapons); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 790.33(d)(5) (West 1992) (exempting
transactions between federally licensed dealers from a three-day waiting period); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, §
432(c) (1979) (requiring that each transaction between dealers be reported to the Secretary of Justice and the
Superintendent of Police of Puerto Rico); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 461(b) (1993) (setting forth reporting
requirements for transactions between licensed dealers).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12084 (amended by Chapter 606); see id. § 12084(c),(d) (amended by Chapter
606) (describing the procedure to be followed by the sheriffs department and setting forth the requirements
relating to the completion of the Law Enforcement Firearms Transfer Form).
29. Id. § 12084(c)(6) (amended by Chapter 606).
30. See id. §§ 830-832.9 (West Supp. 1993) (designating certain persons as peace officers and defining
the appropriate scopes of authority for various peace officers).
31. See id. § 12601(a) (amended by Chapter 606) (defining less lethal weapon as a device which expels
less lethal ammunition by any mechanism for the purpose of incapacitating a human being, including physical
pain or discomfort); id. § 12601(b) (amended by Chapter 606) (excluding certain weapons from inclusion in the
definition of "less lethal weapons"); see also id. § 12601(c) (amended by Chapter 606) (defining less lethal
ammunition).
32. Id. § 12600 (West 1992).




instructions on the use of the firearm. 4 Chapter 606 deletes this
provision.
Prior law required applicants, for admission to a basic course of
training certified by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and
Training, to certify that they did not have a criminal background 36 which
would prevent them from owning a firearm capable of being concealed
upon the person.37 Chapter 606 requires certification that the applicants
do not have a criminal background which would prevent them from
owning any firearm.
38
Under existing law, if a weapon is confiscated from a person who has
been detained for mental examination,39 it must be returned to the person
34. 1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 950, sec. 20 at 3803 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 12809); see CAL. PENAL
CODE § 12803(a)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993) (directing the Department to develop an instructional manual to be
distributed to instructors, to designate a minimum level of skill to be required of instructors, and to develop
guidelines to be utilized for the certification of instructors); id. § 12805(a) (West 1992) (stating that the
Department must designate any person, certified by a nationally recognized organization which fosters safety
in firearms, or any person found to be competent to give instruction, as a basic firearms safety instructor); id
§ 12805(b) (West 1992) (providing that the Department must designate a licensed firearms dealer as a basic
firearms safety instructor).
35. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 12809 (amended by Chapter 606).
36. See id. § 13511.5 (amended by Chapter 606) (defining criminal background as a criminal record that
would disqualify the person from possessing a firearm pursuant to California Penal Code § 12021); see also id.
§ 12021 (West Supp. 1993) (disqualifying any person who has been convicted of a felony, addicted to a narcotic
drug, or other specified offenses from possessing a firearm).
37. 1984 Cal. Stat. ch. 785, sec. 1, at 2779 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 13511.5).
38. CAL. PENAL CODE § 13511.5 (amended by Chapter 606); see id. § 12021.1(a) (West 1992)
(prohibiting ownership or possession of any firearm if the person has been convicted of specified offenses); id.
§ 12021.1(b) (West 1992) (specifying certain violent offenses including murder, mayhem, rape, felonies
punishable by death or life imprisonment, robbery, and kidnapping among others as violent offenses); see id.
§ 13511.5 (amended by Chapter 606) (requiring certification by the applicant that the applicant does not have
a criminal history which would prohibit ownership of any firearm in accordance with California Penal Code §§
12021, 12021.1 or California Welfare and Institution Code §§ 8100, 8103); see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 8100(a) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting possession of a firearm by a person determined to be a danger to
himself or others); id. § 8103 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that any person, who has been adjudicated as a danger
to others or as a mentally disordered sex offender, or has been found not guilty of certain crimes by reason of
insanity, can not have possession or custody of a firearm).
39. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1984) (setting forth grounds for involuntary detention
in a facility approved by the State Department of Mental Health for treatment and evaluation).
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upon that person's release without judicial commitment.4  Chapter 606
provides for return of the weapon upon release of the person.41
RMC
Crimes; fraud-telephone services
Penal Code § 502.7 (amended).
AB 1656 (Polanco); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1014
Under existing law a person who avoids or attempts to avoid lawful
telephone or telegraph charges through specified means is guilty of a
crime.' Chapter 1014 adds conspiracy and the fraudulent use of altered or
stolen identification to the list of means for which a person can be
punished for theft of telephone services.2
Prior law made the theft of telephone services a misdemeanor or felony
if the total value of the services exceeded $400 for a period of twelve
consecutive months during the three years prior to indictment. 3 Chapter
1014 mandates a felony conviction if a person has had a prior
40. Id. § 8102(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 606); see id. § 5152 (West Supp. 1993) (providing for the
release of a person within 72 hours of the original detention, if a psychiatrist believes that the person no longer
requires evaluation and treatment).
41. Id. § 8102(b) (amended by Chapter 606).
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7(a)-(e) (amended by Chapter 1014); see id. (describing the various penalties
available for telephone or telegraph fraud). A person will be guilty of theft of telephone services if that person
used deception, false pretense, trick, scheme, or device in order to avoid lawful telephone charges. Id. §
502.7(a)(5) (amended by Ch. 1014); see also id. § 591 (West 1992) (stating that a person who makes any
unauthorized connection with a telephone line will be guilty of a crime). See generaly People v. Dingle, 174
Cal. App. 3d 21, 30, 219 Cal. Rptr. 707, 713 (1985) (stating that in order to be guilty of theft of telephone
services you must first show an intent to deprive a person of property); People v. Rousseau, 129 Cal. App. 3d
526, 535, 179 Cal. Rptr. 892, 896 (1982) (stating that § 502.7 does not apply to fraud in directory listings);
People v. Kreiling, 259 Cal. App. 2d 699, 704, 66 Cal. Rptr. 582, 585 (1968) (stating that a person can be guilty
of violations of both § 509 and § 502.7 if that person uses unauthorized means to tap into a telephone line or
service and use it for free).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 1014); cf. State v. Tansey, 593 N.Y.S.2d 426,
428 (1992) (detailing how the identification codes of state employees were used to obtain free long distance
services); John Eckhouse, Organized Crime Gets Into Phone Fraud, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 7, 1993, at D1 (stating
that organized crime has conspired to defraud telephone companies and businesses of about $4 billion worth of
long distance calls annually); James M. Gomez, Two Youths Accused of Computer Data Thievery, L.A. TnImEs,
Jan. 10, 1991, at BI (detailing how two youths shared access codes with hundreds of computer users in order
to obtain telephone services valued at $1.5 million).
3. 1993 Cal. Stat. ch. 1110, sec. 6, at 4017 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7).
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misdemeanor or felony conviction for theft of telephone services within the
past five years.4
Existing law prohibits the publishing5 of credit card or calling card
numbers for the purposes of avoiding lawful telephone charges. 6 Under
Chapter 1014, publication of credit card or calling card numbers on a
computer bulletin board system also constitutes a crime.7 Additionally,
Chapter 1014 makes it a crime for a person to receive something of value
in exchange for furnishing a calling card or credit card number to someone




Penal Code §§ 594.2, 594.6, 640.7 (new); §§ 550, 594, 594.1,
640.5, 640.6, 1203.1, 4024.2 (amended); Vehicle Code § 13202.6
(amended).
AB 1179 (Epple); 1993 STAT. Ch. 605
Penal Code § 594.7 (new).
SB 1011 (Watson); 1993 STAT. Ch. 715
Existing law provides that any person' who maliciously 2 defaces 3
4. CAL. PENAl. CODE § 502.7(g) (amended by Chapter 1014); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1656, at 2 (July 13, 1993) (stating that the author of Chapter 1014 contends that
mandating a felony conviction for repeat offenders will greatly reduce theft of telephone services).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 502.7(c) (amended by Chapter 1014) (defining publishing as the communication
of information to one or more persons). Publishing can be accomplished either through oral, written, or electronic
communications. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; see Eckhouse, supra note 2, at Dl (stating that victims of telephone long distance theft believe
that computer hackers are responsible for 58% of all losses); Gomez, supra note 2, at Bi (chronicling the tale
of two young computer hackers who published long distance access numbers over computer bulletin board
systems for use by other hackers); Paul Wallich, Digital Desperadoes, SCL AM., Sept. 1990, at 34 (warning that
prior restraint on the publishing of articles detailing methods of hacking and obtaining free telephone services
could be unconstitutional).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE 502.7(d) (amended by Chapter 1014); cf. State v. Tansey, 593 N.Y.S.2d 426,428
(1992) (holding that telephone calling card numbers are not considered to be property).
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 7(4) (West 1988) (defining maliciously as importing a wish to vex, annoy, or injure another
person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, established either by proof or presumption of law).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Crimes
with paint or any other liquid, damages, or destroys any real4 or personal5
property not the person's own, is guilty of vandalism. 6 Chapter 605
expands the definition of vandalism to include any act of malicious
spraying, scratching, writing on, or otherwise defacing, damaging or
destroying any real or personal property not a person's own.7 Chapter 605
also creates a permissive inference that real property belonging to any
public entity,8 or to the federal government, is neither owned by the
offender nor was the offender permitted by the owner to deface, damage,
or destroy the property.9 Chapter 715 makes it either a misdemeanor'
or felony" for a person, having been previously convicted for vandalism
under Penal Code § 594 on two separate occasions and having been
incarcerated 2 for at least one of the convictions, to be subsequently
convicted of vandalism. 3
3. See People v. Brumley, 242 Cal. App. 2d 124, 128, 51 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1966) (stating that to
deface does not necessarily mean to obliterate and to alter does not mean to change beyond recognition); cf.
State v. Kasnett, 283 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio Ct. App. 1972) (defining deface as meaning to mar, injure, or
spoil), rev'd, 297 N.E.2d 537 (Ohio 1973).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(11) (West 1988) (defining real property).
5. See id. § 7(12) (West 1988) (defining personal property).
6. Id. § 594(a) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. § 594(b)(l)-(4) (amended by Chapter 605) (specifying
that vandalism is punishable as a misdemeanor if the amount of damage caused is less than $5,000 and is
punishable as a felony or misdemeanor if the amount of damage is $5,000 or more); id. § 594(c) (amended by
Chapter 605) (providing that for a vandalism conviction consisting of writing graffiti, the court may order the
defendant to either clean up or repair the damaged property himself or to pay for the work to be done); People
v. Kahanic, 196 Cal. App. 3d 461, 466, 241 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1987) (stating that each community property
owner has an equal and undivided ownership interest; thus, a spouse can be found guilty of vandalism for
destroying or damaging community property); see also CAL. EvID. CODE § 1410.5(b) (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that graffiti is admissible evidence of writing in an action for vandalism, for the purpose of proving
the writing was made by the defendant); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 640.5(f), 640.6(f) (amended by Chapter 605)
(defining graffiti). See generally D.E. Evins, Annotation, What Constitutes "Vandalisni" or "Malicious Mischier'
within Coverage of Property Insurance Policy, 23 A.L.R. 3d 1259, § 3 (1969 & Supp. 1993) (discussing cases
from other jurisdictions that establish the definitions of vandalism and malicious mischief).
7. CAL. PENAL. CODE § 594(a) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. § 594.6 (enacted by Chapter 605)
(providing that any person convicted of specified graffiti or vandalism offenses, pursuant to California Penal
Code §§ 594, 640.5, 640.6. or 640.7 on two separate occasions, after incarceration for at least one of the
convictions, and after a subsequent conviction of vandalism, may be ordered by the court, as a condition of
probation, to perform up to 300 hours of community service).
8. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 811.2 (Vest 1980) (defining public entity).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(a) (amended by Chapter 605).
10. See id. § 17(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor as those crimes, excluding infractions,
which are not punishable with death or imprisonment in the state prison).
II. See id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining felony as a crime which is punishable by death or
imprisonment in the state prison).
12. See id. § 594.7 (enacted by Chapter 715) specifying that the incarceration must be pursuant to a
sentence, a conditional sentence, or a grant of probation); see also id. § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining
probation).
13. Id. § 594.7 (enacted by Chapter 715).
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Existing law also provides that it is a misdemeanor for any person
under the age of eighteen to possess14 an aerosol container of paint on
public property or in a public place for the purpose of defacing any
property.' 5 Under existing law, it is proper and constitutional to treat
people under the age of eighteen differently from those over that age. 6
Chapter 605 authorizes the court to order the defendant to perform
community service as a condition of probation. 7
Existing law provides that every person who possesses specified
burglar tools' 8 with the intent to feloniously break and enter into any
building' 9 is guilty of a misdemeanor. 0 Chapter 605 provides that every
14. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 637 (West 1966) (specifying that the things which a person possesses are
presumed to be owned by him); cf United States v. Ocampo. 937 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating, in a
case involving cocaine possession, that possession means dominion and control, and may be proved
circumstantially by proof of exclusive dominion or of some special relationship, and it is not enough to show
mere proximity or a defendant's presence on the property where it is found); People v. Mijares, 6 Cal. 3d 415,
423, 491 P.2d 1115, 1120. 99 Cal. Rptr. 139, 144 (1971) (holding that handling a narcotic for the sole purpose
of disposal does not constitute possession within the meaning of California Health & Safety Code § 11500);
People v. Gory, 28 Cal. 2d 450, 454-55, 170 P.2d 433, 436 (1946) (holding that the term possession means an
immediate and exclusive possession under the dominion and control, and a defendant having such control must
have knowledge of the presence of the forbidden item). But cf People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 24, 582 P.2d
1000, 1007, 148 Cal. Rptr. 409, 416 (1978) (stating that a felon's temporary possession of a firearm for a period
no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, and its use
without a preconceived plan or design on the part of the felon, does not constitute possession within the terms
of California Penal Code § 12021).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.1(e), (f) (amended by Chapter 605); see Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of
Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 4th 893, 906, 844 P.2d 534, 542, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 215, 223 (1993) (holding that a local
ordinance, which prohibited retailers from displaying aerosol paint containers where they would be accessible
by the public, was not preempted by California Penal Code § 594. 1, because the express preemption provision
in the statute when originally enacted was not carried over into its later amendment). See generallyv Jennifer Kerr,
Graffiti Vandals to Lose Right to Drive-New Law Allows Courts to Suspend Licenses of Teens Caught Defacing
Public Places, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 26, 1990, at C21 (declaring that San Francisco spent over two million dollars
and the city of Los Angeles over nine million dollars to clean up graffiti last year and that an 18-year old was
accused of painting the word "Chaka" on 10,000 traffic signs and various other objects in Southern California,
causing approximately $500,000 in damage).
16. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,425 (1961) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment gives the
states a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others,
and "the constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective"); Hernandez v. DMV, 30 Cal. 3d 70, 79, 634 P.2d 917, 922, 177 Cal. Rptr.
566, 571 (1981) (stating that the law need not be logically consistent in its aim in every respect to be
constitutional and that it is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that the particular legislative
measure might be thought a rational way to correct it); In re Arthur W., 171 Cal. App. 3d 179, 186, 217 Cal.
Rptr. 183, 186-87 (1985) (stating that age is not recognized under either the California or the federal Constitution
as a suspect classification).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.1(e)(2)(A)-(C) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. (authorizing the court to
order, as a condition of probation, a defendant to perform 100 hours of community service for the first
conviction, 200 hours for a second conviction under this section, and 300 hours for any subsequent convictions).
18. See id. § 466 (fVest 1988) (defining burglars' tools as a picklock, crow, keybit, crowbar, screwdriver,
vice grip pliers, water-pump pliers, slide-hammer, slimjim, tension bar, lock pick gun, tubular lock pick, floor-
safe door puller, master key, or other instrument or tool).
19. See id. (defining building as also including railroad car, aircraft, vessel, trailer coach, or vehicle).
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person who possesses a masonry, glass, or carbide drill bit, a glass cutter,
a grinding stone, an awl, a chisel, or a carbide scribe, with the intent to
commit vandalism or graffiti, is guilty of a misdemeanor."1
Under existing law, any person who writes, sprays, scratches, or affixes
graffiti on property not the person's own, or on government facilities or
vehicles, is guilty of an infraction.22 Chapter 605 increases the community
service to be performed for a first conviction, and increases the punishment
for subsequent convictions for affixing graffiti when the defendant has
prior, separate convictions for vandalism or graffiti.23 Chapter 605 also
provides that any person who commits graffiti or vandalism offenses24 on




21. Id. § 594.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 605); see id. § 594.2(b) (specifying that, as a condition of
probation for any violation of this provision, the court may order the defendant to perform community service
not to exceed 90 hours).
22. Id. §§ 640.5(a), 640.6(a) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. § 640.5(a) (amended by Chapter 605)
(stating that any person who affixes graffiti on the facilities or vehicles of governmental agencies, causing less
than $250 damage, is guilty of an infraction, punishable by a fine not to exceed $250 and also by up to 48 hours
of community service); id. § 640.6(a)-(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 605) (stating that any person who affixes
graffiti to real or personal property not the person's own, causing less than $250 damage, is guilty of an
infraction, punishable by a fine not to exceed $250 and community service not to exceed 48 hours for the first
conviction and not to exceed 96 hours for subsequent convictions); see also id. § 19.6 (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that infractions are not punishable by imprisonment, that a person charged with an infraction is not
entitled to a jury trial or have the public defender or other counsel at public expense represent him, unless the
person is arrested and not released); id. § 19.8 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that an infraction is punishable by
a fine not exceeding $250).
23. Id. §§ 640.5(a)-(c), 640.6(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. §§ 640.5(a)-(c) (amended by
Chapter 605) (making the sentence for a first conviction an infraction with a fine not to exceed $500 and a
minimum of 24 and a maximum of 100 hours of community service; a second conviction a misdemeanor, with
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed six months, a fine up to $1000, and, as a condition of probation,
a minimum of 48 and a maximum of 200 hours of community service; a third conviction a misdemeanor, with
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, and, as a condition of probation, community service of
up to 300 hours); id. § 640.6(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 605) (making the sentence for a first conviction an
infraction with a fine not to exceed $250 and up to 100 hours of community service; a second conviction a
misdemeanor, with imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed six months, and, as a condition of probation,
up to 200 hours of community service; a third conviction a misdemeanor, with imprisonment in a county jail
not to exceed one year, and as a condition of probation, community service of up to 300 hours).
24. See id. § 640.7(a) (enacted by Chapter 605) (specifying that violations of California Penal Code §§
594, 640.5, and 640.6 are punishable as vandalism and graffiti offenses).
25. See id. (providing that appurtenances include, but are not limited to, guard rails, signs, traffic signals,
snow poles, or similar facilities, but excludes signs naming streets).
26. Id.; see id. (providing that a violation of this provision is a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not
to exceed $1000 and to six months imprisonment in a county jail, and on the second conviction, by a fine not
to exceed $1000 and up to one year imprisonment in a county jail); id. § 640.7(b) (enacted by Chapter 605)
(specifying that as a condition of probation, the court may order the defendant to perform 100 hours of
community service; on the second conviction for this offense, 200 hours of community service; and for the third
or subsequent convictions, 300 hours of community service).
Selected 1993 Legislation
Crimes
Existing law authorizes a court to impose and require any or all of
specified terms of imprisonment, fines, and other reasonable conditions of
probation upon a defendant convicted of a crime.27 Chapter 605 requires
a court to consider, except as specified, whether any defendant, who has
been convicted of a nonviolent and nonserious offense and ordered to
participate in community service as a condition of probation, will be
required to engage in graffiti removal to satisfy that service.28
Existing law authorizes any county correctional facility to offer a work
release program, consisting of specified manual labor, under which a
person may voluntarily participate and each day of participation will be in
lieu of one day of confinement.29 Chapter 605 authorizes a work release
27. Id. § 1203.1 (amended by Chapter 605); see People v. Lent, 15 Cal. 3d 481,486, 541 P.2d 545, 548,
124 Cal. Rptr. 905, 908 (1975) (holding that a condition of probation which requires or forbids conduct which
is not itself criminal is valid if that conduct is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was
convicted or to future criminality); People v. Fritchey, 2 Cal. App. 4th 829, 835-36, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 585, 589
(1992) (stating that once a court grants probation, it has broad discretion to prescribe reasonable probation
conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect the public, but that an imposed condition must serve a purpose
specified in California Penal Code § 1203.1, which has as its major goal the rehabilitation of the criminal, and
thus limits the measure of authority the court may exercise); People v. Dailey, 235 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 13, 19.
286 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (1991) (stating that probation conditions not specifically authorized by statute arc
generally authorized by California Penal Code § 1203.1, which allows imposition of any reasonable conditions
which the court may determine are fitting and proper, and should be sustained if they are reasonable under all
the circumstances of the case, unless precluded by either the federal or state constitution or a federal or state
statute); People v. Gilchrist, 133 Cal. App. 3d 38, 44, 183 Cal. Rptr. 709, 712 (1982) (holding that the power
of the court with regard to probation is entirely statutory, and the court cannot impose a probation period which
extends beyond the maximum allowed by statute); see also 32 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 48,49 (1958) (providing that
a court may not remand a probationer directly to an industrial farm or road camp, but must be remanded into
the custody of the sheriff to be committed to the facility). See generally Richard J. Hanscom, Probation-The
Quiet Rerohtion, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 182, 184 (1975) (discussing the general rules for determining reasonable
probation conditions under California Penal Code § 1203.1); Thomas F. McBride & George W. McClure, The
Conditions of Probation, 29 CAL. ST. BJ. 44, 44 (1954) (discussing conditions of probation and whether they
are reasonable within the meaning of California Penal Code § 1203.1).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.1(g)(1) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. § 1203.1(g)(I)(A)-(D) (amended
by Chapter 605) (providing that a nonserious offense shall not include offenses in violation of the Dangerous
Weapons' Control Law, California Penal Code § 12000; offenses involving the use of a dangerous or deadly
weapon, including all violations of California Penal Code § 417; offenses involving the use or attempted use
of violence against the person of another or involving injury to a victim; and offenses involving the annoying
or molesting of children); id. § 1203.1(g)(2)(A)-(B) (amended by Chapter 605) (stating that the court and the
prosecuting attorney need not consider a defendant eligible for graffiti removal if he or she was convicted of
a violent felony under California Penal Code § 667.5(c) or a serious felony under California Penal Code §
1192.7(c) or the judge believes the defendant may pose a danger to the community).
29. Id. § 4024.2(a) (amended by Chapter 605); see id. § 4024.2(b)(l)-(2) (authorizing that the work
release program shall consist of manual labor to improve or maintain public facilities or levees, manual labor
in support of nonprofit organizations, or participation in education, vocational, or substance abuse programs, but
at a minimum, at least one-half of the total work release hours must consist of manual labor); id. §
4024.2(b)(1)(D) (amended by Chapter 605) (providing that any person not able to perform manual labor because
of a medical condition, physical disability, or age, may participate in a work release program involving any other
type of designated and approved public sector work); see also 66 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 27, 27 (1983) (stating that
a person sentenced to jail for drunk driving may, if authorized by the county under California Penal Codc §
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program to include the performance of graffiti cleanup for local
government entities."
Existing law authorizes, for each conviction of a person for violations
involving vandalism, the court to suspend or delay issuance of the person's
driving privilege for one year.3' Chapter 605 would also extend this
provision to apply to vandalism involving spraying, scratching, or writing
on a surface.3
FSG
4024.2, perform 10 hours of labor on public works in lieu of one day of confinement or if serving a term of 48
or 96 hours for drunk driving, may satisfy his or her sentence by performing public labor of 20 or 40 hours,
respectively).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4024.2(b)(I)(C) (amended by Chapter 605).
31. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.6(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 605); see also New Law: Do Graffiti, Lose
License, SEATFLE TIMES, Jan. 6, 1991, at All (noting that California is the first state to punish graffiti vandals
by suspending driving privileges, but that at least 15 states, including California, suspend driver's licenses for
underage drinking, and that some states have suspended licenses of high school dropouts and truants). See
generally Greg Lucas, Check Identification, Graffiti Bills Signed, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 13, 1990, at A13 (stating
that Senator Quentin Kopp, the bill's author, feels that there are few things as important to teenagers as their
driving privilege and that threatening to revoke it for one year will serve as a powerful deterrent to writing
graffiti, while opponents object to the lack of relationship between graffiti and driving).
32. CAL. VEH. CODE § 13202.6(d) (amended by Chapter 605).
Selected 1993 Legislation
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Crimes; habitual sexual offenders
Penal Code § 667.71 (new).
SB 41 (Presley); 1993 STAT. Ch. 590
Existing law defines and establishes punishments for sex crimes against
the person, including but not limited to rape,' penetration with a foreign
object,2 sodomy,3 and oral copulation.4
Chapter 590 establishes the definition of "habitual sexual offender."5
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West Supp. 1993) (defining rape); id. § 264 (West Supp, 1993)
(providing the punishment for the crime of rape); see also People v. Kelley, I Cal. 4th 495, 524, 822 P.2d 385,
399, 3 Cal Rptr. 2d 677, 691 (1992) (holding that rape requires the victim to be alive; however, a person who
attempts to rape a live victim, kills the victim and then has intercourse with the body has committed an
attempted rape), cert. denied, 121 L. Ed. 2d 168 (1992); People v. Jeff, 204 Cal. App. 3d 309, 328-29, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 145-47 (1988) (holding that it must be established that the intercourse was against the victims will
and that the victim must fear immediate and unlawful bodily injury or that the rape was completed through force,
violence, menace, or duress); People v. Burnham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 1140, 222 Cal. Rptr. 630, 635 (1986)
(holding that rape requires only a general criminal intent); People v. Vela, 172 Cal. App. 3d 237, 243, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 165 (1985) (holding that each act of non-consensual sexual penetration of a victim constitutes a
separate rape offense). See generally 2 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Crimes Against Decency and Morals §§ 768-778 at 869-78 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the crime of rape and its
elements).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (West Supp. 1993) (defining rape by a foreign object); id. § 264.1
(West 1988) (providing the punishment for the crime of rape or object rape while acting in concert with another
person); see also People v. Harrison, 48 Cal. 3d 321, 329, 768 P.2d 1078, 1082, 256 Cal. Rptr. 401, 405 (1989)
(holding that, under California Penal Code § 289, a separate violation is committed each time a new and separate
penetration, however slight, occurs); People v. Wilcox, 177 Cal. App. 3d 715, 717, 223 Cal. Rptr 170, 171
(1986) (establishing that a finger is a foreign object). See generally 2 WITIN & EPSTEIN supra note I, § 792
at 894-96 (discussing the crime of penetration with a foreign object).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining sodomy); see also People v. Thompson,
50 Cal. 3d 134, 172, 785 P.2d 857, 878, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 330 (1990) (stating that a person who commits an
act of sodomy on a child may be convicted of both sodomy and lewd and lascivious conduct with a child), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1988): People v. Martinez, 188 Cal. App. 3d 19, 24, 232 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (1986)
(holding that any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime of sodomy); People v.
Thornton, 11 Cal. 3d 738, 765, 523 P.2d 267, 285, 114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 485 (1974) (establishing that only general
intent is required in offenses of sexual perversion). See generally 2 WITKIN & EPSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 782-
783 at 881-85 (discussing the crime of sodomy and its elements).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261-266 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); see id. § 288(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(defining oral copulation); People v. Muniz, 213 Cal. App. 3d 1508, 1517, 262 Cal. Rptr. 743, 747 (1989)
(holding that forcible oral copulation does not require a specific intent or purpose). See generally 2 WITKIN &
EPSTEIN, supra note 1, §§ 784-785 at 885-89 (discussing the crime of oral copulation and its elements).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.71 (enacted by Chapter 590); see id. § 667(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(establishing the definition for habitual criminal as being a person who has previously served at least one prison
term for one or more of the offenses listed in paragraph (2) of § 261(a), § 264.1, § 289(a) of the California Penal
Code, or of committing sodomy or oral copulation in violation of § 286 or § 288(a) by force, violence, duress,
menace, or fear of unlawful and immediate bodily injury on the victim or another person and is convicted in
the present proceeding of at least two of the specified offenses against at least two separate victims or is
convicted of at least three of the delineated offenses against at least three separate victims); see also Graham
v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912) (holding that recidivist statutes authorizing heavier or enhanced
sentences for subsequent offenses do not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual
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Chapter 590 further provides that a habitual sexual offender who is, in one
proceeding, convicted of two separate offenses against at least two separate
victims may be sentenced to twenty-five years in prison.6 Additionally,
Chapter 590 provides that a habitual sexual offender who is convicted in
one proceeding of at least three separate offenses against at least three
separate victims may be subject to imprisonment for twenty-five years to
life.
7
punishment); People v. Crocket, 222 Cal. App. 3d 258, 265, 271 Cal. Rptr. 500, 504 (1990) (holding that
enhancements for prior convictions are intended to increase penalties for repeat offenders in the hope of deterring
recidivism); cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-3-412 (1986) (defining habitual sexual offender against children); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01(a) (Baldwin 1993) (defining habitual sexual offender to include any person who
is convicted two or more times, in separate criminal actions of specified sex offenses); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
407 (1990) (establishing additional prison time for repeat and habitual sexual offenders); Hendking v. Smith,
781 F.2d 850, 852 (1 th Cir. 1986) (stating that sex offenders are subject to a continually recurring physiological
urge and therefore require the imposition of effective restraint); Funk v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1081, 1086 (Ind.
1981) (holding that the Indiana habitual offender statute is not unconstitutional for punishing one convicted
under it for a status); Rolack v. Commonwealth, 514 S.W.2d 47, 49, (Ky. 1974) (holding that the imposition
of a life sentence under Kentucky's habitual criminal statute is neither cruel nor unusual punishment).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.7 1(b) (enacted by Chapter 590); see id. (stating that Article 2.5 of Chapter
7 of Title I of Part 3 of the California Penal Code shall apply to reduce the prison term imposed by Chapter
590; however, no habitual offender sentenced under the provisions of Chapter 590 may be paroled unless at least
20 years of incarceration has transpired); id. § 667.71(d) (enacted by Chapter 590) (stating that in lieu of the
punishments specified in (b) and (c), the court shall order, at the request of the prosecutor, that the defendant
be punished pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 1170.1, 667.6, or 667.7 if applicable); Minnesota v. Ramsey
County, 309 U.S. 270, 273-74 (1940) (upholding a sentencing statute that allowed commitment procedures to
be brought against habitual sexual offenders and finding that the law does not deny equal protection of the laws);
People v. Warner, 20 Cal. 3d 678, 689, 574 P.2d 1237, 1243, 143 Cal. Rptr. 885, 891 (1978) (stating the
paramount concern in sentencing must be the protection of society); People v. Preciado, 116 Cal. App. 3d 409,
412, 172 Cal. Rptr. 107, 108-09 (1981) (holding that the severity of the defendant's sentence was directly
proportionate to the number and violence of his crimes and further holding that the mandatory imposition of
consecutive sentences for violent rapes does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); cf. UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-3-407 (1990) (establishing additional prison terms for repeat and habitual sexual offenders); People v.
Carmickle, 360 N.E.2d 794, 797 (ill. 1977) (stating that the Illinois Constitution requires penalties to be decided
according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship
which requires the sentencing judge to look at the circumstances attending the offense); Johnson v. State, 537
N.E.2d 1191, 1193 (Ind. 1989) (stating that aggravating circumstances may serve as guidelines, however, they
do not limit the matters which the judge may consider in determining the proper sentence to proscribe). See
generally People v. Valencia, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 1046, 255 Cal. Rptr. 180, 183 (1989) (stating that the
court should not have discretion to order enhancement terms to be concurrent of one another); People v. Wallace,
169 Cal. App. 3d 406, 410, 215 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (1985) (holding that, where two sentencing enhancement
statutes overlap, no federal equal protection violation necessarily occurs when a defendant is charged under the
more harsh statute); People v. Weaver, 161 Cal. App. 3d 119, 126,207 Cal. Rptr. 419,424 (1984) (holding that,
where a sentenced was enhanced 15 years because of three prior serious felony convictions, it was not
unconstitutional as constituting cruel and unusual punishment); Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Law: The Need To Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness From Civil
Commitnent Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213 (discussing Washington's violent sexual predator law and
whether it may be successfully challenged under the United States Constitution); Note, Hate is Not Speech: A
Constitutional Defense of Penalty Enhancement For Hate Crimes, 106 HARv. L. REV. 1314 (1993) (discussing
the constitutionality of penalty enhancements for hate crimes); Robb London, Strategy on Sex Crimes Is Prison,
Then Prison, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1991, at B16 (discussing the civil commitment of habitual sexual offenders).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.71(c) (enacted by Chapter 590).
Selected 1993 Legislation
Crimes
For the purposes of Chapter 590, prosecutorial jurisdiction is authorized
in any county where at least one of the offenses occurred. 8 Chapter 590
shall apply if the defendant's habitual sexual offender status is alleged in
the information and is either admitted by the defendant in court or found
by the jury to be true, or established by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
or by trial by a court without a jury.9
DMB/JVE
Crimes; kidnapping-habitual child molesters
Penal Code § 667.72 (new).
AB 526 (Brown, V.); 1993 STAT. Ch. 558
Under existing law, a person who commits the offenses of sodomy,'
lewd and lascivious acts,2 or oral copulation,3 when the victim is under
8. Md § 667.71(0 (enacted by Chapter 590).
9. Id. § 667.71(g) (enacted by Chapter 590).
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 286(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining sodomy); id. § 286(c) (West Supp.
1993) (specifying that any person who participates in an act of sodomy with another person who is under 14
years old and who is more than 10 years younger than he or she, or when the act is accomplished against the
victim's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on
the victim or another person, or threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or another person, and
there is a reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will execute the threat, shall be punished in the state prison
for three, six, or eight years); People v. Thompson, 50 Cal. 3d 134, 171, 785 P.2d 857, 877, 266 Cal. Rptr. 309,
329 (1990) (finding that evidence of sperm in the boy victim's body is in itself sufficient evidence of sodomy).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West Supp. 1993) (stating that any person who willfully commits
lewd or lascivious acts upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14
with the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or child,
shall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the state prison for three, six, or eight years); id. § 288(b)
(,Vest Supp. 1993) (specifying that any person who commits an act described in § 288(a) by use of force,
violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years); People v. Jones, 51 Cal. 3d 294,
316, 792 P.2d 643, 655, 270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 623-24 (1990) (stating that in determining the sufficiency of a
victim's testimony, the court must not focus on the youth of the victim, but the victim must describe: (1) The
kind of acts committed with sufficient specificity to assure that the conduct has occurred and to differentiate
between the various types of conduct; (2) the number of acts with sufficient certainty; and (3) the general time
period in which the acts occurred); People v. Gilbert, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1380, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 660, 664
(1992) (stating that the lewd and lascivious act need not be inherently sexual in nature, nor must it be shown
that the offender touched the child's private parts); id. (stating that the crime is committed by any touching of
the child with the requisite intent and that the purpose of the perpetrator in touching the child is the controlling
factor to be considered); People v. Newlun, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1590, 1601, 278 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1991)
(holding that the defendant's convictions on 15 counts of lewd and lascivious acts with a child under 14 were
supported by sufficient evidence despite the defendant's contention that the victim failed to establish with
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fourteen years old and is more than ten years younger than the person, has
committed a felony4 and is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
for three, six, or eight years.5
Chapter 558 defines a habitual child molester as a person who has
previously served a prison term for sodomy, lewd and lascivious acts, or
oral copulation, who kidnapped6 a victim under the age of fourteen at the
time of the offense, for the purpose of committing that sexual offense, and
is convicted in a present proceeding of that same offense against two or
more separate victims.
7
specificity the kind or number of acts the defendant committed).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining oral copulation); id. § 288a(c) (West
Supp. 1993) (stating the punishment of imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years shall be
given to any person who participates in an act of oral copulation with another person who is under 14 years of
age and more than 10 years younger than he or she, or when the act is accomplished against the victim's will
by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or
another person, or by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or any other person and there is a
reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will execute the threat).
4. See id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining felony).
5. Id. §§ 286(c), 288(b), 288a(a) (West Supp. 1993).
6. See id. § 207(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that any person who, for the purpose of committing
any act defined in § 288, hires, persuades, entices, decoys or seduces by false promises, misrepresentations, or
the like, any child under the age of 14 years to go out of this country, state or county, or into another part of
the same county is guilty of kidnapping); People v. Daly, 8 Cal. App. 4th 47, 56-7, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 21, 26-7
(1992) (stating that movement or asportation must be substantial to satisfy the element of kidnapping and finding
that moving the victim forty feet in an unsuccessful effort to get her into a van was legally insufficient to
support a conviction for kidnapping); People v. Magana, 230 Cal. App. 3d 1117, 1121, 281 Cal. Rptr. 338, 340
(1991) (finding that the victim's testimony that the defendant forced her to walk at least half a mile was
sufficient movement to sustain a kidnapping conviction); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (setting
forth the Federal Kidnapping Act); United States v. Peden, 961 F.2d 517, 523 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that the
victim's testimony in combination with the defendant's admission that he had sex with the victim was sufficient
to support the finding that sexual gratification was the defendant's object in the asportation which was sufficient
to support a conviction for kidnapping); United States v. Duncan, 855 F.2d 1528, 1536 (11 th Cir. 1988) (finding
that the defendant's motivation of rape was admissible to show that the defendant kidnapped for a benefit, a
required element of an offense under title 18, section 1201 of the United States Code).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.72(a) (enacted by Chapter 558); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OP AB 526, at 2, (June 22, 1993) (indicating that there is a small class of criminals who
are responsible for a large number of violent repeat attacks, which continues to prey on vulnerable and innocent
children and stating that criminals who kidnap and sexually assault young children usually repeat the offense,
if given the chance); cf COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-412 (1986) (setting forth the punishment for habitual sex
offenders against children); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 558.018 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (defining "persistent sexual
offender" and specifying that the term of imprisonment for one found to be a persistent sexual offender shall
be not less than 30 years without probation or parole); People v. Harper, 796 P.2d 4, 6 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-3-412 did not apply to a defendant convicted of sexual assault on
a child who also had a prior conviction for the same offense where the defendant was not charged under the
provisions of that statute); State v. Nevels, 712 S.W.2d 688, 690-91 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that a
defendant must raise the issue of whether the persistent sexual offender statute is constitutional at the first
available opportunity and that if the issue is not raised, it will not be preserved for appellate review); State v.
Williams, 700 S.W.2d 451, 453-54 (Mo. bane. 1985) (holding that the state's persistent sexual offender statute
is constitutionally valid despite its failure to specify precise procedural rules for the trial court's guidance); State
v. Davis, 663 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that an enhanced sentence imposed upon a
Selected 1993 Legislation
Crimes
Under Chapter 558, habitual child molesters are punishable by twenty-
five years in the state prison, which may be reduced under certain
provisions of the Penal Code. 8 However, a habitual child molester will not
be released on parole until he or she has served at least twenty years in the
state prison.9 Chapter 558 provides that the prosecutor may request that
the court order the defendant to be punished in various other specified
manners10 in lieu of the twenty-five year prison sentence."
Chapter 558 specifies that the allegations of the defendant's status as
a habitual child molester must be alleged in the information, 2 and either
admitted by the defendant in open court, found to be true by the jury or
defendant as a persistent sexual offender was a valid exercise of judicial authority). Most other states have
enacted statutes which prescribe enhanced punishment for habitual offenders, although not specifically habitual
sex offenders. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 54-501 (Michie Supp. 1993); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-104 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 19-2514 (1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West Supp. 1993);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Baldwin 1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (West 1993); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2221 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-17 (Michie Supp. 1993);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (Consol. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN,
§§ 22-7-7, 22-7-8 (1988 & Supp. 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (1974); W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1992);
WYO. STAT. § 6-10-201 (1988).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.72(b) (enacted by Chapter 558); see id. §§ 2930-2935 (West Supp. 1993)
(setting forth circumstances under which a prison term may be reduced, including good behavior and
participation, worktime credits, and performance of heroic or exceptional assistance); SENATE COMMITIEE ON
JUDICIARY, COMMTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 526, at 2, (June 22, 1993) (stating that Chapter 558 would assure that
repeat offenders who kidnap and rape young children will be sentenced to suitably long terms of imprisonment
and have diminished opportunities to re-offend). See generally U.S. CONST'. amend. VIII, § I (stating that
excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted);
State v. Katura, 837 S.W.2d 547, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a 30-year sentence under the
persistent sexual offender statute did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Virgin v. State, 792 P.2d
1186, 1186-88 (Oki. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that sentences of 150 years imprisonment for each count of
forcible oral sodomy and lewd or indecent acts with a child under the age of 16 were not excessive considering
the nature of the offenses and defendant's two prior convictions, one of which was for child molestation); State
v. Koonce, 731 S.W.2d 431, 444 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that defendant's consecutive sentences of 30
years each, based on defendant's stipulation that he had previously been convicted of rape and wa,, a persistent
sexual offender, were mandated by § 558.018 and were not disproportionate to the offenses).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.72(b) (enacted by Chapter 558). See generally Jim Zook, Longer Terms for
Felons Keeping Jails Crowded, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 13, 1991, at Al (discussing the shortage of county jail
and state prison space in Texas as a result of state-mandated enhanced prison sentences for habitual offenders).
10. See CAL PENAL CODE § 667.6(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for sentence enhancement for prior
sex offenses and for the imposition of a $20,000 fine); id. § 667.7 (West 1988) (setting forth punishment for
habitual offenders who use force likely to cause great bodily harm); id. § 667.8 (West 1988) (providing sentence
enhancements for any person convicted of §§ 286, 288 or 288a who, for the purpose of committing that sexual
offense, kidnapped the victim who was younger than 14 years at the time); id. § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1993)
(setting forth punishment for two or more felony convictions); see also People v. Hemandez, 46 Cal. 3d 194,
197, 757 P.2d 1013, 1013, 249 Cal. Rptr. 850, 850 (1988) (holding that a rape defendant could not be sentenced
to an additional three-year term under § 667.8 where a violation of that section was not pled or proven at trial).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.72(c) (enacted by Chapter 558).
12. See generally State v. Stapleton, 661 S.W.2d 620, 621-622 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that where
the second amended information pled that the defendant was a persistent offender, there was no error in the
prosecutor's waiting until final disposition to raise the persistent sexual offender act as a basis for enhanced
punishment).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Crimes
a court sitting without a jury, or found to be true where guilt is established
by a plea of guilty or nolo contendere."3
LTE
Crimes; licenses to carry concealed firearms
Penal Code § 12053 (repealed, new, and amended); §§ 11106,
12050, 12051, 12054 (amended).
AB 155 (Connolly); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1167
Under existing law, the sheriff' or head of a municipal police
department' may issue a license to carry a concealed firearm' upon the
person.4 Chapter 1167 prohibits issuance of the license if the Department
13. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.72(e) (enacted by Chapter 558).
1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 17 (West 1982) (defining sheriff as including constables and marshals);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.3 (Vest Supp. 1993) (setting forth training standards for sheriffs).
2. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 20000-20332 (West 1992) (regulating the establishment of
police protection districts).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining pistol, revolver, and firearm capable
of being concealed upon the person as including any device designed to be used as a weapon which propels a
projectile by force of combustion and which has a barrel less than 16 inches in length); 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
777, 777 (1975) (declaring that a Taser TF-1 weapon is a firearm capable of being concealed upon the person);
cf D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3201(a) (1981) (defining pistol); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36F(b) (1992) (defining
handgun as any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being concealed on the person); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 166.210(4) (1991) (defining handgun as any conventional pistol or revolver which: (1) Uses a fixed cartridge
and contains a propellent charge, primer, and projectile; (2) is designed to be fired otherwise than from the
shoulder; and (3) fires only a single shot for each pull of the trigger); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-1-2(32)
(1988) (defining pistol as any firearm with a barrel less than 16 inches and is designed to expel a projectile by
action of an explosive); Strong v. United States, 581 A.2d 383, 385 (D.C. 1990) (stating that an air pistol does
not constitute a pistol for purposes of a statute prohibiting carrying dangerous weapons).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050(a) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. § 7 (West 1988) (defining person);
id. § 12050 (a)(l)-(2) (amended by Chapter 1167) (authorizing the issuance of a license to carry concealed
firearms upon proof that the applicant is of good moral character, good cause exists to issue the license, and the
applicant is a resident of the county); id. § 12050 (amended by Chapter 1167) (regulating the issuance of
licenses to carry concealed firearms capable of being concealed upon the person); id. § 12054(a) (amended by
Chapter 1167) (permitting the Department to charge a fee not to exceed three dollars for processing a renewal
application or an application for a new license); id. § 12025 (West Supp. 1993) (describing the criteria and
punishment for the crime of carrying a concealed firearm); Salute v. Pitchess, 61 Cal. App. 3d 557, 560-61, 132
Cal. Rptr. 345, 347 (1976) (stating that the duty of the sheriff is to make a determination of good cause on an
individual basis for every application of licensed private investigators seeking a permit to carry concealed
weapons); 62 Op. Att'y Gen. 508, 508 (1979) (declaring that a reserve police officer is ineligible to receive a
concealed firearm permit if that officer does not reside in the county in which the city is located); cf. COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 30-10-523, 31-4-112.1 (1992) (authorizing the chief of police and the sheriff of each county to issue
permits to carry concealed weapons); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(2) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring the Department
Selected 1993 Legislation
Crimes
of Justice (Department) determines that the person is within a prohibited
class of persons.5 If, at any time, the licensing authority is notified by the
Department, or determines that a licensee is within the prohibited class of
persons, Chapter 1167 requires the licensing authority to revoke the
license.6 Chapter 1167 additionally permits a licensee, under certain
circumstances, to apply for an amendment to a license to carry a concealed
firearm.7
of State to issue a license to carry a concealed weapon upon the applicant meeting specified criteria); ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 25, § 2003 (1992) (setting forth specific criteria for issuance of a permit to carry a concealed firearm);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(B) (1993) (stating that applications to carry concealed firearms are to be filed
with the county sheriff or with the chief of police); MacNutt v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 572 N.E.2d 577, 579
(Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that a statute, which permits issuance of a license to carry a concealed weapon
to "suitable persons" for a "proper purpose" does not infringe on any protected liberty or property right).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050(d) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(defining felony); id. § 12050(d) (amended by Chapter 1167) (prohibiting the issuance of a license to carry a
concealed pistol if the Department determines that the applicant is within the class of persons described in
California Penal Code §§ 12021, 12021.1 or California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 8100, 8103); see also
id. § 12021 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting any person who has been convicted of a felony from owning or
possessing a firearm); id. § 12021.1 (West 1992) (providing that persons convicted of specified violent offen'ses,
who own or possess any firearm, are guilty of a felony); id. § 12021(b)(1)-(26) (West 1992) (enumerating the
specific violent offenses); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100 (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting possession or
ownership of a firearm by a person determined to be a danger to himself or others and certain mentally
disordered persons); id. § 8103 (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating that any person, who has been adjudicated as a
danger to others or as a mentally disordered sex offender, or has been found not guilty by reason of insanity of
certain crimes, must not have possession or custody of a firearm); Dickerson v. State, 517 So. 2d 625, 627 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1986) (declaring that a statute which prohibits owning or possessing a pistol after having been
convicted if a felony is not unconstitutional); State v. Ortiz, 546 A.2d 338, 339 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (stating
that a statute prohibiting possession of a pistol by a person previously convicted of a crime does not violate due
process).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050(e)(1) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. (authorizing the licensing
authority to revoke a license to carry a concealed pistol upon the person if either the Department or the licensing
authority determine that the licensee is within the class of persons described in California Penal Code §§ 12021,
12021.1 or California Welfare and Institutions Code §§ 8100, 8103); id. § 12050(2) (amended by Chapter 1167)
(requiring the Department to notify the licensing authority if, at any time, it determines that a licen:see is within
a prohibited class of persons); id. § 12050(3) (amended by Chapter 1167) (requiring the licensing authority to
notify the licensee and the Department of the revocation of a license); Nichols v. County of Santa Clara, 223
Cal. App. 3d 1236, 1244, 273 Cal. Rptr. 84, 89 (1990) (stating that the privilege to carry a concealed firearm
is not such a significant property right so as to require a hearing prior to the revocation of the license under the
Due Process Clause of the Constitution); id. at 1243, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 88 (declaring the sheriffs' decision to
revoke a license to carry a concealed firearm highly discretionary); id. at 1244-45, 273 Cal. Rptr. at 89
(upholding a sheriff's revocation of a license to carry a concealed firearm where the licensee displayed a poor
attitude towards police while under the influence of alcohol); cf. ALA. CODE § 13A-11-75 (1992) (permitting
the sheriff to revoke a license upon proof that the licensee is not a proper person to be licensed); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 790.06(10) (West Supp. 1992) (setting forth conditions under which a license to carry a concealed
weapon may be suspended or revoked); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6109(I) (1993) (stating that, for good cause,
a license to carry a firearm may be revoked by the issuing authority).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12050(0(1 (A)-(D) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. (allowing a licensee to
apply for an amendment to the license in order to add or delete authority to carry a particular firearm, to
authorize the licensee to carry a concealed pistol, or to change any restrictions on the license); id. § 12050(f)(2),
(4) (amended by Chapter 1167) (stating that, when licensees change their address, new licenses will be issued
reflecting the changes, and providing that a license may not be revoked solely because the licensee changed
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Existing law requires the Attorney General to keep and file specified
forms and records, including applications for licenses to carry concealable
firearms upon the person.8 Chapter 1167 additionally requires the Attorney
General to keep records of all issued, amended, or revoked licenses to
carry a concealed firearm capable of being concealed upon the person.'
Under existing law, the licensing authority1 ° is required to keep
records of any licenses issued and to file copies of those licenses with the
Department."1 With the enactment of Chapter 1167, the licensing
authority must also maintain records of any licenses which are issued,
amended, revoked, or denied, and file copies of those records with the
Department.
1 2
Existing law provides that any person who knowingly 13 makes false
statements, concerning specific circumstances, on an application regarding
the denial or revocation of a license to carry a concealed firearm, is guilty
of a felony.' 4 Chapter 1167 mandates that any person who knowingly
makes false statements, concerning the same specific circumstances, on an
residences without applying for an amendment to that license); id. § 12050(f)(3) (amended by Chapter 1167)
(requiring the licensing authority to issue a new license if the original license has been amended); id. § 12051(b)
(amended by Chapter 1167) (providing that any person, who files an application to carry a concealed weapon,
while knowing that the information provided is false, is guilty of a misdemeanor); see also id. § 17(a) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor); id. § 12054(b) (amended by Chapter 1167) (permitting any city or county
to charge a fee not to exceed three dollars for processing an amended license).
8. Id. § 11106(a) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. (directing the Attorney General to maintain records
of fingerprints, applications to carry firearms which are capable of being concealed upon the person, dealers'
records of sales of firearms, reports filed by peace officers relating to the transfer of firearms, Law Enforcement
Firearms Transfer Forms, and reports of stolen, lost, found, pledged, or pawned property).
9. Id. § 11106(a) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. (mandating that the Attorney General maintain
records of specified documents, including information supplied to the Department pursuant to California Penal
Code § 12053); id. § 12053(b) (repealed and enacted by Chapter 1167) (specifying records relating to licenses
which must be provided to the Department by the issuing authority).
10. See id. § 12050(a)(1)(A) (amended by Chapter 1167) (authorizing the sheriff of a county, the chief,
or other head of a municipal police department to issue licenses to carry concealed weapons).
11. Id. § 12053(a)(3), (b)(3) (enacted by Chapter 1167); cf PA. CONS. STAT. § 6109(e)(3) (1993)
(directing the issuing authority to retain, for six years, a copy of the original license to carry a firearm).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12053(a)-(b) (enacted by Chapter 1167).
13. See United States v. Hester, 880 F.2d 799, 802-03 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating that the term "knowingly,"
in a statute which prohibits knowingly making false statements in connection with the transfer or acquisition of
a firearm, includes deliberate disregard for the truth, falsity with conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth,
as well as actual knowledge).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12051(c)(l)-(7) (amended by Chapter 1167); see id. (providing that any person,
who makes a false statement regarding a criminal conviction, a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, the
use of a controlled substance, a dishonorable discharge from military service, a commitment to a mental
institution, or a renunciation of United States citizenship, on an application concerning the denial or revocation
of a license to carry a concealed firearm is guilty of a felony); see also United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d
1506, 1513 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that providing false information on an ATF Form 4473 is a violation of
the statute prohibiting false statements in connection with the purchase of a firearm).
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application, regarding the denial of an amendment to a license, is also




Penal Code § 11177.2 (new).
AB 2399 (Burton); 1993 STAT. Ch. 824
(Effective October 5, 1993)
Under existing law, the court responsible for granting probation or
release on parole' has the power to condition a prisoner's early release
upon payment of restitution2 to the victim Existing law authorizes the
Department of Corrections (DOC) to enter into a compact with another
state for the purpose of admitting eligible parolees to a participating state
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12051(c)(1)-(7) (amended by Chapter 1167).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 3040 (West 1982) (authorizing the Board of Prison Terms to allow the
release of state prisoners on parole outside the prison walls and enclosures).
2. See id. § 1203.04(d) (West Supp. 1993) (defining restitution as full or partial payment to cover the
value of stolen property, medical expenses, and wages or profits lost because of an injury or for time spent as
a witness or in assisting the police resulting from the commission of a crime for which the defendant is
convicted).
3. Id. § 1203.1 (West Supp. 1993); see CAL. CONSr. art. I, § 28(b) (establishing the right of every victim
to receive restitution, to be paid by the person convicted of committing the crime); 42 U.S.C. §§ 10601-10607
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990) (authorizing the federal courts to order defendants to pay restitution to the victims of
the crime); CAL PENAL CODE § 1203.1e (West Supp. 1993) (authorizing the court to charge a parolee the
reasonable cost of parole supervision, taking into account the amount of restitution the parolee has been ordered
to pay); id. § 1203.1g (West Supp. 1993) (requiring restitution, as a condition of probation, to victims of sexual
assault for the costs of medical and psychological treatment); id. § 1203.lj (West Supp. 1993) (ordering that
restitution be paid, as a condition of probation, to victims of assault, battery, or assault with a deadly weapon,
who are 65 years or older, for the costs of any necessary psychological or medical treatment); id. § 11165.1(a)-
(b)(5) (West 1992) (defining sexual assault); People v. Friscia, 93 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11469, 11471 (filed
Sept. 9, 1993) (ruling that trial courts do not have the discretion to order victim restitution for what amounts
to civil damages); People v. Broussard, 93 Daily Journal D.A.R. 11389, 11392 (filed Sept. 2, 1993) (holding
that trial courts are authorized to order restitution in cases involving economic loss as well as in those involving
physical injury); cf ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-412(c) (Vest Supp. 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.181 (West
Supp. 1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 213.126 (Michie 1992); TEX. CRINI. PROC. CODE ANN. §§
42.12(11)(a)(8), 1 l(a)(14) (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.210(2) (Vest Supp. 1993) (conditioning
probation upon payment of restitution to the aggrieved victim). See generally Thomas M. Kelly, Note, Where
Offenders Pay For Their Crimes: Victim Restitution And Its Constitutionalily, 59 NOTRE DAM 1E L. REV. 685,
694-704 (1984) (discussing the constitutionality of victim restitution and the Victim and Witness Protection Act
of 1982); Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural Analysis, 97 HAMV. L. REV. 931, 931-
32 (1984) (advocating the appropriateness of restitution as a sentencing tool in criminal proceedings).
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following their release from prison.4 Chapter 824 prevents parolees, who
have been ordered to make restitution to a victim, from leaving the state
unless the parolee posts a bond for the amount of restitution or the court
determines that justice requires their release.5
SMK
Crimes; possession and manufacture of false compartments to conceal
or smuggle controlled substances
Health and Safety Code § 11366.8 (new).
AB 1760 (Cannella); 1993 STAT. Ch. 562
Existing law prohibits the sale of any chemical, drug, or laboratory
apparatus1 or device with the knowledge or intent that it will be used for
the unlawful manufacture, processing, or preparation of a controlled
substance.' Chapter 562 makes it a crime for any person to use a false
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11176 (West 1992); see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (forbidding any state to enter
into a compact with another state without the consent of Congress); 4 U.S.C. § 112 (1988) (providing
congressional consent for states to enter into compacts with one another for the purpose of assisting one another
in crime prevention); CAt.. PENAL CODE § 11176 (West 1992) (granting the Governor the authority to enter into
compacts with any of the United States which have joined in a compact authorized by Congress for the
prevention of crime); id. § 11177 (West 1992) (providing the guidelines governing the form of the compact);
id. § II 177(l)(a)-(b) (West 1992) (allowing release of a parolee to a participating state if the parolee has family
or job opportunities therein, or upon consent of the receiving state); In re Joseph Tenner, 20 Cal. 2d 670, 674-
78, 128 P.2d 338, 341-43 (1942) (holding that the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parole Supervision is not in
conflict with the federal extradition clause found in article IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution, and is thus
constitutional); cf FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. § 949.07(1) (West 1985); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 42.11(1) Sec.
2 (West 1979) (authorizing the Governor to enter into compacts with other states for the purpose of allowing
parolees to reside in receiving states).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11177.2 (enacted by Chapter 824).
1. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11364.5(d)(l)-(12), (e)(1)-(10) (West 1991) (defining drug
paraphernalia as all equipment, products, and materials of any kind which are intended for use or designed for
use, in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, compounding, converting,
producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, packaging, repackaging, storing, containing, concealing,
injecting, ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance).
2. Id. § 11366.8 (West 1991) (amended by Chapter 562); id. §§ 11054-11057 (West 1991) (listing all
the known controlled substances); see id § 11017 (West 1992) (stating that the definition of manufacturer for
the purposes of the Health & Safety Code is the same as § 4034 of the Business and Professions Code); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4034 (West 1988) (defining manufacturer as every person who prepares, derives,
produces, compounds, or repackages any drug or device excepting a pharmacy which manufactures on the
immediate premises where the drug or device is to be sold to the ultimate consumer); cf United States v. Poole,
878 F.2d 1389, 1391 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that to convict a defendant of possession of cocaine to distribute,
the federal government has to prove knowledge, possession, and intent to distribute); Stewart v. State, 580 So.
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compartment3 with the intent to store, conceal, smuggle, or transport a
controlled substance.4 Chapter 562 also makes it a crime for any person
to design, construct, or fabricate a false compartment with the intent to
store, conceal, smuggle, or transport a controlled substance.5
PLJ
Crimes; possession and use of tear gas
Penal Code § 12460 (new); §§ 12403.7, 12403.8, 12450 (amended).
AB 581 (Speier); 1993 STAT. Ch. 954
2d 27, 28 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (stating that knowledge was an essential element of an offense of trafficking
in cocaine that had to be alleged in an indictment). But see United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 735 (11th Cir.
1989) (holding that defendant, a criminal defense attorney, could not be convicted of aiding, abetting, and
counseling possession with intent to distribute one kilogram of cocaine on a theory that, by refusing to aid or
abet transfer of cocaine out of client's possession, he thereby criminally aided and abetted client's continued
possession thereof); Baldwin v. State, 498 So. 2d 1385, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the use
or possession of drug paraphernalia did not require that a defendant unequivocally knew of illicit purpose for
use, but only required that a defendant knew or reasonably should have known about illicit purposes for u..e of
paraphernalia). See generally Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 410(a)(l), 21
U.S.C.S. § 841(a)(1) (West 1992) (stating that to prove a charge of aiding and abetting possession of drugs with
intent to distribute, the government must connect a defendant to possession and intent to distribute).
3. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11366.8(d)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 562) (defining false
compartment as any box, container, space, or enclosure that is intended for use or designed for use to conceal,
hide, or otherwise prevent discovery of any controlled substance within or attached to a vehicle, including: (1)
False, altered, or modified fuel tanks; (2) original factory equipment of a vehicle that is modified, altered or
changed; and (3) a compartment, space, or box that is added to, or fabricated, made, or created from, existing
compartments, spaces, or boxes within a vehicle).
4. Id. § 11366.8 (enacted by Chapter 562); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 1760, at 1 (May 28, 1993) (stating that the use of false compartments has become an integral
part of major drug smuggling operations both across the border between Mexico and the United States and
within California). Since no prior law targeted the construction or use of such secret compartments as illegal
when intended for the sole purpose of trafficking drugs, Chapter 562 makes it unlawful to construct or use a
false compartment for trafficking drugs. Id. But see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11379 (a)-(b) (West Supp.
1993) (stating that anyone who transports or furnishes to transport or attempts to transport controlled substances
shall be punished by imprisonment for a period of two, three, or four years). See generally Pat Fenner, Top
Cocaine Bust Was $130 Million, ST. PETERSBLIGH TIMEs, Aug. 6, 1987, at 2 (pointing out that the record
cocaine bust in the United States was a 6,900-pound seizure concealed in false compartments of two furniture
containers); Joseph B. Treaster, A More Potent Heroin Makes a Comeback in a New, Needless Form, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 1991, at 4 (stating that the largest shipments of heroin are mixed in sealed containers that arrive
by ship from Southeast Asia, and also, that scores of individuals smuggle packets of heroin in false
compartments in suitcases); Joseph B. Treaster, Months of Surveillance Lead Agents to $13 Million Tied to
Drugs, N.Y. TmEs, Oct. I1, 1990, at 3 (describing how drug traffickers use false compartments under the
floorboards of trucks to transport cocaine and money from one state to another).
5. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11366.8(b) (enacted by Chapter 562).
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Under prior law, a person' was prohibited from purchasing tear gas2
or a tear gas weapon3 unless that person had completed a training course
certified by the Department of Justice (Department), pursuant to which a
card was issued identifying that person.4 Chapter 954 requires the person
to first obtain a tear gas identification card issued by the Department
before purchasing, possessing,5 or using any tear gas or tear gas weapon.6
Under prior law, any course taken in an institution approved by the
Department to offer tear gas training was sufficient.7 Under Chapter 954,
an identification card may only be obtained by participating in a training
course which has been certified by the Department, passing an objective
test8 evaluating the applicant's knowledge of tear gas, or completing a
point-of-sale instruction.9
Existing law permits certified tear gas training institutions to charge
reimbursement fees. 0 Chapter 954 authorizes the Department to charge
various administrative fees relating to the issuance of tear gas instruction
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 12401 (West 1992) (defining tear gas as including substances intended to cause physical
discomfort or permanent injury by being vaporized or dispersed in the air); 63 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 209, 209
(1980) (stating that a vile-smelling liquid which is sprayed from it's container and is manufactured and sold for
use as a self-defense weapon against humans is "tear gas"); People v. Homer, 9 Cal. App. 3d 23, 27, 87 Cal.
Rptr. 917, 920 (1970) (specifying that the statutory definition of tear gas expands the meaning of that term so
as to include substances not ordinarily understood to be tear gas); Cook v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. 3d 822,
828, 84 Cal. Rptr. 664, 669 (1970) (stating that chemical mace is within the statutory definition of tear gas).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12402 (West 1992) (defining a tear gas weapon as a device capable of the
emission of tear gases).
4. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1340, see. 2, at 6079 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(a)(6)(A)).
5. See People v. Scheib, 98 Cal. App. 3d 820, 828, 159 Cal. Rptr. 665, 669 (1979) (declaring that the
existence of elements of possession of contraband is a question of fact); People v. Prochnau, 251 Cal. App. 2d
22, 30, 59 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268 (1967) (stating that, in order to establish the elements unlawful possession of
contraband, it must be shown, by at least circumstantial evidence, that the person exercised dominion and control
over the object and had knowledge of its contraband character).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(a)(7)(A) (amended by Chapter 954).
7. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1340, see. 2, at 6079 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(a)(6)(A)).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(a)(7)(ii) (amended by Chapter 954) (requiring the Department to
issue a tear gas identification card to an applicant, who has responded correctly to at least 75% of a 20 to 30
question objective exam, administered by a licensed point-of-sale retailer or a certified training institution, and
correctly sprayed a test canister of tear gas containing inert ingredients).
9. Id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(A) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. § 12403(a)(7)(A)(i) (amended by Chapter
954) (directing the Department to issue a tear gas instruction card to an applicant who has completed a certified
course in the use of tear gas and tear gas weapons); id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(A)(iii) (amended by Chapter 954)
(directing the Department to issue a tear gas identification card to an applicant who has participated in point-of-
sale instruction by a licensed retailer or certified training institution, which includes watching an approved
informational videotape of less than 30 minutes in duration and requires the participant to test spray a canister
of tear gas containing inert ingredients); see also id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(B) (amended by Chapter 954) (stating that
the tear gas identification card must be carried upon the person who is carrying tear gas or tear gas weapons and
must be presented to a retailer if that person is purchasing tear gas or tear gas weapons).
10. Id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(C)(v) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. (permitting institutions to charge fees
to cover the actual cost of the training).
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cards not to exceed $10, and permits fees to be charged for administration
of the objective test."
Existing law requires every tear gas container and weapon to be
labelled with a specific warning."l Chapter 954 requires every tear gas
container and weapon to be accompanied by an insert containing specified
information, including directions for use, first aid information, safety and
storage information, and an explanation of legal ramifications of improper
use.
13
Prior law permitted a minor, sixteen years of age or older, to purchase
tear gas after completing a certified training course and obtaining written
consent from a parent or guardian. 14 Chapter 954 allows the minor to
purchase tear gas after presentation of a signed affidavit stating, under
penalty of perjury,' 5 the minor's intent to use the tear gas or tear gas
weapon solely for the purpose of self-defense, as well as written consent
from a parent or guardian. 16 Chapter 954 also imposes civil liability,
arising out of a minor's use of tear gas, upon the person who signed the
statement of consent.
17
11. Id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(C)(i)-(v) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(C)(i)-(ii) (amended
by Chapter 954) (authorizing the Department to charge an applicant, for a tear gas instruction card, a fee not
to exceed $10, and to charge each person requesting a replacement certificate a fee not to exceed $5); id §
12403.7(a)(7)(C)(iii) (amended by Chapter 954) (authorizing the point-of-sale retailer or certified tear gas training
institution to charge a fee, not to exceed $10, to an applicant for the objective test).
12. Id. § 12403.7(a)(5)(C) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. (stating that every tear gas or tear gas
weapon must have a label which states: "WARNING: The use of this substance or device for any purpose
other than self-defense is a felony under the law. The contents are dangerous - use with care.").
13. Id. § 12403.7(a)(6) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. (requiring the informational material to
accompany every tear gas container or weapon as of March 1, 1994 and permitting the Department to establish
minimum standard guidelines as to the information contained in that material); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 17533.9 (West 1987) (providing that it is unlawful for any person to advertise tear gas unless that
advertisement contains a statement that the possession and use of tear gas is regulated by law); cf. MINN, STAT.
ANN. § 624.731(2) (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating that use of a tear gas compound is permitted only under certain
circumstances, such as when the tear gas is propelled from an aerosol container which is labeled or accompanied
by instructions relating to the use and dangers of tear gas compounds and dated to indicate its anticipated useful
life); NEV. REv. STAT. § 202.390(1) (1991) (mandating that every tear gas weapon bear the name of the
manufacturer and a serial number).
14. 1982 Cal. Slat. ch. 1324, sec. 1, at 4886 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.8); cf MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 624.73 1(3)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting persons under the age of 16 from possessing or using tear
gas except by written permission of a parent or guardian).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 118(a) (defining perjury as false statements made while under oath).
16. Id. § 12403.8(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 954).
17. Id. § 12403.8(c) (Vest 1992); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.1 (West 1985) (holding parents civilly
liable for the willful misconduct of a minor); cf. id. § 1714.3 (Vest Supp. 1993) (imputing liability to the parent
for the discharge of a firearm by a minor under the age of 18); CAL. PENAL CODE § 502(e)(1) (West Supp,
1993) (imputing conduct of a minor who commits a computer crime to that minor's parent or legal guardian);
CAL. VEH. CODE § 17708 (West 1971) (imposing liability on the parent or guardian for acts arising out of a
minor's permissive use of a motor vehicle).
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Under existing law, no person can purchase tear gas unless the
Department has certified, as acceptable, 18 that particular type and brand
of tear gas.19 Chapter 954 provides that a qualified purchaser may acquire
tear gas in which the active ingredient is oleoresin capsicum, of a
particular brand or type that has been certified by the Department.2"
Under Chapter 954, any person, who possesses a tear gas certificate prior
to March 1, 1994, must obtain oleoresin capsicum certification to purchase,
possess, or use a tear gas containing oleoresin capsicum as its active
ingredient.2'
Under existing law, any person who uses tear gas, except for the
purpose of self-defense,22 is guilty of a public offense.23 Prior law also
permitted the use of tear gas while participating in an approved training
course.24 Under Chapter 954, the use of tear gas for any purpose other
than self-defense is a public offense.25
Chapter 954 provides that any person who uses, purchases, or
possesses, for the purpose of self-defense, tear gas or a tear gas weapon
which has not been certified by the Department is guilty of a
18. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12451 (West 1992) (defining acceptable as meaning that the tear gas is
reasonably free from any undue hazard and setting forth factors to be considered by the Department when
determining acceptability).
19. Id. § 12450 (amended by Chapter 954); see id. §§ 12453-12456 (West 1992) (regulating certification
requirements); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.731(3)(d) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting persons from possessing
or using an unauthorized tear gas or tear gas compound).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12460 (enacted by Chapter 954).
21. Id. § 12403.7(a)(7)(A) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. § 12403.7(7)(C)(iv) (amended by Chapter
954) (authorizing the Department to charge each person, who possesses a tear gas certificate prior to March 1,
1994 and requests oleoresin capsicum certification, a fee not exceeding five dollars).
22. See id. § 693 (West 1985) (permitting a person, about to be injured, to put forth resistance sufficient
to prevent an offense against his person or family, or an illegal forcible attempt to take or injure property in his
lawful possession).
23. Id. § 12403.7(a)(8) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. (mandating punishment of 16 months, two
years, or three years imprisonment in state prison; or in a county jail for a duration not to exceed one year, a
fine not to exceed $1,000, or both); id. (providing that if the use is against a peace officer while in the course
of that officer's official duties, and the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a peace officer,
the offense is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, two years, or three years, or a fine
not to exceed $1,000, or both).
24. 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1340, sec. 2, at 6079 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(a)(8)).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(a)(8) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. (mandating punishment of
imprisonment, a fine not to exceed $1,000, or both); id. § 15 (West 1988) (defining public offense as an act
committed or omitted in violation of a law forbidding or commanding it and which is punishable by either:
death, imprisonment, fine, removal from office or disqualification to hold any office in the state); cf. MINN.
STAT. § 624.731(8)(b)-(c) (1992) (providing that the unlawful use of tear gas is a misdemeanor); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-23-470 (Law. Co-op. 1991) (permitting possession, use, purchase, or sale of tear gas for self-defense
purposes only); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-312 (Michie 1992) (stating that a person is guilty of a Class 3 felony
if that person maliciously releases noxious gas).
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misdemeanor.26 Chapter 954 further provides that any person who has not
received a tear gas instruction card issued by the Department, and who
uses certified tear gas in self-defense, is guilty of an infraction."
RMC
Crimes; prison inmates-weapons
Penal Code § 4502 (amended).
AB 146 (Richter); 1993 STAT. Ch. 554
Under existing law a person who is confined in a state prison' or
under the custody2 of prison personnel and who possesses, carries upon
his or her person, or has under his or her custody or control specified
instruments or weapons3 is guilty of a felony.4 Chapter 554 provides that
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12403.7(b) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. (mandating punishment by
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by a fine not exceeding $2,000, or both); see also id.
§ 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor).
27. Id. § 12403.7(b) (amended by Chapter 954); see id. § 19.6 (Vest Supp. 1993) (specifying punishment
for an infraction); id. § 12403.7(b) (amended by Chapter 954) (mandating punishment by a fine not to exceed
$100).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 4504 fVest 1982) (defining "confined in a state prison" and including
within the definition individuals who are temporarily outside the prison walls serving on work detail).
2. See id. § 4502 (amended by Chapter 554) (specifying individuals who come within the purview of
California Penal Code § 4502 as those who are: (1) Being conveyed to or from any state prison; (2) located at
any prison road camp, forestry camp, other prison camps, or prison farms; (3) being conveyed to or from any
of those places; or (4) under the custody of prison officials, officers, or employees).
3. See id. § 4502(a) (amended by Chapter 554) (specifying as an instrument or weapon anything
commonly known as a blackjack, slingshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, or metal knuckles, any explosive substance
or fixed ammunition, any dirk, dagger, or sharp instrument, any pistol, revolver, or other firearm, or any tear
gas or tear gas weapon).
4. Id. § 4502(a) (amended by Chapter 554); see id. (specifying that each violation is a felony punishable
by imprisonment for two, three, or four years to be served consecutively); see also People v. Elguera, 8 Cal.
App. 4th 1214, 1224, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 910, 915-16 (1992) (holding that jury instructions on the elements of the
crime of possession of a weapon by an inmate were proper where it was not reasonably likely that the jury
would convict the defendant unless the defendant knowingly possessed a weapon or sharp instrument), review
denied 1992 Cal. LEXIS 5622; People v. Reynolds, 205 Cal. App. 3d 776, 779, 252 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639 (1988)
(discussing that while California Penal Code § 4502 requires the defendant to knowingly possess the prohibited
object, the prosecution does not need to prove a purpose or intent for which the instrument was possessed);
People v. Wells, 261 Cal. App. 2d 468, 478-79, 68 Cal. Rptr. 400, 406 (1963) (stating that California Penal
Code § 4502 serves an objective demanding relative inflexibility, and is one of the most stringent statutes
governing prison safety); cf Culbertson v. State, 386 S.E.2d 894, 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a water-
bug, a device used to heat liquid, was a weapon under the statute specifying that it is unlawful for an inmate
to be in possession of a weapon); People v. Gazelle, 595 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Il1. App. Ct. 1992) (providing a
detailed review of the statute prohibiting contraband in a penal institution and holding that small scissors are
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a person who manufactures or attempts to manufacture the same specified
instruments or weapons is also guilty of a felony.5  CJK
not a weapon within the definition of the statute); People v. Morissette, 589 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
(holding that a hacksaw blade is not a per se dangerous weapon under the statute prohibiting possession of a
weapon by a person within the custody of a correctional facility, as the statute was not intended to prohibit the
possession of every tool, implement, or sporting device which might inflict serious bodily harm); State v.
Guirlando, 491 So. 2d 38, 40 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that, to sustain a conviction for the crime of
possession of contraband by an inmate based upon constructive possession, something more than mere presence
or association with the person in actual custody of the contraband must be established).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 4502(b) (amended by Chapter 554); see id. (specifying that each violation is
a felony punishable by imprisonment for 16 months, two years, or three years, to be served consecutively);
People v. Evans, 2 Cal. App. 3d 877, 881, 82 Cal. Rptr. 877, 880 (1969) (stating that knowing possession of
a prohibited instrument is sufficient to support a conviction for possession of a weapon by an inmate, and
specifying that the prosecution is not required to prove any intent for which the instrument is possessed); SENATE
FLOOR COMMITTEE, CoMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 146, at 2 (Aug. 25, 1993) (stating that Chapter 554 was
initiated in an attempt to close a loophole whereby an inmate might be in the process of making a shank, but
as the instrument was not sufficiently honed, it would not yet constitute a device for which possession is
prohibited); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a) (1988) (providing that it is an offense for an inmate to make, possess,
obtain, or attempt to obtain a prohibited object such as a firearm, destructive device, ammunition, weapon, any
object intended to be used as a weapon, or any object that threatens the security of the prison or an individual);
ALA. CODE § 13A-10-36 (1982) (providing that a person confined in a detention facility is guilty of a first
degree felony if he intentionally and unlawfully makes, obtains, or possesses any deadly weapon); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-2505(A)(3),(C) (Supp. 1992) (providing that anyone who is confined in a correctional facility
or is being moved incident to such confinement, and knowingly makes, obtains, or possesses a deadly weapon,
dangerous instrument, or explosive is guilty of a class two felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.47(1)(a)(5),(c) (West
Supp. 1993) (providing that it is a felony in the second degree for any inmate of a state correctional institution
to be in actual or constructive possession of any contraband such as a firearm, weapon, or explosive substance);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/24-1.1(b) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (providing that the possession of any weapon,
firearm, or firearm ammunition by a person confined in a penal institution is a felony, regardless of the intent
with which it is possessed); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402(B) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that it is unlawful
for any person to possess contraband on the grounds of a correctional facility); id. § 402(D)(4) (including within
the definition of contraband any dangerous weapon, explosive, combustible, or plans for the making or
manufacturing of a dangerous weapon or other instrumentality customarily used as a dangerous weapon); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 205.25(2) (McKinney 1988) (providing that any person confined in a detention facility who
knowingly and unlawfully makes, obtains, or possesses any dangerous contraband is guilty of a first degree
felony); Tx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.11 (West 1989) (providing that anyone confined in a penal institution who
possesses, carries upon his person, or conceals within the institution any deadly weapon is guilty of a felony in
the third degree); United States v. Fox, 845 F.2d 152, 156 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that the intended use of a
sharpened nail was immaterial to the determination of guilt for the crime of possession of a weapon by a federal
inmate and the trial court did not commit error by excluding such testimony), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1012
(1989); United States v. Perceval, 803 F.2d 601, 603 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that a federal inmate must
knowingly possess a weapon in order to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1791, which prohibits a federal inmate
from possessing a weapon); Jackson v. State, 566 So. 2d 752, 755 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (upholding a
conviction for possession of a deadly weapon by an inmate for possession of the components the combination
of which clearly formed a deadly weapon), cert. denied, 566 So. 2d 757 (1988); Dennison v. Oregon State
Penitentiary, 715 P.2d 88, 89 (Or. 1986) (holding that possession by an inmate of detailed plans depicting how
to make a gun was not sufficient evidence to support a conviction for attempting to manufacture a weapon). See
generally People v. Kite, 605 N.E.2d 563, 565 (III. 1992) (stating that although possession of a prohibited
weapon by a person confined in a penal institution is a strict liability offense, an inmate so charged may assert
necessity as an affirmative defense); id. at 566 (holding that a "continuing threat" is not a specific and immediate
threat entitling one to jury instructions on the necessity defense); People v. Johns, 581 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ill. Ct.
App. 1991) (providing three factors to consider to determine if an inmate is entitled to a necessity defense: (1)
Whether the defendant is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack, or immediate and
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Crimes; probation of child sex offenders
Penal Code §§ 1203.066 (amended).
AB 2009 (Snyder); 1993 STAT. Ch. 587
Existing law provides that any person who willfully' and lewdly
commits a lewd or lascivious act with a child under fourteen years of age
with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the sexual desires
of the person, or by using force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the child victim or another person, is guilty of a felony.
substantial bodily injury; (2) whether there is time to complain to the authorities or if there was a history of
futile prior complaints; and (3) whether there exists time or opportunity to resort to the courts), appeal denied,
587 N.E.2d 1020 (1992); People v. Rau, 436 N.W.2d 409, 411 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (refusing to extend the
defense of duress to the crime of possession of a weapon by a prison inmate, absent exceptional circumstances),
appeal denied, 1989 Mich. LEXIS 2008 (1989); State v. Baca, 845 P.2d 762, 767 (N.M. 1992) (stating that a
duress defense is available for the crime of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner); January v. State, 811
S.W.2d 631, 634 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (providing that necessity was not an available defense in prosecutions
for possession of a deadly weapon in a penal institution as a matter of law); Califonlia in Brief, San Quentin;
Weapons Prompt Lock-Down, L.A. TImEs, June 14, 1990, at A41 (stating how prison officials ordered a lock-
down after discovering a dozen "inmate-manufactured" stabbing devices that were up to 11 inches in length);
Class Action Filed Against Pelican Bay State Prison, CNN TRANSCRIPT, Aug. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, OMNI File (stating that the inmates in Pelican Bay State Prison are considered so dangerous that
anyone who enters is required to wear a stab-proof vest); Gabriel Escobar, Lorton Iniate is Stabbed to Death;
Another Prisoner Cut by Homemade Knives in Youth Center Brawl, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1992, at B4 (stating
that although inmates at the youth center are searched periodically, the inmates often make another shank the
next day); Judge Bars Prison Confiscations, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 28, 1993, at 5 (describing how the
Michigan State Corrections Director vowed to appeal a court ruling barring the confiscation of certain items
allegedly being used to make weapons); id. (stating that prison tensions are heightened as a result of the
stabbings of four prison guards); Latest Con Among Cons: Shoot Self and Sue, UPI, Jan. 19, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing how inmates were smuggling in weapons in order sue the city
for negligence based upon self-inflicted wounds); Possible Drugs and Weapons are Found in Maryland Prison,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 1991, at C3 (describing how 53 homemade weapons were confiscated during shakedown
at a Maryland correction institution).
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willfully, when applied to the intent with which
an act is done, as simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act).
2. Id. § 288(b) (West Supp. 1993).
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Existing law also provides that a person convicted of committing a
lewd or lascivious act3 with a child cannot receive probation4 or a
suspended sentence if the person: (1) Used force or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (2) caused bodily
injury5 on the child during the molestation; (3) befriended the child for the
purpose of molestation;6 (4) used a weapon during the molestation; (5)
molested more than one victim; (6) has had substantial sexual conduct7
with a victim under eleven years old; (7) had been previously convicted
of rape,8 rape with a foreign object,9 abduction of a child for the purposes
of prostitution,10 incest," child molestation,12 penetration with a foreign
3. See People v. O'Connor, 8 Cal. App. 4th 941, 947-48, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 533-34 (1992)
(acknowledging that the defendant's act of directing a child to remove all his clothes except underwear was
sufficient for lewd and lascivious conduct under California Penal Code § 288(a)); People v. Catelli, 227 Cal.
App. 3d 1434, 1447-48, 278 Cal. Rptr. 452, 461 (1991) (holding defendant's act of forcing the victim to lick
the defendant's scrotum was lewd and lascivious); cf. People v. Gilbert, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1380, 7 Cal. Rptr.
2d 660, 664 (1992) (noting that the lewd and lascivious act need not be inherently sexual in nature); id. (stating
that a crime is committed by any touching of a child with the requisite intent).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining probation as the suspension or
execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and revocable release in the community under the
supervision of the probation officer); see also id. § 1203(e) (West Supp. 1993) (providing the circumstances
under which probation is not granted); id. § 1203.066(c)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1993) (stating the circumstances
under which denial of probation to a person convicted of child molestation shall not apply).
5. See People v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1132, 244 Cal. Rptr. 522, 528 (1988) (finding
that the victim's pregnancy as a result of unlawful sexual intercourse constituted great bodily injury); People
v. Villarreal, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1136, 1141,219 Cal. Rptr. 371, 374 (1985) (concluding that the fracture of nasal
bones during an assault constituted great bodily injury); People v. Johnson, 104 Cal. App. 3d 598, 609, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 75 (1980) (stating that a jaw fracture was a significant bodily injury).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 587) (providing an exception to this
circumstance if the defendant honestly and reasonably believed that the child was more than 14 years old); see
also People v. Thompson, 205 Cal. App. 3d 871, 876-78, 252 Cal. Rptr. 698, 699-701 (1988) (stating that
California Penal Code § 1203.066(a)(3) is not unconstitutionally vague).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.066(b) (amended by Chapter 587) (redefining "substantial sexual
conduct" as penetration of the vagina or rectum by the penis of the offender or by any foreign object, oral
copulation, or masturbation of either the victim or the offender).
8. See id. § 261 (West Supp. 1993) (defining rape).
9. See id. § 264.1 (West 1988) (providing the punishment for rape with a foreign object).
10. See id. § 267 (West 1988) (specifying the punishment for abducting a minor for the purposes of
prostitution).
11. See id. § 285 (West 1988) (stating the punishment for committing incest).
12. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (West Supp. 1993) (providing the punishment for child molestation);
cf. A.L. v. Commonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1023-25 (Mass. 1988) (holding the Commonwealth liable for
negligent failure of a probation officer to verify the place of employment for a three time convicted child
molester who was employed as a teacher); id. (providing that this occupation was a violation of the terms of his
probation, and that the molester sexually molested two students during the term of his probation). But see People
v. Wardlow, 227 Cal. App. 3d 360, 367, 278 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1991) (stating that the court conditioned a
convicted child molester's probation on his not associating with other known child molesters); Debra L. Dailey,
Prison and Race in Minnesota, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 761, 778 (1993) (stating that under Minnesota law, it is
likely that the child sexual abuser who does not go to prison will receive a heavy dose of intermediate sanctions




object, 3 or kidnapping 4 a child for the purpose of molestation and
ransom; 15 or (8) assaulted another with intent to commit a crime specified
in this paragraph.'
6
Chapter 587 provides additional circumstances under which a person
convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act cannot receive probation
or a suspended sentence, including a previous conviction for: (1) Raping
one's spouse; 17 (2) enticing an unmarried female under eighteen into
prostitution; 18 or (3) continuous sexual abuse.' 9
In addition, Chapter 587 provides that a person who commits
sodomy 2° or oral copulation with a child under eighteen2' by force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury
13. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 289 (West Supp. 1993) (stating the punishment for penetration with a
foreign object).
14. See id. § 207 (West Supp. 1993) (defining kidnapping).
15. See id. § 209 (West Supp. 1993) (defining kidnapping for ransom).
16. Id. § 1203.066 (amended by Chapter 587); see id. § 220 (West 1988) (listing the various crimes under
which this provision applies including assault with intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, oral copulation, rape
in concert with another, lascivious acts upon a child, or penetration of the genitals or anus with a foreign object).
Other states have statutes regulating probation for sex offenders. See COL. REV. STAT. § 16-11-204 (Supp. 1993)
(providing the conditions of probation that the court may require); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 730, para. 15015 (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (providing that sex offenders who are granted probation are required to register with the specified
authorities). But see State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. 1989) (stating that the court suspended two
consecutive five-year sentences and placed the defendant on probation with the condition that he post signs with
letters at least three inches high on his residence and vehicle doors that read: DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER
- NO CHILDREN ALLOWED); Theresa Walker Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Meeting Congressional Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 434
(1991) (citing United States v. Sadler, 488 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1974), which stated that the defendant pled guilty
to charges relating to pornographic literature, but because he had a Ph.D. in English literature and significant
skills in teaching, sales, and business, many letters were written portraying him as civic-minded and socially
involved, and unlike typical sex offenders, he had sought treatment prior to the proceedings, the court sentenced
him to probation); Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1881, 1888 (1991) (discussing a Rhode Island Superior Court decision that required a convicted sex offender
to place a four-by-six-inch ad with his picture and an apology in the local paper as a condition of his probation).
17. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West Supp. 1993) (stating the punishment for raping one's spouse).
18. See id. § 266 (West 1988) (providing the punishment for enticing an unmarried female under 18 into
prostitution).
19. Id. § 1203.066(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 587); see id. § 288.5 (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining
continuous sexual abuse as an offense committed by any person who either resides in the same home with a
child under age 14 or has recurring access to the child and within a period of three months, engages in three
or more acts of substantial sexual conduct or lewd and lascivious conduct); People v. Jeffers, 43 Cal. 3d 984,
992, 741 P.2d 1127, 1131, 239 Cal. Rptr. 886, 890 (1987) (construing a lower court as explaining that "living
in the household" denotes physical presence under a common roof, whereas being a "member of the ...
household" denotes a quality of relationship). See generally ASSEMBLY COmMITrEE ON WAYS AND MEANS,
COmItrrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2009, at 1 (June 2, 1993) (stating that Chapter 587 is meant to address
circumstances related to the shooting death of a convicted child molester by the victim's mother).
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 286 (West Supp. 1993) (defining sodomy).
21. See id. § 288a (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining oral copulation and the punishment for committing it with
a minor).
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on the victim or another person, is ineligible for probation or a suspended
sentence.22
Chapter 587 also specifically provides that if a person commits
continuous sexual abuse and meets one of the circumstances listed above,
the person is ineligible for probation or a suspended sentence.23
CCA
Crimes; prohibited classes of firearms
Penal Code § 12021, 12021.1 (amended).
AB 685 (Murray); 1993 STAT. Ch. 612
Existing law prohibits persons' convicted of felonies2 and various
enumerated misdemeanors, including assault4 or battery,' from owning
or possessing 6 firearms7 for a period of ten years.8 Chapter 612 adds
22. Id. § 1203.066(a)(5) (amended by Chapter 587); see id. (stating that these violations disqualify a
person from probation or a suspended sentence).
23. Id. § 1203.066(a) (amended by Chapter 587).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining felony); id. §§ 12001.6, 12021(a), 12021(c), 12021.1
(West 1992) (enumerating felonies subject to California Penal Code § 12021); see also People v. Ratcliffe, 223
Cal. App. 3d 1401, 1410, 273 Cal. Rptr. 253, 259 (1990) (declaring that a violation of § 12021(a) is committed
simply by an ex-felon who owns, possesses or has in his custody or control a firearm which thereby constitutes
a felony).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining misdemeanor); see also id. §§ 136.5, 140,
171b, 171c, 171d, 241,243, 244.5,245,245.5,246.3,247,417,417.2, 626.9, 12034(b), (d), 12100(a), 12320(a),
12590(a) (West Supp. 1993) (enumerating misdemeanors subject to California Penal Code § 12021).
4. See id. § 240 (West 1988) (defining assault); id. § 241 (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing the punishment
for assault); see also People v. Mosqueda, 5 Cal. App. 3d 540, 544, 85 Cal. Rptr. 346, 347 (1970) (stating that
under the plain language of § 240, what is determinative is whether the person charged has the present ability
to commit the assault and not the subjective belief of the victim of the offender's ability).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1988) (defining battery); id. § 243 (West Supp. 1993) (providing
the punishment for battery); see also People v. Lindsay, 209 Cal. App. 3d 849, 855, 257 Cal. Rptr. 529, 533
(1989) (holding that for a conviction of a simple battery any force used against the victim is sufficient).
6. See People v. King, 22 Cal. 3d 12, 24, 582 P.2d 1000, 1007, 148 Cal. Rptr. 409, 416 (1978) (stating
that possession under California Penal Code § 12021 does not prohibit those circumstances that are "not
planned" or "without preconceived design"); People v. McClindon, 114 Cal. App. 3d 336, 340, 170 Cal. Rptr.
492, 494 (1980) (stating that possession must only be for a brief time and without predesign or prior possession);
see also People v. Snyder, 32 Cal. 3d 590, 592, 652 P.2d 42, 44, 186 Cal. Rptr. 485, 487 (1982) (stating that
actual knowledge of the provisions of California Penal Code § 12021 is irrelevant to its enforcement).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining firearm); see also 18 U.S.C. §
921(a)(3) (1993) (defining firearm).
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specified domestic violence-related offenses and restraining order
violations to the list of offenses for which a person may not possess
firearms for the ten-year period.9
Under prior law, any person whose livelihood depended on the
possession of a firearm could petition the court for relief from the ten-year
provision at any time prior to January 1,'1993.1" Under Chapter 612, only
persons seeking employment for specific peace officer positions" or
persons employed as peace officers, who are subject to the prohibition
against possession of firearms due to a prior conviction of domestic
violence, may petition the court for relief, and may do so only once.
12
Under Chapter 612, the court can grant relief if it finds by the
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 612); see id. § 12021(c) (amended by Chapter
612) (specifying that any violation constitutes a public offense punishable by imprisonment in state prison or
county jail for not more than one year, a fine not more than $1,000 or both); see also United States v.
Sherbondy, 865 F.2d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that prohibiting a convicted felon from possessing a
firearm did not violate equal protection fights of felons by treating them differently than non-felons); Marchese
v. State 545 F.2d 645, 647 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that there is a legitimate interest in minimizing the use of
firearms by felons and stating that legislatures may decide that convicts have more of a tendency to commit
violence than non-convicts); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1993); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/24-3.1 (1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN § 30-7-16 (Michie Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 61-7-7 (1992) (enumerating prohibitions against
possession of firearms by felons).
9. CAL PENAL CODE § 12021(a) (amended by Chapter 612); see also id. 273.5 (West Supp. 1993)
(mandating that domestic violence which results in traumatic injury is either a felony or misdemeanor punishable
by two to four years imprisonment in state prison, or up to one year in the county jail, by a fine up to $6,000,
or both); id. 273.6 (West Supp. 1993) (mandating that any willful and knowing violation of a court order to
prevent domestic violence, obtained pursuant to the Civil Code or the Code of Civil Procedure, is a
misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $1,000, up to one year in the county jail, or both); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 527 (West Supp. 1993) (providing the basis for obtaining a temporary restraining order); People v.
Gutierrez, 171 Cal. App. 3d 944, 950,217 Cal. Rptr. 616, 619 (1985) (validating California Penal Code § 273.5
in that it did not deny married persons prosecuted for battery equal protection of the laws); ASSEM3BLY
COMMIITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 242, at 3 (May 25, 1993) (stating that the
purpose of the bill is to protect victims of domestic violence from further harm at the hand of the person who
already has injured them, and stating that FBI statistics show that 28% of the women murdered in 1991 were
slain by their husbands or boyfriends); see generally Janice L. Grau, Restraining Order Legislation for Battered
Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REV. 703, (1982) (evaluating the current laws regarding restraining orders
and battered women); Sylvia A. Law, Every 18 Seconds a Woman is Beaten: What Judges Can Do in the Face
of This Carnage, 30 JUDGES J. 12 (1991) (discussing the developing judicial role in domestic violence).
10. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 163, sec. 114, at 648 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 612) (specifying that only persons seeking
employment for peace officer positions, or employed as peace officers under California Penal Code §§ 830.1,
830.2, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, and 830.5 can petition the court for relief from this provision).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a)-(c) (amended by Chapter 612); see id. (providing that any felon,
narcotic addict, or convicted felon of an offense enumerated under § 12001.6 or a misdemeanor as enumerated
under § 12021(c) who owns, possesses a firearm within ten years of the conviction is guilty of a public offense,
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or county jail not exceeding one year, a fine not exceeding
$1,000, or both).
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preponderance of the evidence t3 that the petitioner is likely to use the
firearm safely and lawfully, that the person is not subject to prohibition
under other provisions, 14 and that the petitioner does not have a previous
conviction under subsection (c) of this section. 5 Chapter 612 provides
that the court, in making its decision regarding a petition for relief, will
consider the petitioner's continued employment, the interest of justice, any
relevant evidence, the totality of the circumstances, and whether the
petitioner agrees to participate in counseling as deemed appropriate by the
court. 16
Under existing law, any person who is alleged to have committed a
specified offense 7 subject to juvenile court law,18 is properly before the
juvenile court, and is subsequently adjudged a ward of the court19 for
committing a specified offense, must not own or have in their possession
any firearm until the age of thirty years.20 Chapter 612 adds to the
specified offenses, felony convictions for controlled substances involving
cocaine, cocaine base, methamphetamine, phencyclidine or heroin.2'
13. See In re Corey, 230 Cal. App. 2d 813, 823, 41 Cal. Rptr. 379, 385 (1964) (stating that
preponderance of the evidence means evidence which when weighed against opposing evidence is more
convincing and is probably closer to the truth).
14. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 8100, 8103 (West Supp. 1993) & CAL. PENAL CODE 12021.1
(West 1992) (amended by Chapter 612) (comprising the enumerated provisions for which the court will not grant
relief from California Penal Code § 12021).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(c)(2)(A)-(C) (amended by Chapter 612); see id. (setting forth the
standards for review for the court upon a petition for relief).
16. Id. § 12021(c)(2)(C) (amended by Chapter 612).
17. See id. § 12021(e) (West Supp. 1993) (amended by Chapter 612) (enumerating the specified offenses
as those offenses listed in the California Welfare and Institutions Code § 707); CAL. WELF. & INST. § 707 (West
Supp. 1993) (listing the specified offenses which if committed will subject a minor to a determination of fitness
prior to being dealt with by the juvenile court).
18. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 245-265 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (providing for the jurisdiction
and scope of the juvenile court).
19. Id. § 602 (West 1984) (providing that any person under the age of eighteen who has committed any
crime other than a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which can adjudge
such person a ward of the court).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(e) (West Supp. 1993) (amended by Chapter 612); see id. § 12021(e)
(West Supp. 1993) (mandating that a violation of this section is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison
or county jail for one year or less, a $1000 fine, or both).
21. Id. § 12021(e) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (adding to the specified offenses any offense described in
California Penal Code § 1203.073); see id. § 1203.073(b) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that if conviction results
from one of the enumerated drug related offenses, no probation will be granted); see also People v. Cattaneo,
217 Cal. App. 3d 1577, 1587-88, 266 Cal. Rptr. 710, 715-16, review denied (1990) (aiding and abetting two
sales of cocaine, one involving over 15 pounds of cocaine, did not entitle defendant to probation under the
unusual case exception since the interests of justice would not be served).
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Under existing law, any person previously convicted of a specified
offense who owns or has in their custody or control a firearm22 is guilty
of a felony.23 Chapter 612 adds to the specified offenses: (IThe felony
conviction of participation in a criminal street gang;
24 (2) carjacking; 21
22. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining firearm as any device used as a
weapon which expels a projectile by the force of any explosion or other form of combustion through a barrel);
cf. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1993) (including within the definition of firearm, the frame or receiver of any
explosive weapon, any destructive device, but not including antique firearms); id. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(4) (1993)
(defining destructive device).
23. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021.1 (amended by Chapter 612); id. § 12021.1(b) (amended by Chapter 612)
(enumerating the offenses as: (1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force,
violence, duress, menace or threat of great bodily harm; (5) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace,
or threat of great bodily harm; (6) lewd acts on a child under 14 years old; (7) any felony punishable by death
or life imprisonment; (8) any other felony which the defendant inflicted great bodily harm on another person,
other than an accomplice, or any felony which the defendant uses a firearm; and (9) attempted murder); id. §
17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining felony as a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the
state prison); see People v. Scheidt, 231 Cal. App. 3d 162, 171, 282 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1991) (holding that
the defendant could properly be charged and convicted of both possession of a sawed-off shotgun and being a
felon in possession of a firearm, though both charges involved the same shotgun, in that the first charge was
not a statutorily lesser included offense of the latter charge); People v. Roberson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 890, 894, 146
Cal. Rptr. 777, 779 (1978) (precluding the use of an out-of-state conviction of possession of a firearm after
conviction of a felony for enhancement purposes where the prosecution did not allege that the weapon in
possession was concealed or used by the defendant in commission of a prior felony and, therefore, the out-of-
state conviction would not have been a felony in California).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing sentence enhancement for persons
participating in crimes in furtherance of, or while assisting criminal street gang activity, by imprisonment in
county jail for not more than one year or up to three years in state prison); id. § 186.22(f) (West Supp. 1993)
(defining criminal street gang as any ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more persons,
identified by a common name or identifying sign or symbol, having as its primary activities crimes such as
assault with deadly weapons, robbery, homicide or manslaughter, drug trafficking, drive-by shootings, and
intimidation of witnesses); see People v. Green, 227 Cal. App. 3d 692, 701-02, 278 Cal. Rptr. 140, 146-47
(1991) (holding that the term criminal street gang as used in California Penal Code § 186.22 was sufficiently
defined and did not render the section unconstitutionally vague under the due process clause). Membership in
an undefined gang is not prohibited but membership in a criminal street gang with ongoing criminal activities
is prohibited. Id. at 701; 278 Cal. Rptr. at 146. See also In re Nathaniel C., 228 Cal. App. 3d 990, 1004, 279
Cal. Rptr. 236, 246 (1991) (holding that the focus of California Penal Code § 186.22 is narrower than general
criminal conduct and in order to invoke the sentence enhancement of the statute it must be shown that the
primary activity of the gang is one of the enumerated offenses).
25. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1993) (comprising the federal carjacking statute which mandates up to 25
years imprisonment if serious bodily injury results, and up to life imprisonment if death results); Julie Tamaki
& Jim Herron Zamora, 2 Men Killed in Carjackings 2 Miles Apart, L.A. TImEs, Apr. 22, 1993, at Al (describing
the killing of two men during carjackings occurring on the same day within two miles of each other); Paul
Feldman, Carjackings Make Fear An Unwelcome Passenger, Crime: Series of Violent Incidents Sours
Southland's Love Affair With Cars, and Fuels Calls For Tougher Laws, L.A. TImES, Apr. 11, 1993, at Al
(reporting that the increase of carjackings is spawning fear into Southern Californians and prompting legislation
with tougher penalties for carjacking convictions); One More Urban Nightmare; If You Find Yourself Facing
A Carjacker, Rule No. 1 Well May Be "Don't Resist," L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1993, at B6 (recommending that
victims of carjacking surrender without resistance).
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and, (3) drawing a loaded or unloaded gun in a rude, angry, or threatening
manner or unlawfully using a gun in any fight or quarrel.26
JCB
Crimes; reporting obligations of health practitioners, physicians, and
surgeons
Penal Code §§ 11160, 11161 (repealed and new); §§ 11161.9,
11162.5, 11162.7, 11163, 11163.2 (new); § 11162 (amended).
AB 1652 (Speier); 1993 STAT. Ch. 992
Under prior law, any person' who oversaw a hospital or a pharmacy
was required to report2 to the appropriate legal authorities3 if any person
was brought into the facility with a wound or injury,4 either self-inflicted
or inflicted by the act of another person, caused by the use of a deadly
weapon,5 or inflicted in violation of any state penal law.6 Chapter 992
26. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021.1(b)(28) (amended by Chapter 612) (adding as a specified offense any
offense listed in California Penal Code § 12001.6(c) if the person has two or more convictions under California
Penal Code §417(a)(2)); id. § 12001.6 (West 1992) (specifying offenses involving the violent use of a firearm,
including California Penal Code § 417(2)); id. § 417(2) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that any person who, in
the presence of others, draws or exhibits a loaded or unloaded firearm, in a rude, angry or threatening manner,
or uses in any unlawful manner during a quarrel or fight is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
in county jail for not less than three months but not more than six months, or a fine of $500, or both); see In
Re Jose A., 5 Cal. App. 4th 697, 700, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 45 (1992) (exhibiting a pellet gun that operated by
use of compressed air rather than by explosion or other form of combustion, in an angry manner was not
sufficient for a conviction under California Penal Code § 417).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 11 160(b)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 992) (requiring that a telephone report be made
immediately, and a written report be sent to the local authorities within two working days from the time the
information is acquired); id. § 11 160(b)(4)(A)-(D) (enacted by Chapter 992) (detailing the items to be included
in the report such as: (1) Name of victim; (2) victim's location; (3) nature and extent of victim's injuries; and
(4) identity of the alleged aggressor).
3. See id. § 11160(b) (enacted by Chapter 992) (designating law enforcement officers as the appropriate
legal authorities); id. § 830.1 (West Supp. 1993) (defining peace officer); cf. ALA. CODE § 11-43-181 (1989)
(defining a law enforcement officer as an official who is authorized to arrest people, required to carry out law
enforcement functions, and employed by a state municipality).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160(c) (enacted by Chapter 992) (excluding from the definition of injury
a psychological or physical condition caused by the voluntary use of drugs).
5. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7500.1(k) (West Supp. 1993) (defining deadly weapon as any of the
following instruments: blackjack, slungshot, billy, sandclub, sandbag, metal knuckles, dirk, dagger, firearms,
knife with a blade over five inches in length, razor without a guarded blade, or metal pipe or bar intended to
be used as a club); People v. Macias, 77 Cal. App. 2d 71, 82, 174 P.2d 895, 901-02 (1946) (noting that when
an instrument is used in a dangerous or deadly fashion, it is inferable from the evidence that its user intended
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provides that any health practitioner7 employed by a health facility,'
clinic, 9  or physician's office, and acting within the scope of
employment, 10 must make a report to the appropriate legal authorities
concerning any person that the practitioner knows or reasonably
suspects" has suffered from a wound or injury inflicted by the use of a
deadly weapon, or resulting from assaultive or abusive conduct.'"
to utilize it as a weapon during a certain incident); cf Sumpter v. State, 480 So. 2d 608, 614 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985) (indicating that a firearm need not be loaded at the time of the offense to constitute a deadly weapon),
6. 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 417, sec. 1, at 739 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 11160); see People v. Perez,
2 Cal. 4th 1117, 1123, 831 P.2d 1159, 1161, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577, 579 (1992) (indicating that a police
investigation was conducted as a result of the information that the police received from the hospital regarding
the defendant's wounds, despite the fact that the defendant had told the nurse that he had cut his hand with a
saw); cf MOD. HEALTHCARE, ERs III Prepared for Domestic Violence, Sept. 6, 1993, at 17 (recognizing that
many hospital employees do not have the proper training to spot victims of domestic violence).
7. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162.5(a) (enacted by Chapter 992) (defining health practitioner the same
as under Penal Code § 11165.8); id. § 11165.8 (West 1992) (listing the following as health practitioners:
physician, surgeon, psychiatrist, psychologist, dentist, resident, intern, podiatrist, chiropractor, licensed nurse,
dental hygienist, optometrist, emergency medical technician, counselor, paramedic, psychological assistant,
medical examiner who does autopsies, coroner, religious practitioner who treats children, or public health
employee who treats minors for sexually transmitted diseases).
S. See id. § 11162.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 992) (defining health facility); CAL. HEALTH & SArdiS
CODE § 1250 (West Supp. 1993) (explaining that a health facility is a place organized for the purpose of treating
human ailments to persons who visit the facility for 24 hours or longer).
9. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 992) (defining clinic); CAL, HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1200 (West 1990) (describing a clinic as an organized health care facility which provides
treatment for outpatients).
10. See Hendy v. Losse, 54 Cal. 3d 723, 740, 819 P.2d I, I1, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543, 553 (1991) (stating
that a person who negligently treats a patient is acting within the scope of his employment if the actor is
functioning with an intent to serve his employer); cf. Williams v. Hughes Moving & Storage Co., 578 So. 2d
1281, 1283 (Ala. 1991) (recognizing that persons violating company policy at the time of a pertinent incident,
do not necessarily act outside the scope of their employment); Conchin v. El Paso & Southwestern R.R. Co.,
108 P. 260, 261 (Ariz. 1910) (stating that the determination of whether a person is acting within the scope of
his employment must be assessed on a case-by-case basis).
11. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162.5(d) (enacted by Chapter 992) (defining reasonably suspects as when
a person has a reasonably objective suspicion, based on that person's training and experience).
12. Id. § 11 160(a)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 992); see id. § II 160(b)(l)-(2) (enacted by Chapter 992)
(describing the manner in which the report should be made); id. § 11 160(d)(l)-(24) (enacted by Chapter 992)
(listing various types of assaultive and abusive conduct, including abusing a marital partner or cohabitant); id.
§ 11161.8 (West 1992) (requiring that every person overseeing a hospital must inform the legal authorities of
any incoming patient from a health facility who is suffering from an injury caused by abuse or neglect);
Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. App. 3d 399,413, 551 P.2d 389, 396, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76 (1976) (holding that the
minor, who accused a doctor and hospital of negligently failing to deal with her battered child syndrome
effectively, could, as an alternative, rely on the legal provisions requiring hospitals and physicians to report
intentionally inflicted injuries to the appropriate law enforcement agencies); see also People v. Gonzalez, 182
Cal. App. 2d 276, 277-79, 5 Cal. Rptr. 920, 921-22 (1960) (holding that since hospital workers are required to
report the treatment of any wound caused by a deadly weapon to the legal authorities, a search by a hospital
attendant for a patient's identification, which results in the discovery of contraband, does not constitute an illegal
search and seizure); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-602 (Michie 1987) (providing that all doctors, hospitals,
druggists, or any other persons, who might be summoned to administer first aid, are required to report any knife
or gunshot wounds to a law enforcement agency); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1762 (1987) (stating that a
physician, any other person from a hospital, sanitarium, or other institution who treats a stab or gun-related
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Under existing law, a physician 13 or surgeon caring for a patient 4
who is suffering from a specified wound or injury is required to report the
wound or injury to the legal authorities.' 5 Under Chapter 992, a physician
or surgeon is required to adhere to the same reporting procedures as a
health practitioner.' 6 Chapter 992 also recommends that the physician's
or surgeon's report include: (1) Documentation in the patient's medical
records regarding any statements made by a domestic violence 7 victim
regarding past domestic violence, or made by the culprit of the present
domestic violence; (2) a sketch of the victim's body within the patient's
medical records, noting the location of the injuries and bruises at the time
treatment was provided; and (3) a copy of the report given to the law
enforcement agency.' 8 Chapter 992 further recommends that the physician
wound, or a victim of an intentional poisoning must report such an incident to the legal authorities); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 453-14 (1985) (providing that a physician, surgeon, or manager of a hospital or clinic which treats a
knife or gun-related wound, or any injury that could seriously maim, cause death, or render a person
unconscious, and is the result of violence, must report the same to the police); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-101(a)
(1991) (providing that any hospital, clinic, sanitarium, doctor, physician, surgeon, nurse, pharmacist, undertaker
or embalmer, who helps a person with a wound or injury resulting from the use of a deadly weapon or by other
means of violence, or who suffers from the effects of poison or suffocation, must make an immediate report of
the same to the legal authorities); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4012(a) (1974) (providing that any physician or
manager of any hospital, sanitarium, or other institution which treats a gun-related wound must report the same
to the police). See generally Ian Katz, The Motives: Rare Disorder Holds Key to Ward Killings; Doctors Say
Self-Injury and Child Attacks Were Medical Attention-Seeking Typical of Munchausen's Syndrome by Proxy,
GUARDIAN, May 18, 1993, at 2 (explaining that people who suffer from a rare disorder, called Munchausen's
Syndrome by Proxy, get emotional satisfaction from intentionally harming others and causing them to seek
medical help).
13. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 990 (West 1966) (defining a physician as an individual authorized to engage
in the practice of medicine in all states and nations); cf Er parte Interstate Truck Leasing, 537 So. 2d 53, 54
(Ala. Civ. App. 1988) (referring to a physician as a medical doctor, surgeon, or chiropractor); Clemons v.
Fairview Medical Ctr., 449 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1984) (defining a practitioner as a physician, dentist, or
podiatrist who holds a license); Gates v. Kilcrease, 188 P.2d 247, 250 (Ariz. 1947) (defining a physician as a
licensed person who is authorized to practice medicine or osteopathy).
14. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.05(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining a patient as an individual, dead or alive,
who has been administered medical treatment from a health care provider).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161(a) (enacted by Chapter 992); cf Baker v. Arkansas, 637 S.W.2d 522,523
(Ark. 1982) (holding that the law requiring a doctor to report his treatment of a knife or gunshot wound to the
police is not broad enough to require a doctor to report his treatment of a sexually transmitted disease to the
legal authorities, because such information is protected by the doctor-patient privilege).
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161(a) (enacted by Chapter 992).
17. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 542(a), (b)(l)-(12) (West Supp. 1993) (defining domestic violence as
purposefully causing bodily harm, sexually assaulting, or putting any of the following persons in imminent
apprehension of harm: wife, husband, ex-wife, ex-husband, cohabitant, former cohabitant, blood-related adult,
a person with whom the defendant has been engaged or dated, or a person who is the parent of a child). See
generaly CAL. PENAL CODE § 13519(a), (b)(1)-(16) (West 1992) (designating training courses and procedures
to be adhered to by police officers for the purpose of effectively handling domestic violence complaints); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 70.123.130 (Vest 1992) (providing that the Social & Health Services Department will be
responsible for establishing a technical assistance grant program to help communities to learn how to deal with
domestic violence, and setting forth the program's goals).
18. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 161(b)(1)-(3) (enacted by Chapter 992).
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or surgeon refer the patient to local agencies providing domestic violence
services. 9
Under existing law, any violation of these provisions constitutes a
misdemeanor.2" Under Chapter 992, such a misdemeanor will be
punishable by a jail sentence of up to six months, a fine of up to $1,000,
or both.2
Chapter 992 provides that a health practitioner who makes such a
report is immune from civil or criminal prosecution. 2 Under Chapter 992,
if a person pursues an action against a health practitioner for making a
report, the practitioner is permitted to present the claims to the State Board
of Control to recover reasonable attorney's fees23 of up to $50,000
incurred in connection with such an action.2
19. Id. § 11161(c) (enacted by Chapter 992); see Greg Lucas, Wilson Grants Clemency to Two Battered
Women, Petitions Denied for Fourteen Other Female Prisoners, S.F. CHRON., May 29, 1993, at Al (reporting
that lawyers for the California Coalition for Battered Women in Prison have represented the 21 of the 34 inmates
who have petitioned the Governor to commute their sentences based on the battered women's syndrome); cf.
Comic Books and the Rape Culture, GANNETT NEws SERVICE, Aug. 31, 1993 (stating that Domestic Violence
Project-SAFE House is a private, nonprofit organization which serves as a refuge for battered women in Ann
Arbor); Bonnie Miller Rubin, Shelters, Crisis Centers Confront Increase in Domestic Violence, CH. TRIB., Sept.
8, 1993, at 5 (naming two domestic violence crisis centers in the Chicago area: Crisis Center for South Suburbia
and Evanston-North Shore YWCA).
20. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11162 (amended by Chapter 992); see id. § 17(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining
misdemeanor).
21. Id. § 11162 (amended by Chapter 992); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1762(a) (1992) (providing that
a person who fails to report to the legal authorities the treatment of a knife or gun-related wound will be subject
to a minimum fine of $25); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-1-101(a) (1991) (providing that a person who fails to report
the treatment of a gun-related wound to the legal authorities will be fined up to $100).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.9(a) (enacted by Chapter 992); see Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. App. 3d
399, 410, 551 P.2d 389, 394, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74, (1976) (indicating that the statute requiring the defendant
doctor to report the treatment of intentionally inflicted injuries to the legal authorities did not make the defendant
susceptible to liability for violation of the doctor-patient privilege since the statute exempted the defendant from
liability for making such a report); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1762(b) (1992) (providing that any doctor or
other person making a report regarding intentionally inflicted injuries will be immune from liability, as long as
the report is made in good faith and without malice).
23. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(a)(1)-(4) (West 1990) (setting the limited amounts that an
attorney can collect in fees when representing a client seeking damages against a health care provider based upon
that person's alleged professional negligence); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1235.140 (West 1982) (including the
following as litigation expenses: (1) Reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with trial
preparation, trial and subsequent judicial proceedings; and (2) reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, and
expert expenses incurred while protecting the defendant's interests in connection with the action); ef. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1717(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that where a contract allows for the reimbursement of attorney's
fees and costs, the prevailing party will be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs).
24. CAL. PENAL CODE § 11 163(a)-(b)(2) (enacted by Chapter 992).
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Under existing law, communications between a physician or
psychotherapist and a patient are confidential under certain conditions.
25
Chapter 992 provides that the doctor-patient privilege will not be
applicable in court proceedings or administrative hearings concerning the
injuries that the health practitioner is required to report.26 Chapter 992
further requires that injury-related reports be kept confidential by the
person or facility submitting the report, and the law enforcement agency
receiving the report, unless the information is disclosed to investigate the
25. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2263 (West 1990); see id. (declaring that any intentional, unauthorized
violation of professional confidence is unprofessional conduct); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp.
1993) (establishing that a psychotherapist is required to warn or protect others from a patient's threatened
volatile behavior where the patient has conveyed to the therapist a serious threat of bodily harm against a person
who can be readily identified); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 444.5 (West Supp. 1993) (providing that
persons who participate in a cardiac catheterization program must furnish statistical data and patient information
for effectively evaluating the program, and procedures will be established to protect the confidentiality of the
patient information); id. § 1250.9(a), (h) (West Supp. 1993) (noting that privilege procedures will be put in place
to assure the confidentiality of patient data gathered during any postsurgical care programs); Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 442, 551 P.2d 334, 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 27 (1976) (holding that the patient-
psychotherapist privilege must give way to situations where disclosure is necessary to prevent harm to others);
Inabnit v. Berkson, 199 Cal. App. 3d 1230, 1239, 245 Cal. Rptr. 525, 531 (1988) (holding that when a plaintiff
fails to assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege, such non-action is equivalent to a waiver of the privilege);
cf ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-714(B)(1) (1986) (providing that a tuberculosis control officer has the authority
to review medical data regarding the condition of tuberculosis patients, and such information will remain
confidential and will not reveal the identity of the patient to whom the data relates); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17a-630(d) (West 1992) (providing that information regarding a minor's treatment for alcohol or drug
dependence cannot be divulged to that minor's parents without the minor's consent); Johnson v. McMurray, 461
So. 2d 775, 778 (Ala. 1984) (noting that a doctor and the doctor's patient share a confidential relationship);
People v. District Court, 719 P.2d 722, 724 (Colo. 1986) (stating that the aim of the psychologist-patient
privilege is to effectuate a proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient by sheltering the patient from any shame
that might result from the psychologist's disclosure of their discussions during treatment); Tumlinson v. Texas,
663 S.W.2d 539,542 (Tex Ct. App. 1983) (noting four exceptions to the patient-professional privilege: (1) When
the patient brings suit against the professional; (2) when the patient waives the privilege; (3) when the intent of
the suit is to substantiate and collect on a claim for mental or emotional health services provided to the patient;
or (4) when the patient has spoken with a professional pursuant to a court ordered exam and has been informed
that such discussions will not be deemed confidential). But see Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Physician's Tort
Liabiliy for Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential Information About Patient, 48 A.L.R. 4th 668, 680 (1986)
(stating that some courts have acknowledged that if a physician reveals confidential information about a patient,
that patient may pursue a cause of action against the physician based on an invasion of that patient's privacy);
id. at 691-92 (explaining that some jurisdictions do not adhere to the common law rule that the patient and the
physician have a right to keep their communications private, nor have they enacted statutes protecting such a
privilege).
26. CAL PENAL CODE § 11163.2 (enacted by Chapter 992); cf. Samaritan Health Servs. v. Glendale, 714
P.2d 887, 890 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (recognizing that numerous exceptions have been made to the doctor-patient
privilege, such as the statutes mandating that a doctor report his treatment of any knife or gunshot wounds to
the legal authorities); Freeman v. Arkansas, 527 S.W.2d 909, 913 (Ark. 1975) (noting that it would be
hypocritical to require a doctor to inform the legal authorities that he has treated a victim with a gunshot wound,
but prohibit the doctor from testifying at trial about the nature, location and extent of such a wound). But cf. In
re Onondaga, 450 N.E.2d 678, 679 (N.Y. 1983) (quashing a government subpoena served upon a hospital,
requesting the names and addresses of persons treated for stab wounds on certain days in order to further a
murder investigation, since such a request infringed upon the doctor-patient privilege).
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Crimes; restitution tines-child abuse prevention
Penal Code § 294 (new).
AB 931 (Friedman, B.); 1993 STAT. Ch. 967
Existing law prescribes punishments, fines, and penalties for persons
convicted of various specified sex offenses and crimes.' Chapter 967
provides that when a person is convicted of violating specified Penal Code
sections relating to crimes against children,2 or other specified sexual
crimes where the victim was under 14 years of age,3 the court may order
the defendant to pay a restitution fine of up to $5,000 upon a felony
conviction, or $1,000 upon a misdemeanor conviction, in addition to any
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § II163.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 992); see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2225
(West Supp. 1993) (providing that rules governing the doctor-patient privilege are not applicable when
investigations or proceedings are conducted to enforce the law).
28. CAL PENAL CODE § 11163.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 992).
1. See infra notes 2-3 (describing specified sex offenses and crimes). See generally Robert T. Mertens,
Comment, Child Sexual Abuse in California: Legislative and Judicial Responses, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rnv.
437 (1985) (discussing changes in California law resulting from the prevalence of child sexual abuse).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a (West 1988) (describing the punishment for child endangerment); id.
§ 273d (West 1988) (specifying punishment for the willful infliction of corporal punishment upon a child); id.
§ 288.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (prohibiting continuous sexual abuse of a child by a person with access to the
child); id. § 311.2(b) (West Supp. 1993) (making it a crime to send or bring any matter depicting sexual conduct
by a minor into the state for sale or distribution); id. § 311.3(a) (West 1988) (stating that a person is guilty of
sexual exploitation of a child when he or she depicts by film, photograph, videotape, etc., sexual conduct by a
person under the age of 14); id. § 647.6 (West 1988) (specifying the punishment for annoying or molesting a
person under the age of 18); see also id. § 11165 (West 1992) (defining child as a person under the age of 18
years).
3. See id. § 261 (West Supp. 1993) (defining rape); id. § 264.1 (West 1988) (setting forth provisions
regarding rape or penetration by foreign object and acting in concert by force or violence); id. § 285 (West 1988)
(defining incest); id § 286 (West Supp. 1993) (defining and specifying the punishment for sodomy); id. § 288a
(West Supp. 1993) (defining oral copulation and specifying punishment depending upon the age of the victim);
id. § 289 (Vest Supp. 1993) (setting forth provisions with respect to penetration by a foreign object).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Crimes
other penalties or fines' imposed by the court.5 The amount of restitution
ordered by the court will depend upon the defendant's ability to pay.6 In
4. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(b) (stating that it is the unequivocal intention of the State of California
that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the
persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer and that restitution shall be ordered from the convicted
persons in every case in which a crime victim suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist
to the contrary); see also CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 13967(a) (West 1992) (providing that any person convicted of
any crime in the State of California shall be ordered to pay restitution in the form of a penalty assessment in
accordance with California Penal Code § 1464 and to pay restitution to the victim); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1202.4(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a court will order a defendant convicted of a felony to pay a
restitution fine as set forth in California Government Code § 13967(a)); id. § 1203.04(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that in every case where a convicted person is granted probation, the court will order restitution to the
victim or to the Restitution Fund if the crime did not involve a victim); id. § 1203.1g (West Supp. 1993)
(specifying that where a defendant is convicted of sexual assault on a minor and the defendant is eligible for
probation, the court will order the defendant to make restitution for the costs of medical or psychological
treatment incurred by the victim as a result of the assault); People v. Wardlow, 227 Cal. App. 3d 360, 368-71,
278 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4-6 (1991) (holding that a defendant convicted of child molesting must pay for the
psychological treatment of the victim, but does not have to pay Medi-Cal or contribute to the Victim's
Assistance Fund, because the Legislature intended to include only the direct and actual victims of an assault
under California Penal Code § 1203.1g); cf CAL. CONST. art. I, § 17 (stating that excessive fines may not be
imposed); People v. Allensworth, 600 N.E.2d 1197, 1200 (I11. App. 1992) (holding that the defendant must pay
restitution for the cost of counseling a sexual abuse victim and his family).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 294 (enacted by Chapter 967). See generally SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY,
CO TMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 931, at 2 (July 6, 1993) (indicating that there is a lack of state and county
resources for the prevention of child abuse and that there has been a 123% increase in the number of child abuse
cases reported since 1980).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 294(a) (enacted by Chapter 967); see SENATE COMMITrEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 931, at 3 (July 6, 1993) (stating that the fine is discretionary as to its imposition
and amount, as long as it does not exceed $5,000, but noting that Chapter 967 does not specify precisely the
manner in which the defendant's ability to pay will be determined); see also People v. Reyes, 195 Cal. App. 3d
957, 966, 240 Cal. Rptr. 752, 758 (1987); (stating that a trial court need not state the precise reasons for fixing
the amount of a restitution fine, but that the amount of the fine must be supported by the record); People v.
Gray, 187 Cal. App. 3d 213, 222, 231 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 (1986) (stating that the amount of restitution ordered
under California Government Code § 13967 and California Penal Code § 1202A must be supported by the
factual record consistent with the defendant's due process rights); People v. Wyman, 166 Cal. App. 3d 810, 815,
212 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672 (1985) (stating that, under California Government Code § 13967, factors considered by
the court in determining the amount of the restitution fine include: (1) The victim's losses; (2) the seriousness
and gravity of the offense; (3) the circumstances of the commission of the offense; and (4) any economic gain
to the defendant as a result of the crime); cf 18 U.S.C.S. § 3664(a) (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1993) (requiring
that the court, in determining whether to order restitution, shall consider the amount of the victim's loss, the
defendant's financial resources, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant's
dependents and other factors as the court deems appropriate); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(6) (West 1992)
(stating that, in determining the amount of restitution to be paid to the victim, the court shall consider the
victim's losses, the financial resources of the defendant, the present and potential future financial needs and
earning ability of the defendant and his dependents, and any other factors the court deems appropriate); OR. REV.
STAT. § 137.106(2)(a)-(c) (1991) (stating that, in determining the amount of restitution, the court will consider
the financial resources of the defendant and the defendant's ability to pay); McManamon v. State, 609 So. 2d
91, 92 (Fla. App. 1992) (holding that a defendant who agrees to restitution as part of a plea agreement but fails
to argue an inability to pay the amount set by a court waives his rights under FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.089(6));
State v. Carr, 840 P.2d 724, 725 (Or. App. 1992) (holding that the court must consider the defendant's ability
to pay restitution, not establish that the defendant actually had that ability). But see People v. Staley, 10 Cal.
App. 4th 782, 784-85, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 816, 818 (1992) (stating that restitution fines imposed under California
Penal Code § 1202.4 and California Government Code § 13967 do not require a finding of ability to pay);
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cases where the defendant is an immediate family member of the victim,
the court will take into account any hardship to the victim that might result
from the imposition of the fine.7
LTE
Crimes; school crimes
Education Code §§ 1982.5, 48915.2 (new); §§ 1981, 48915.1,
49079 (amended); Penal Code §§ 241.6, 243.6 (amended).
SB 1130 (Roberti); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1257
Existing law provides that the county board of education' may enroll
in community schools2 students who have been expelled3 while attending
People v. McGhee, 197 Cal. App. 3d 710, 715, 243 Cal. Rptr. 46, 48 (1988) (finding that the trial court was not
required to consider that the defendant had no assets and had limited employment potential before imposing a
$10,000 restitution fine under California Penal Code § 1202.4); 65 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 581, 584 (1982) (stating
that a penalty assessment under California Penal Code § 1464 may be levied by the trial court without regard
to the criminal defendant's present ability to pay such assessments).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 294(c) (enacted by Chapter 967). Fines collected under the provisions of Chapter
967 will be deposited into the state's Restitution Fund to be transferred to the county Children's Trust Fund for
child abuse prevention. Id. § 294(d) (enacted by Chapter 967) See SENATE CoMMiTrEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMtTrEE ANALYSTS OF AB 931, at 2 (July 6, 1993) (indicating that the fines imposed by the court shall be
used for local child abuse prevention programs including, but not limited to, neonatal home visits to at-risk
parents, treatment therapy, counseling and training for mandated child abuse reporters); see also CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 18966 (West 1991) (indicating that California's children's trust funds are currently funded
through surcharges on birth certificates, grants, gifts, bequests and money appropriated for the fund from the
state legislature or local government agencies); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18500(a) (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that taxpayers may designate a portion of their tax refund to go to the State Children's Trust Fund);
cf ALA. CODE §§ 26-16-30(e), 26-16-31(a) (1992), Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.174 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (allowing
taxpayers to donate part of their tax refunds to the state children's trust fund); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-30-109(b)
(Michie 1992), MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.226 (West 1989 & Supp. 1993), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 161-11.1 (1992),
WASH. REV. CODE § 70.58.085 (1992) (providing for generation of funds for their state children's trust funds
by assessing surcharges on vital records, including birth, marriage and death certificates); MASS. GEN. L. ANN.
ch. 10, § 25 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993) (providing that the state will donate part of its lottery revenues to its
children's trust fund).
1. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 1000 (Vest 1978) (providing for the creation of county boards of education);
id. § 1040 (West Supp. 1993) (explaining the duties of the county board of education).
2. See id. § 1980 (West 1978) (providing that the county board may establish or maintain one or more
community schools).
3. See id. § 48925(b) (West 1993) (defining expulsion as the removal of a student from the immediate
or general supervision of school personnel).
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continuing classes,4 opportunity classes,5 or alternative classes.6 Chapter
1257 provides that a student may not be enrolled in a community school
if that student is expelled because of: (1) Physical injury to another; (2)
possession of a firearm, knife, or other dangerous object; (3) unlawful sale
of a controlled substance; or (4) robbery or extortion.7 Chapter 1257
further provides that a student in juvenile court school8 who had been
expelled for any of the aforementioned acts is deemed to be enrolled in a
county community school for purposes of State School Funds
apportionments. 9
Under existing law, a student must be recommended for expulsion from
school for certain acts.'0 Prior law required that the governing board1
of a school district which received a request from an individual who had
been expelled from another district for any of these acts, hold a hearing to
determine if that student still posed a threat to students or employees.'
2
4. See id. § 48430 (West 1993) (providing that the intent of the Legislature in establishing continuation
classes is to give students the opportunity to complete academic requirements for highschool graduation, to offer
instruction that emphasizes occupational orientation, and to meet the educational needs of each student).
5. See id. § 48630 (West 1993) (proclaiming that the legislative intent of an opportunity class is to
provide a chance to students in danger of becoming habitually truant from class to resolve their problems and
maintain or reestablish themselves in regular classes).
6. Id. § 1981(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 1257); see id. § 58500 (West 1989) (defining alternative school
as a school or separate class designed to maximize the opportunity for students to develop positive values,
recognize that the student learns best when the student wants to learn, and maintain a learning situation
maximizing student self-motivation).
7. Id. § 1981(a) (amended by Chapter 1257); see id. § 48915(a) (amended by Chapter 1256)
(enumerating the grounds for expulsion that prohibit enrollment in a community school). See generally Jeanne
Freeman Brooks, It's Back to the Books - and the Guns; Weapons a Fact of Life at Today's Schools, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 3, 1993, at Al (stating that the San Diego Unified School District has adopted a "zero
tolerance" policy that expels any student found with a weapon and places the student in an alternative school);
Expulsions Up in Wake of New School Gun Policy, UPI, July 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI
File (describing a new policy in Los Angeles that does not allow a student expelled for possession of a firearm
to attend an alternative school program in the L.A. Unified School District).
8. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48645.1 (West 1993) (defining juvenile court school).
9. Id. § 1982.5 (enacted by Chapter 1257); see id. § 14000 (West Supp. 1993) (stating that the
legislative intent behind public school support is to assure that adequate funding exists for schools).
10. Id. § 48915(a)(1)-(4) (amended by Chapter 1256); see id. (requiring that the principal or
superintendent of schools recommend a student's expulsion if the student caused serious physical injury to
another person, except in self-defense; possessed certain dangerous objects; unlawfully sold any controlled
substance; or committed robbery or extortion); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985) (recognizing
the substantial interest of school officials in maintaining discipline in response to the increasing levels of school
violence and disorder); Mitchell v. Board of Trustees, 625 F.2d 660, 664-65 (5th Cir. 1980) (allowing the strict
enforcement of school rules when they are rationally related to the legitimate interest of student safety).
11. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 78 (West 1978) (defining governing board as a board of school trustees, and
the city and county boards of education).
12. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 756, see. 25, at 2976 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48915.1). The
governing board could then deny the enrollment of the student if it determined that the student was still a threat.
Id. at 2977; cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 20-8.1-5-18(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a student expelled from a
school corporation may not enroll in another school corporation during the period of the expulsion, unless certain
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Chapter 1257 provides that this hearing will be held for students who were
expelled for reasons other than the specified acts. 3 Chapter 1257
prohibits a student expelled for committing one of the acts from
transferring to another district other than a juvenile court school or a
county community school during the period of expulsion.
14
Existing law requires a district to inform the teacher of every student
who has caused injury"5 or serious bodily injury 16 to another person. 7
Chapter 1257 requires a district to inform the teacher of each student who
has engaged in, or is reasonably suspected to have engaged in, certain
violations.
18
Existing law provides that no district will be liable for failing to
comply with this provision if a good faith effort to inform the teacher is
made.' 9 Chapter 1257 mandates that no district, or district officer or
employee, will be civilly or criminally liable for providing information
under this section, unless the information is proven false, and the district,
district officer, or employee knew that the information was false, or had
given the information with a reckless disregard for its truth or falsity. 20
In addition, an officer or employee who knowingly fails to provide the
information is guilty of a misdemeanor.
2'
exceptions apply); IOWA CODE ANN. § 282.18(16) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that a pupil who has been
suspended or expelled shall not be able to transfer to another school district until the student has been reinstated
in the sending district); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-3401(0 (Supp. 1993) (providing that a local education agency
need not enroll a student who is under suspension or expelled in another local agency); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN.
§ 21.3011(m) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that if a student enrolls in another school district before the
expiration of that student's expulsion, the receiving school district may continue the expulsion or allow the
student to attend classes); W. VA. CODE § 18-5-15(c) (Supp. 1993) (providing that any student suspended or
expelled from public or private school shall only be permitted to enroll in public school upon the approval of
the superintendent of the county where the student seeks enrollment).
13. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48915.1(a) (amended by Chapter 1257).
14. Id. § 48915.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 1257).
15. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243()(6) (West Supp. 1993) (defining injury as any physical injury which
requires professional medical treatment).
16. See id. § 243(0(5) (West Supp. 1993) (defining serious bodily injury as a serious impairment of
physical condition).
17. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49079(a) (amended by Chapter 1257).
18. Id.; see id. (providing that any act described in any subdivision of California Education Code §
48900, except subdivision (h), constitutes an act for which a teacher must be informed); see also id. § 48900
(a)-(g), (i)-(l) (West 1993) (providing that causing physical injury, possessing a dangerous object, unlawfully
possessing a controlled substance, selling a controlled substance, committing robbery or extortion, damaging
school property, stealing school property, committing obscene acts, unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia,
disrupting school activities, or knowingly receiving stolen school property are grounds for suspension or
expulsion).
19. Id. § 49079(b) (amended by Chapter 1257).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 49079(c) (amended by Chapter 1257); see id. (providing that the officer or employee may be
imprisoned for up to six months in a county jail, or may face a fine of not more than $1000, or both).
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Under existing law, a person who assaults22 or batters23 a school
employee24 in retaliation for an act performed in the course of that
employee's duty may be punished.25 Chapter 1257 adds that a person who
assaults or batters a school employee who is engaged in the course of his
or her duty may also be punished.26
SVB
22. See CAL PENAL CODE § 240 (West 1988) (defining assault).
23. See id. § 242 (West 1988) (defining battery).
24. See id. §§ 241.6, 243.6 (amended by Chapter 1257) (stating that for the purposes of these sections,
a school employee has the same meaning as defined in California Penal Code § 245.5(d)); id. § 245.5(d) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining school employee as a certificated or classified employee of a school district on a part-time
or full-time basis); see also State v. Reed, 832 P.2d 694, 695 (Ariz. 1992) (ruling that a school bus driver was
a school employee under a statute similar to the California Code).
25. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 241.6, 243.6 (amended by Chapter 1257); see id. § 241.6 (amended by Chapter
1257) (stating that the penalty for such an offense will be imprisonment in the county jail for up to one year,
or a fine not to exceed $2000, or both); id. § 243.6 (amended by Chapter 1257) (providing that the punishment
for an injury inflicted during a battery is imprisonment in the state prison for 16 months, or two or three years).
These sections shall not apply to conduct arising from a labor dispute. Id. §§ 241.6, 243.6 (amended by Chapter
1257); cf. NEv. REv. STAT. § 200.471(c) (1991) (providing that assault upon a school employee in the
performance of his or her duty is a gross misdemeanor); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-3-9 (Michie Supp. 1993)
(defining various types of assaults and batteries against a school employee); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-
113(B) (Vest 1989) (explaining that a person may be punished by imprisonment or by a fine for committing
an assault or battery upon a school employee while the latter is in the performance of his or her duty); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.3(l) (Supp. 1993) (mandating that any person who assaults a school employee acting
within the scope of his or her employment be guilty of a class A misdemeanor); W. VA. CODE § 61-2-15 (1992)
(providing that a person who commits an assault or battery against a school employee may be punished by
imprisonment or fine).
26. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 241.6, 243.6 (amended by Chapter 1257); see People v. Wright, 272 Cal. App.
2d 53, 58-59, 76 Cal. Rptr. 859, 863 (1969) (holding that a similar statute, California Penal Code § 243,
pertaining to assaults and batteries against police officers in the course of their duty, was not unconstitutional
as violative of due process for being too vague). See generally Out-of-State Teachers Seek Nevada Positions,
29 Gov. Employee Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1014 (Aug. 12, 1991) (reporting that violence in the classroom has caused
several applicants for teaching positions to apply to Nevada schools, where tough assault and battery laws
against teachers are being enacted); Beth Kaiman, Bill Targets School Violence; Legislators Seek Tougher
Penalties for Weapons, Assault, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1992, at Ml (describing a new bill in Maryland with
tougher penalties for assault against school employees).
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Crimes; search and arrest warrants-disclosure
Penal Code § 168 (amended).
AB 1314 (Connolly); 1993 STAT. Ch. 311
Existing law provides that if a district attorney, judge, peace
officer,' or clerk2 who, other than by issuing or in executing a search3
or arrest warrant 4 for a felony,5 reveals that a warrant exists prior to its
execution for the purpose of preventing the property at issue from being
searched or seized, or the person in question from being arrested, that
official will be imprisoned in a state prison or in a county jail.6 Existing
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.1 (West Supp. 1993) (defining a peace officer as any type of sheriff,
police officer, marshal, constable, port warden, inspector or investigator employed by the city, county or district
attorney).
2. See CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (defining a county clerk as an dx officio clerk of the superior court in
the county).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1523 (West 1982) (defining a search warrant as a written order, signed by
a magistrate, authorizing a law enforcement officer to seek a particular item of personal property to be submitted
to the magistrate); see also People v. Kesey, 250 Cal. App. 2d 669, 671, 58 Cal. Rptr. 625, 626 (1967)
(confirming that a magistrate has the power to issue a search warrant only if there is enough evidence to cause
a reasonably prudent person to conclude that there is sufficient ground for a search to be conducted); cf. Chenkin
v. Bellevue Hosp. Ctr., 479 F. Supp. 207, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that to determine whether a warrantless
search of a person is reasonable, there must be a balancing of the societal interest against the Fourth Amendment
interest of the person being searched). See generally Time of Day is Relevant to Reasonableness of Search,
NAT'L LJ., May 24, 1993, at 39 (reporting that the reasonableness of a warrantless, protective search may
depend on the time of day that the officer stopped the person and whether or not other people were pre.ent
during that time).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 813 (West Supp. 1993) (explaining that a magistrate will issue an arrest
warrant once a complaint is filed against the defendant, provided that the magistrate is confident from the
information in the complaint that an offense has been committed and there is reasonable ground to suspect that
the defendant committed the offense); Cummiskey v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 4th 1018, 1029, 839 P.2d 1059,
1066, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 551, 557 (1992) (stating that probable cause exists when a reasonably prudent person
would have a strong suspicion that the accused has committed the crime in question); see also People v. Seslin,
68 Cal. 2d 418, 421, 439 P.2d 321, 323, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409, 411 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080 (1969)
(holding that a magistrate has the authority to issue an arrest warrant only if probable cause exists); People v.
McCarter, 117 Cal. App. 3d 894, 909, 173 Cal. Rptr. 188, 196 (1981) (stating that arrest warrants cannot be
issued upon oral testimony, but rather can only be issued on the basis of sworn written complaints or affidavits
establishing probable cause); cf. Lamb v. Arkansas, 743 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
the prosecution failed to meet the warrant requirements where the warrant was issued without the approval of
a disinterested magistrate and without an independent determination of probable cause); Thompson v. Delaware,
539 A.2d 1052, 1055-56 (Del. 1988) (holding that when a warrantless arrest is made, the requirements to fulfill
the probable cause determination must be, at a minimum, equal to those where an arrest warrant is secured);
Iowa v. Harvey, 242 N.W.2d 330, 340 (Iowa 1976) (defining probable cause as when a reasonable man believes
that an offense has been committed by the arrestee).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining felony).
6. Id. § 168(a) (amended by Chapter 311); see id. (providing that the official's jail or prison term for
premature disclosure of a warrant will not exceed one year); cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33c (West Supp.
1993) (providing that the court clerk is prohibited from revealing any information relating to a search warrant
prior to its execution); IDAHO CODE § 18-4402 (1992) (stating that every grand juror, prosecuting attorney, clerk,
Pacific Law Journal/VoL 25
Crimes
law further provides that disclosure7 of the warrant's existence made
solely with the intention of assuring the defendant's voluntary compliance
with the warrant will not be prevented Chapter 311 limits this privilege
to the Attorney General or a district attorney.9
Chapter 311 also provides that the Attorney General or a district
attorney, upon an indictment being made and arrest warrant being issued,
will not be prevented from disclosing the existence of the indictment and
the arrest warrant for the purpose of apprehending the defendant.1"
APW
judge or other officer who intentionally reveals the existence of an indictment for a felony, prior to the
defendant's arrest, has committed a misdemeanor); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-817 (1989) (indicating that any person
who reveals that an application for a warrant has been submitted or a warrant has been issued, prior to its
execution, is guilty of a misdemeanor); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 946.76 (West 1982) (stating that a person is subject
to a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment for up to two years, or both, for disclosing information regarding
a search warrant prior to its execution).
7. See People v. Tansey, 593 N.Y.S.2d 426, 435 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (defining disclosure as the
revelation of secret or not fully comprehended information).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 168(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 311); cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3827 (1988)
(noting that the law against early disclosure of a warrant does not apply to law enforcement officers who
disclose the existence of the warrant in order to encourage the defendant to surrender, or in a matter involving
a child kidnapping).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 168(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 311).
10. Id. § 168(b)(2) (amended by Chapter 311); cf. Pennsylvania v. Johnson, 409 A.2d 308, 310 (Pa. 1979)
(stating that Bucks County officials revealed the existence of an arrest warrant to New Jersey officials where
the appellant was imprisoned on unrelated charges); Wal-Mart Stores v. Medina, 814 S.W.2d 71, 72 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (depicting an incident in which an arrestee surrendered to the police after learning that there was
a warrant for her arrest).
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Crimes; sentence enhancement-credible threat
Penal Code § 1170.13 (amended).
AB 106 (Martinez); 1993 STAT. Ch. 553
Under existing law, a person' convicted of a felony,2 who willfully3
and maliciously4 communicates a credible threat5 to use force or violence
against a victim 6 or witness 7 of the felony, is subject to imprisonment.'
Upon the consecutive convictions for the communication of a credible
threat, the subordinate term9 imposed shall not exceed fifteen years and
shall consist of the full length of the middle term'0 for that offense."
However, the sentence imposed may exceed fifteen years if the person
making the credible threat is either confined or subject to reimprisonment
in state prison.'
2
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
2. See id. § 17 (West Supp. 1993) (defining a felony as a crime that is punishable by death or
imprisonment in a state prison).
3. See id. § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willfully as an intentional act done with a purpose or willingness
to commit the act); People v. Williams, 102 Cal. App. 3d 1018, 1029, 162 Cal. Rptr. 748, 755 (1980)
(concluding that words such as willfully, knowingly, and maliciously are words relating to general intent); 2
CALJIC 351 (4th ed. 1979) (stating that willfully, knowingly, and maliciously are normally expressions of
mental states in general criminal intent).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 136(1) (West 1988) (defining malice as an intent to vex, annoy, harm, or
injure in any way another person, or to thwart or interfere in any manner with the orderly administration of
justice).
5. See id. § 139(c) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining credible threat as a threat made with the intent and the
apparent ability to carry out the threat so as to cause the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her
safety or the safety of his or her immediate family); People v. Dollar, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1335, 1341, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 502, 505 (1991) (requiring that for the threat to be credible it must be made by an actor who has the
apparent ability to carry out the threat and the additional criminal intent to cause the victim to fear).
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 136(3) (West 1988) (defining victim).
7. See id. § 136(2) (West 1988) (defining witness).
8. Id. § 139(a) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (requiring the sentence to be either imprisonment in the
county jail not to exceed one year or in the state prison for two, three, or four years); Dollar, 228 Cal. App. 3d
at 1340 n.2, 279 Cal. Rptr. at 504 n.2 (concluding that the requisite intent required by California Penal Code
§ 139 is the intent to cause reasonable fear); see also People v. Hood, I Cal. 3d 444, 455-57, 462 P.2d 370, 377-
78, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625-26 (1969) (reviewing the distinction between general and specific intent crimes).
9. See 3 B.E. WITKIN & N.L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1474 (2d ed. 1989) (defining
subordinate terms as consecutive sentences). See generally People v. Lawson, 107 Cal. App. 3d 748, 165 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1980) (discussing principal, subordinate, and consecutive terms).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining middle term as the term to be given
if the statute provides three possible terms, or as a sentence when no mitigating or aggravating factors exist to
warrant the sentence being longer or shorter); People v. Lobaugh, 188 Cal. App. 3d 780, 785, 233 Cal. Rptr
683, 686 (1987) (holding that the imposition of the middle term is mandated by California Penal Code § 1170,
absent aggravating or mitigating factors).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.13(a) (amended by Chapter 553); see id. (providing that the term not
exceed 15 years).
12. Id. § 1170.13(b) (amended by Chapter 553).
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Existing law requires the term of the imprisonment not to exceed twice
that of the base term imposed by the trial court. 3 Chapter 553 expressly
exempts the subordinate terms imposed by the existing law from the
double-base term-limit. 4
GAR
13. Id. § 1170.1(g) (West Supp. 1993); see CAL. R. CT. 405(b) (defining base term as the determinate
prison term selected from among the three possible terms prescribed by statute or the determinate prison term
prescribed by law if a range of three possible terms is not prescribed); see also 3 B.E. WITKIN & N.L. EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW § 1487 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993) (discussing the double-base-term rule); Review
of Selected 1991 California Legislation, 22 PAC. L.J. 323, 523 (1991) (reviewing California Penal Code §
1170.1).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.13(c) (amended by Chapter 553); see id. (expressly overriding the double-
base-term limit set forth in § 1170.1(g)); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(f) (stating that any prior felony convictions
shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of sentence enhancements in any criminal
proceeding); People v. Pieters, 52 Cal. 3d 894, 904, 802 P.2d 420,426,276 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (1991) (holding
that quantity sentence enhancements under California Penal Code § 1170 were impliedly exempted from the
double-base-term limit of California Penal Code § 1170.1(g) before § 1170 was amended to expressly provide
such); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.5(b) (Vest Supp. 1993) (requiring the court, for any new felony which
requires a sentence to be imposed, to add a one-year term for each prior separate prison term served for any
felony); People v. Prather, 50 Cal. 3d 428, 440, 787 P.2d 1012, 1020, 267 Cal. Rptr. 605, 613 (1990)
(concluding that the California Constitution supersedes the application of the double-base-term limitation of
California Penal Code § 1170.1(g) to sentence enhancements based on California Penal Code § 667.5); People
v. Fritz, 40 Cal. 3d 227, 233, 707 P.2d 833, 837, 219 Cal. Rptr. 460, 464 (1985) (Lucas, J. dissenting) (arguing
that the intent of the framers and voters was thwarted by allowing the trial courts to dismiss or strike prior
convictions to avoid the mandatory sentence enhancements of California Penal Code § 667); Sue Ellen Dieb,
California Supreme Court Survey, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 682, 685 (1991) (stating that People v. Prather should be
broadly interpreted due to the constitutional language used); cf.ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-604, 13-702 (West
Supp. 1993) (providing similar sentence enhancement statutes); State v. Phillips, 678 P.2d 512, 515 (Ariz. 1983)
(stating that the elements of the prior offenses are relevant in determining whether the enhanced punishment
provisions apply). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(b) (West Supp. 1993) (overruling People v. Martinez, 175
Cal. App. 3d 881, 221 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1985) by providing that a judge may not strike any prior convictions of
a serious felony for purposes of sentence enhancement under California Penal Code § 667(a)); People v. Salazar,
194 Cal. App. 3d 634, 637 n.2, 239 Cal. Rptr. 746, 747 n.2 (1987) (stating that People v Fritz was abrogated
by emergency legislation on May 6, 1986, which amended California Penal Code §§ 667 and 1385). See
generally Victim's Rights Symposium, 23 PAC. L.J. 815 (1992) (discussing Proposition 8 and the Victim's Rights
Bill regarding sentence enhancements and the double-base-term rule).
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Crimes; sentence enhancement-great bodily injury to the elderly
Penal Code § 12022.7 (amended).
AB 1549 (Epple); 1993 STAT. Ch. 608
Existing law provides that any person who, with the intent to inflict
great bodily injury,' personally inflicts such injury on any person, other
than an accomplice, during the commission of a felony, will receive an
additional three year sentence.
2
Chapter 608 provides that any person who intentionally inflicts great
bodily injury on another person which causes that person to become
paralyzed 3 or comatose, will receive an additional and consecutive five
year term.4 Chapter 608 further provides that a person who inflicts great
bodily injury on a victim who is seventy years of age or older, other than
an accomplice, during the commission or attempted commission of a
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.7(d) (amended by Chapter 608) (defining great bodily injury as a
significant or substantial physical injury).
2. Id. § 12022.7(a) (amended by Chapter 608); see id. § 1170.1 (West Supp. 1993) (listing the
sentence enhancements which are imposed for aggravating circumstances); id. (discussing the statutory
provisions relating to aggravating circumstances); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988) (permitting a court to
impose a sentence which extends beyond a specified range if aggravating circumstances exist).
3. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.9(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1993) (defining paralysis as a major or
complete loss of motor functioning resulting from injury to the nervous system or muscular mechanisms).
4. Id. § 12022.7(b) (amended by Chapter 608).
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felony, will receive an additional five year term, unless the injury is an
element of the felony offense of which that person is convicted.5
CCA
Crimes; sentence enhancement-sex offenses against minors
Penal Code § 667.15 (new).
AB 25 (Burton); 1993 STAT. Ch. 591
Under existing law, it is a felony punishable by a three, six, or eight
year prison term for any person' to willfully2 commit any lewd or
5. Id. § 12022.7(c) (amended by Chapter 608); see id. § 12022.7(e) (amended by Chapter 608) (noting
that this provision does not apply to murder, manslaughter or arson); Finney v. State, 320 S.E.2d 147, 153 (Ga.
1984) (finding that the defendant's acts of intentionally inflicting serious physical and psychological abuse on
two elderly women, prior to their deaths, were aggravating circumstances for increased sentences), cert. denied,
470 U.S. 1088 (1985); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUB3LIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1549, at 2
(Apr. 13, 1993) (stating that the purpose of the bill is to protect seniors who are vulnerable victims and who are
afraid to leave their homes at night or even to walk during the daytime); id. (reporting that seniors who hear of
others being attacked become fearful of walking outdoors and subsequently may become psychological prisoners
in their own homes); id. (noting that some of the seniors that have been attacked have ended up in hospitals,
or nursing homes with broken hips or may have had to move out of their neighborhood and in with their
children); see also People v. Bean, 46 Cal. 3d 919, 960, 760 P.2d 996, 1022, 251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 493-94 (1988)
(Broussard, J., dissenting) (stating that the nature of the crimes, involving senseless violence against older,
defenseless victims, was inherently prejudicial), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1038 (1990); People v. Jackson, 28 Cal.
3d 264, 315, 61 P.2d 149, 175, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 629 (1980) (noting that in the case of the murders of two
elderly people in their mobilehome, one of the aggravating circumstances was the use of lethal and unusually
brutal force against the elderly ladies), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1035 (1981); cf. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3002(24) (West
Supp. 1993) (defining elder abuse as the abuse of an older individual); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-21(d) (1992)
(stating that any person who commits the offense of aggravated assault against a person who is 65 years of age
or older will be punished by imprisonment for three to 20 years); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-2(a)(12)
(Smith-Hurd 1993) (stating that a person who knowingly or without legal justification, commits an assault on
a person 60 years of age or older is guilty of misdemeanor aggravated assault); id. ch. 320, para. 15/2(D) (1993)
(defining "abuse" as intentionally or knowingly causing any physical injury or exploiting the resources of an
elderly individual); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 6913(a) (1992) (providing that any person who willfully or
intentionally engages in abuse or exploitation of an elderly person will be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than 18 months, or both). See generally Susan M. Witt, Note, The Illinois Aggravated
Batter' of a Senior Citizen Statute: Out of Sync with the Sentencing System, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 1161, 1161
(discussing an Illinois law that defines the offense of aggravated battery of a senior citizen as a class 2 felony,
distinguished from the general class 3 felony of aggravated battery, and concluding that the law hinders rather
than promotes convictions); ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1549,
at 3 (Apr. 13, 1993) (reporting that the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice oppose this bill because the
group has experienced that the Penal Code is a poor medium by which to send a message to those who commit
violent crimes).
1. See In re Paul C., 221 Cal. App. 3d 43, 49, 270 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (1990) (concluding that the
definition of person may include a minor under 14 committing sexual acts with other children upon clear proof
of the minor's knowledge of the wrongfulness of the acts and criminal intent); In re John L., 209 Cal. App. 3d
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lascivious act3 with a child under the age of fourteen.4 It is also a felony
punishable by a six, twelve, or sixteen year prison term, for a person who
lives with or has recurring access to a minor to engage in continuous
sexual abuse5 with that child.
6
Existing law further provides that it is a felony to knowingly possess
or control any matter depicting a minor under age fourteen personally
engaging in or simulating sexual conduct.7
1137, 1141, 257 Cal. Rptr. 682, 684 (1989) (holding that a minor 14 or older is a person under California Penal
Code § 288(a), when the minor engages in sexual contact with a willing partner who is under 14 years of age).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willfully, when applied to the intent with which
an act is done, as simply a purpose or willingness to commit the act).
3. See People v. O'Connor, 8 Cal. App. 4th 941, 947-48, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 533-34 (1992)
(acknowledging that the defendant's act of directing a child to remove all his clothes except underwear was
sufficient for lewd and lascivious conduct under Califomia Penal Code § 288(a)); People v. Catelli, 227 Cal.
App. 3d 1434, 1447-48, 278 Cal. Rptr. 452, 461 (1991) (affirming that defendant's act of forcing the victim to
lick the defendant's scrotum was lewd and lascivious); cf. People v. Gilbert, 5 Cal. App. 4th 1372, 1380, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 660, 664 (1992) (noting that the lewd and lascivious act need not be inherently sexual in nature). A
crime is committed by any touching of a child with requisite intent. Id.
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288(a) (West Supp. 1993); see People v. Dunnahoo, 152 Cal. App. 3d 561, 574,
199 Cal. Rptr. 796, 802-03 (1984) (stipulating that other uncharged sexual acts are admissible to prove that the
defendant committed the charged acts with the intent required under the statute).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining continuous sexual abuse).
6. Id.
7. Id. § 311.11(a) (West Supp. 1993); see id. § 311.4(d) (West 1988) (defining sexual conduct); see also
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (holding that a state statute prohibiting the distribution of child
pornography did not violate the First Amendment due to the state's interest in protecting children); id. at 760
(stating that the most expeditious and practical method of law enforcement is to impose severe criminal penalties
on persons selling, advertising, or otherwise promoting child pornography); id. at 761 (stating that it was not
necessary to find the pornography patently offensive in order to have required the sexual exploitation of a child
for its production); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (stipulating that criminalization of pornography
distribution is constitutional only if the material is obscene and providing a three-part test to determine
obscenity); People v. Cantrell, 7 Cal. App. 4th 523, 542-43, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188, 199-200 (1992) (noting that
the trial court's interpretation of the term "sexual conduct" was not overbroad when it stated that simple nude
photographs of children without more would not fall within California Penal Code § 311.4(d); the photographs
must have been taken for the purpose of sexual stimulation of the viewer), See generally United States v.
Schultz, 970 F.2d 960, 961 n.l (1st Cir. 1992) (interpreting § 2G2.2(b)(1) of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (1992) which provides a two level enhancement to the Level 13 sentencing guideline when
pornographic materials involve minors under age 12), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1020 (1993); United States v.
Meyer, 802 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(1) (Supp. 1984) which prohibits
transporting in foreign commerce the visual depictions of minors engaging in sexually explicit conduct), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987); id. at 351 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2253(2)(E) (1982), which uses the term lascivious
to describe photographs of the genitals of fifteen and seventeen year old boys which were found in the
defendant's possession). The purpose of these statutes is to combat the sexual exploitation of minors. Id. at 351-
52; Review of Selected 1989 California Legislation, 21 PAc. L.J. 429, 429-30 (1989) (comparing New York v.
Ferber with Miller v. California and earlier court decisions concerning child pornography). Most states prohibit
child pornography because it is exploitative of minors. See generally COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-403(l),(1.5)
(Supp. 1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-751 (Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 531.320(1) (Baldwin 1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1(A)(1) (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-625(1) (1993).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Crimes
Chapter 591 enhances the punishment for an adult' convicted of the
crimes of lewd and lascivious acts with a child or continuous sexual abuse
upon a minor.9 The punishment shall be increased by an additional one
year or two year term, if the adult uses child pornography prior to or
during the lewd or lascivious act, in order to seduce the child, or for the
adult's or the child's gratification."l
The punishment shall be increased by an additional two year term if
the adult engages in continuous sexual abuse with the child and uses child
pornography prior to or during the molestation.1
CCA
8. See CAL. FANI. CODE § 6501 (West Supp. 1993) (defining adult as an individual who is 18 years of
age or older).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.15 (enacted by Chapter 591).
10. Id. § 667.15(a) (enacted by Chapter 591); see In re Duncan, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1348, 1358, 1360,234
Cal. Rptr. 877, 883-84 (1987) (stating that the purpose of California Penal Code § 311.3 is to protect children
from sexual abuse and invasion of their privacy rights through the development and duplication of photographs,
movies, and video tapes depicting them engaged in sexual conduct), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 985 (1987); id.
(stating that California Penal Code § 311.3(a) is part of a statutory scheme to combat the exploitative use of
children in the production of pornography); cf. Schultz, 970 F.2d at 961 (citing § 2G2.2(b)(1) of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (1992) which provides a two level enhancement for transporting, trafficking, or
receiving pornographic materials involving minors under age 12); State v. Reed, 853 P.2d 605, 606-07 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a twenty-five year to life sentence was not an abuse of the court's discretion when
the defendant had used pornographic movies among other manipulative techniques to engage in sexual activity
with minors). See generally State v. Mankiller, 722 P.2d 1183, 1191 (N.M. 1986) (discussing the relevance of
presenting pornographic materials as evidence at trial); Darrel W. Cole, A Success Story With a Different Type
of Spitz: Prosecutor Has No Plans to Give Up Battle, OAKLAND BUS. MONTHLY, Jan. 1992, § 1, at 36
(discussing how molesters use pornography to desensitize a child to sexual acts, and then abuse the child).
11. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.15(b) (enacted by Chapter 591).
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Crimes; sex offenses-spousal rape, sex offender registration
Penal Code §§ 261, 262, 264, 286, 288a, 289, 290 (amended).
AB 187 (Solis); 1993 STAT. Ch. 595
Penal Code § 293 (amended).
AB 191 (Umberg); 1993 STAT. Ch. 555
Existing law defines rape as an act of sexual intercourse with a person
not the spouse of the perpetrator under specified circumstances.' Spousal
rape is described as an act of intercourse achieved against the will of one's
spouse through the use of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury on the spouse or another, or through threatening to retaliate2 in the
future.
3
Chapter 595 redefines spousal rape to be substantially similar to
general rape including sexual intercourse accomplished against the victim's
will through: (1) The use of force, violence, duress, 4 menace,5 or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of the victim or
another; (2) the prevention of the victim's resistance by any intoxicating,
anesthetic or controlled substance administered by, or with the knowledge
of, the accused; (3) threats to retaliate in the future against the victim or
another person with the reasonable possibility that the perpetrator will
carry out the threat; (4) threats to incarcerate, arrest, or deport the victim
or another where the victim holds a reasonable belief that the accused is
1. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(I-7) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (delineating the circumstances
constituting rape as where, due to a mental disorder, the victim is incapable of consent, where intercourse is
accomplished through the use of force, violence, duress, menace or fear of immediate harm to the victim or
another; where resistance is prevented by any intoxicating, anesthetic or controlled substance; where victim
mistakenly believes that the accused is the victim's spouse and the accused has cultivated this belief; where the
accused threatens future retaliation; and where the accused threatens incarceration, arrest or deportation to
accomplish intercourse).
2. See id. § 262(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 595) (defining threatening to retaliate as a threat to kidnap,
or falsely imprison, or to inflict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death).
3. Id. § 262(a) (amended by Chapter 595).
4. See id. § 262(c) (amended by Chapter 595) (defining duress as a direct or implied threat of force,
violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to
perform an act which would otherwise not have been performed, or acquiesce in an act to which one otherwise
would not have submitted).
5. See id. § 262(d) (amended by Chapter 595) (defining menace as any threat, declaration, or act which
shows an intention to inflict an injury upon another).
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a public official;6 and (5) intercourse with a person who the accused
knows is unconscious during the act.7
For the offenses of rape, spousal rape, sodomy, oral copulation, and
rape by foreign object, Chapter 595 describes a victim "unconscious of the
nature of the act" as incapable of resisting because the victim: (1) Was
unconscious or asleep; (2) was not aware, knowing, perceiving, or
6. See id. § 261(a)(7) (amended by Chapter 595) (defining public official as a person employed by a
governmental agency who has the authority, as part of that position, to incarcerate, arrest, or deport another).
7. Id. § 262 (amended by Chapter 595); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (mandating that no state shall
make or enforce any law which denies any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 163.305-.475 (1987) (repealing the portion of its sex crimes statutes defining woman as "a female
person not married to the actor," thus giving sex crimes against spouses the same elements and penalties as
crimes against nonspouses); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 187, at
3 (Apr. 13, 1993) (noting that since Oregon deleted the distinction between spousal and nonspousal rape, very
few cases have been reported, those that are reported tend to be very violent in nature, and there is no evidence
that the law has been abused); see also Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. 1986) (holding that an
Alabama statute providing for a marital exemption to rape was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment); State
v. Rider, 449 So. 2d 903, 906 (Fla. 1984) (refusing to recognize an interspousal exception to rape); State v.
Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1981) (holding that there is no such thing as a wife's implied consent to
sexual battery by her husband); Commonwealth v. Chretien, 417 N.E.2d 1203, 1209 (Mass. 1981) (holding that
forcible, nonconsensual sexual intercourse between spouses following the entry of a divorce judgment nisi is
unlawful); People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 572 (N.Y. 1984) (declaring that there is no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital and non-marital rape and therefore a New York statute which did so was
unconstitutional); Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (Va. 1984) (holding that while consent
to marital relations may be implied between spouses, a wife may unilaterally revoke this implied consent); c.f.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (Michie 1992) (prohibiting the prosecution of a spouse for rape unless the parties
are living separate and apart); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (Baldwin 1993) (allowing for a spousal
exemption unless the spouses are living apart); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507(b)(1)(A) (1992) (allowing for
a spousal exemption unless the defendant causes serious bodily injury to the victim, is armed with a weapon,
or the spouses are living apart and one has filed for a separation or divorce); Linda Chong, Wfhen Rape Shatters
the Vows to Love, Honor and Cherish, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., July 5, 1992, at 1 (discussing spousal rape
and reporting that one in seven wives is sexually abused by her husband); Jerry Gillam, Bill Targets Spousal
Rapists for Longer Prison Sentences, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993, at A25 (reporting the introduction of AB 187);
Linda Goldston, California Moves to Strengthen Law for Prosecuting Spouse Rape, HOUST. CHRON., Aug. 2,
1992, at A13 (reporting on a bill with the same content as AB 187 in the 1992 session and noting that studies
have shown that 80% of the approximate 1.8 million women who are battered are also victims of spousal rape);
Dana Wilkie, Taking the Measure of Violence, S.D. UNION-TRIB., May 29, 1993, at Al (noting the high wave
of crime against women and recently proposed legislation aimed at combatting such crime); Sonya Live: Spousal
Rape Laws (CNN television broadcast, July 31, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Transcripts File
(reporting that according to some studies marital rape is more prevalent than non-marital rape since it occurs
over and over - up to 20-40 times in one relationship). See generally SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR
WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975) (denouncing the concept that compulsory sexual intercourse is a
husband's right); SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987) (noting that wives are the most suspect class of victims
in rape prosecutions); FINKELHOR AND YiLO, LICENSE TO RAPE (1985) (discussing marital rape and indicating
that it may be more traumatic than stranger rape); DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE (1982) (reporting
that over one million women are raped by their husbands each year); Thomas R. Bearrows, Abolishing the
Marital Eiremption for Rape: A Statutory Proposal, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 201 (1983) (discussing the roots of
the marital rape exemption and suggesting potential changes in the law); Kenneth McLaughlin, Case Note,
Criminal Law - Sexual Battery - No hiterspousal Erceptionfroin Prosecution Under Florida Sexual Battery
Statutes, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 326 (1982) (examining State v. Smith, 401 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1981), and the
rejection of the interspousal exception from prosecution under Florida Sexual Battery statutes).
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cognizant that the act occurred; or (3) was not aware, knowing, perceiving
or cognizant of the essential characteristics of the act due to the
perpetrator's fraud.8
Existing law provides that rape is a felony, punishable by three, six, or
eight years in the state prison.9 Under prior law, spousal rape was
punishable as a felony by three, six, or eight years in state prison or it
could be treated as a misdemeanor and punished by imprisonment in the
county jail, a fine up to $1,000, or both.'0 Chapter 595 abolishes the
misdemeanor alternative for spousal rape and makes it a felony punishable
by imprisonment in the state prison for three, six, or eight years."
Under existing law, a prosecution of a felony punishable by eight or
more years' imprisonment must be commenced within six years after the
commission of the offense.' 2 Prior law provided that no prosecution may
be commenced for spousal rape unless the victim reported the incident to
a peace officer with the power to arrest, or to the district attorney for the
county in which the violation occurred within ninety days after the day of
the violation. 3
Chapter 595 makes spousal rape a felony with a statute of limitations
of six years. 14 Additionally, the time for reporting the violation is
extended to one year, the same as that allowed to rape victims. 15 If the
victim's allegations are corroborated by independent evidence which is
admissible at trial the victim is not required to have reported the incident
in accord with specified guidelines.
16
Existing law mandates that any person who, since July 1, 1944, is
convicted of an assault with the intent to commit rape, sodomy,' 7 or other
sexual offenses, 8 contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 9
8. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 262, 286, 288a, 289 (amended by Chapter 595).
9. Id. § 264(a) (amended by Chapter 595).
10. 1988 CAL. STAT. ch. 1243, see. 264, at 4133 (amending California Penal Code § 264).
11. Id.
12. CAL. CRIM. PROC. CODE § 800 (West Supp. 1993).
13. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 184, sec. 262, at 941 (amending California Penal Code § 262).
14. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262(b) (amended by Chapter 595).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See id. § 286(a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining sodomy); id. § 220 (West 1988) (stating the criminal
provision for assaulting another with intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copulation).
18. See id. § 285 (Vest 1988) (stating the criminal provision for committing incestuous acts); id. § 288
(Vest Supp. 1993) (stating the criminal provision for committing a lewd or lascivious act with a child under the
age of 14); id. § 288.5 (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating the criminal provision for committing continuous sexual abuse
with a child); id. § 289 (amended by Chapter 595) (stating the criminal provision for penetrating the genital or
anal openings of another person with any foreign object, for the purpose of sexual arousal); id. § 314(l)-(2)
(West 1988) (stating the criminal provision for exposing one's genitals in public or procuring another to expose
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disorderly conduct,20 or is convicted in any other state of any similar
attempt or committed offense, or has been determined to be a mentally
disordered sex offender,21 must register with the appropriate authority.22
himself); id. § 647.6 (West 1988) (stating the criminal provision for annoying or molesting a child under the
age of 18, on school property); see also In re DeBeque, 212 Cal. App. 3d 241, 245, 260 Cal. Rptr. 441, 443
(1989) (holding that requiring a person convicted under California Penal Code § 647.6 to register does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment); People v. Tate, 164 Cal. App. 3d 133, 140, 210 Cal. Rptr. 117, 121
(1985) (holding that in order to grant probation, a person convicted of violating California Penal Code § 647.6
must comply with the registration requirement). But see In re King 157 Cal. App. 3d 554, 558, 204 Cal. Rptr.
39, 41 (1984) (holding that the continuing penalty of sex offender registration is out of proportion to the
misdemeanor crime of indecent exposure provided for in California Penal Code § 314(1)).
19. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 266 (West 1988) (stating the criminal provision for luring, through false
pretenses, an unmarried female, under the age of 18, into prostitution); id. § 267 (West 1988) (stating the
criminal provision for kidnapping a person under the age of 18 for the purpose of prostitution); id. § 272 (Vest
Supp. 1993) (stating the criminal provision for inducing any person under the age of 18 to fail or refuse to
conform to a lawful order of the juvenile court); id. § 288.2 (West Supp. 1993) (stating the criminal provision
for sending harmful matter to a minor with the intent of seducing the minor); see also id. § 313 (West Supp.
1993) (defining harmful matter).
20. See id. § 647(d) (Vest Supp. 1993) (stating the criminal provision for loitering in or about any public
toilet for the purpose of soliciting a lewd or lascivious act).
21. See 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928, see. 2, at 3485 (repealing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6300) (defining
a mentally disordered sex offender as any person who was diagnosed, between July 1, 1969 and Jan. 1, 1981,
with a disease or disorder that predisposed this person to the commission of sexual offenses to such degree that
he was dangerous to the health and safety of others); 1981 Cal. Stat. ch. 928, sec. 3, at 3485 (repealing CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6300) (stating that those offenders who committed their crimes between July 1, 1969
and Jan. 1, 1981, are still retained as mentally disordered sex offenders, in order for society to have proper
control over them and to protect society against repeated commissions of sex crimes).
22. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(a) (amended by Chapter 595); see id. (providing that the person must
register within 14 days of release with the chief of police of the city in which that person temporarily resides
or is domiciled, with the sheriff of the county if domiciled in an unincorporated area, and, additionally, with the
chief of police of the University of California or the California State University if he or she is domiciled upon
the campus or in any of its facilities). Many other states have statutes requiring registration for sex offenders.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-1 1-200 (Michie 1982); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821 (West Supp. 1993); COL.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-412.5 (Bradford Supp. 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. para. 223 (\Vest 1992); MINN. STAT.
§ 243.166 (West 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.152 (Michie 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.06
(Baldwin 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 57, § 582 (1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.519 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
27-21.5 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130 (1991); see also Kirk v. Hesselroth, 707 F. Supp.
1149, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (holding that unless a person who acts under color of state law acts with gross
negligence, the improper arrest of a person for failing to register is not a violation of the arrestee's rights);
People v. Monroe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1205, 1209, 215 Cal. Rptr. 51, 53 (1985) (holding that the mandatory
language "shall" of California Penal Code § 290 leaves no discretion to the trial judge to not require registration
if one or more of the listed violations occurs); cf. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11590 (West 1991) (requiring
registration for controlled substance offenders). See generally People v. Tye, 160 Cal. App. 3d 796, 802, 206
Cal. Rptr. 813, 816 (1984) (stating that the fundamental legislative purpose underlying California Penal Code
§ 290 is to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein will be readily available for police
surveillance at all times because the Legislature has deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the
future); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 191, at 4 (June 22, 1993) (stating that
the ACLU opposes the registration provision of this bill because registration laws impose additional penalties
for crimes for which the individuals have already been penalized by the criminal justice system).
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Existing law also mandates that any person, who after August 1, 1950,
is discharged or paroled from an institution,23 or is released on
probation,24 and has been confined because of a conviction of a
previously mentioned offense, must be informed of the duty to register,
prior to discharge or parole, by the official in charge of the place of
confinement.25
Chapter 595 expressly states that any person who has been or is
convicted of assault with intent to commit lewd or lascivious acts with a
child under fourteen years of age, 26 rape,27 oral copulation,28  spousal
rape involving the use of force or violence, or rape or penetration of
genital or anal openings by a foreign object,
29 must also register. 30
Existing law further provides that an employee of a law enforcement
agency who personally receives a report from a person alleging to have
23. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 290(b) (amended by Chapter 595) (specifying that an institution includes
a jail, prison, school, road camp, state hospital, or other facility where a person was confined because of the
attempt or commission of an offense listed earlier).
24. See id. § 290(c) (amended by Chapter 595) (providing that a person may be released on probation
or discharged upon payment of a fine).
25. Id. § 290(b) (amended by Chapter 595); see id. (providing that the official must require the person
to read and sign a form from the Department of Justice, which states that the duty to register has been explained
to this person); id. (providing that if the person has been convicted of a felony, the official must, no later than
45 days prior to the scheduled release date, send one copy of the notice to the appropriate law enforcement
agency having local jurisdiction where the person expects to reside, one copy to the prosecuting agency which
prosecuted the person, and one copy to the Department of Justice).
26. See id. § 288 (West Supp. 1993) (stating the provision for this type of conduct).
27. See id. § 261(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 595) (stating that this provision applies when the rape occurs
when the victim is incapable, because of a mental disorder or disability, of giving legal consent, and the accused
should have been aware of the disorder or disability); id. § 261(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 595) (stating that
this provision applies when the rape is accomplished by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate
and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another); id. § 261(a)(3) (amended by Chapter 595) (stating that this
provision applies when the rape occurs while the victim is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating or
anesthetic substance that is administered by the accused); id. § 261(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 595) (stating that
this provision applies when the rape occurs when the victim is unconscious and the accused is aware of the
victim's condition); id. § 261(a)(6) (amended by Chapter 595) (stating that this provision applies when the rape
occurs because the accused threatens to kidnap, falsely imprison the victim, or to inflict extreme pain, serious
bodily injury, or death upon the victim and there is a reasonable possibility that the accused will execute the
threat); id. § 262 (amended by Chapter 595) (stating that this provision applies when the victim is the spouse
of the accused and the accused uses force or violence during the assault).
28. See id. § 288a(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining oral copulation).
29. See id. § 264.1 (Vest 1988) (stating the punishment for this conduct if it is committed by force or
violence); id. § 289 (amended by Chapter 595) (stating the punishment for this conduct if it is committed for
the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse).
30. Id. § 290(a) (amended by Chapter 595). But see People v. Saunders, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1592, 1598,
284 Cal. Rptr. 212,216 (1991) (holding that a defendant who was convicted of assault with the intent to commit
oral copulation was not required to register as a sex offender because the registration requirement under the
statute did not expressly enumerate the convicted crime). Penal Code section 290 was amended with the intent
of abrogating the Saunders decision. SENATE CoNimarrIEE ON THE JUDICIARY, CoMmrT'rEE ANALYSIS OF AB 191,
at 2-3 (June 22, 1993).
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been the victim of a sex offense, must inform the person that his or her
name will be part of the public record, unless the person requests
otherwise.3' Existing law states that the employee may disclose the
name32 or address of a person who alleges to be the victim of a sex
offense only to the prosecutor.33
Chapter 555 provides that a law enforcement agency may disclose the
name or address of a person who alleges to be the victim of a sex offense




Civil Procedure Code § 527 (amended); Family Code § 6222
(amended); Penal Code §§ 166, 273.6 (amended).
AB 284 (Speier); 1993 STAT. Ch. 583
Penal Code §§ 646.9, 2684 (amended).
AB 1178 (Epple); 1993 STAT. Ch. 581
Penal Code § 602 (amended).
AB 504 (Quackenbush); 1993 STAT. Ch. 793
Existing law defines stalking as willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly
following or harassing1 another person and making a credible threae with
31. CAL. PENAL CODE § 293(a) (amended by Chapter 555); see id. (stating that the alleged victim's name
is automatically part of the public record when the report is filed, unless the alleged victim specifically requests
otherwise).
32. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254(f)(2) (West Supp. 1993) (providing circumstances under which a
person may exercise the right to maintain anonymity).
33. CAL. PENAL CODE § 293(c) (amended by Chapter 555).
34. Id. § 293(c)-(d) (amended by Chapter 555).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(d) (amended by Chapter 581) (defining harassment as a knowing and
willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, torments or terrorizes the
person and which serves no legitimate purpose).
2. See id. § 646.9(0 (amended by Chapter 581) (defining a credible threat as a threat made with the
intent and the apparent ability to carry it out so as to cause the targeted person to reasonably fear for the
person's safety or the safety of the person's immediate family); People v. Dollar, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1335, 1338,
279 Cal. Rptr. 502, 503 (1991) (using the statutory definition of credible threat in the jury instruction).
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the intent to place that person or that person's immediate family in
reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury.
3
Existing law defines credible threat as a threat coupled with the
apparent ability to carry it out.4 Chapter 581 specifies that a credible
threat may be verbal, written, implied by conduct, or a combination
thereof
5
Under existing law, anyone who stalks another is guilty of a
misdemeanor which is punishable by up to one year in the county jail, a
fine of up to $1000, or both.6 Under prior law, a subsequent conviction
for stalking the same victim, which occurred within seven years of the
prior conviction, could be categorized as a felony or misdemeanor, and
punished by either imprisonment in the state prison or a fine. Chapter
581 provides that a first offense for stalking may be treated as a felony or
a misdemeanor. 8 Furthermore, under Chapter 581, if the offender has been
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (amended by Chapter 581); see id. § 646.9(i) (amended by Chapter
581) (defining immediate family). See generally SENATE COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF AB 284, at 3 (July 6, 1993) (noting that five percent of all women in the United States will be stalked at
some point in their lives and there are approximately 200,000 stalkers nationwide).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(e) (amended by Chapter 581).
5. Id.; see Telephone Interview with Deputy District Attorney Rhonda Saunders, Office of the District
Attorney, Los Angeles (May 28, 1993) (detailing a recent case which prompted the enactment of Chapter 581,
because the previous definition of credible threat was not broad enough to encompass behavior that was clearly
life threatening) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (amended by Chapter 581); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. 5-71-208(a)(3)
(Michie Supp. 1993) (encompassing stalking under the heading of harassment and defining it as following a
person in or about a public place); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111(1),(4) (Bradford 1986 & Supp. 1993)
(setting forth extensive examples that constitute stalking); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-7.3(a) (Smith-
Hurd 1993) (defining stalking as a threat coupled with either following the victim or placing the victim under
surveillance); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 508.140, 508.150 (Baldwin 1992) (defining stalking and providing that
stalking accompanied by an explicit or implicit threat is punishable); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.26 (2)-(3)
(McKinney Supp. 1993) (categorizing conduct which is indicative of stalking as harassment). See generally Kelli
L. Attinello, Comment, Anti-Stalking Legislation: A Comparison of Traditional Remedies Available for Victims
of Harassment Versus Califonia Penal Code Section 646.9, 24 PAC. L.J. 1945 (1993); Matthew J. Gilligan,
Stalking the Stalker. Developing New Laws to Thwart Those Who Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L. REV. 285 (1992)
(addressing recent legislation designed to offer relief to victims who are harassed, followed, or threatened by
other persons); Scott Armstrong, States Crack Down on Stalking, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, May 19, 1993,
at 7 (detailing recent stalking cases and legislation designed to curb stalking); Miles Corwin, When the Law
Can't Protect, L.A. TiMES, May 8, 1993, at Al (mentioning recently proposed federal legislation to make
stalking a federal crime); Pamela Newkirk, New Laws Put Bite on Stalkers, NEWSDAY, May 3, 1993, at 21
(discussing the stalking of David Letterman and the shooting of Mary Jo Buttafuoco and that new legislation
is in response to such high profile cases); Rene Riley-Adams, Can Laws Stop the Obsessed?, THE TIMES, Feb.
22, 1993, at 3 (discussing the stalking phenomenon and the penalties imposed in the 31 states which have
adopted such legislation).
7. Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 627, sec. 1, at 2419 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9); cf. FLA. STAT. ch.
784.048 (2)-(3) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for up to five years in prison); MASS. GEN. ANN. ch. 265, §
43(b),(c) (West Supp. 1993) (providinj that a first offense for stalking may warrant a five year prison sentence
with any subsequent offenses warranting up to ten years imprisonment with a two year mandatory minimum).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (amended by Chapter 581).
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 25
Crines
convicted of felony stalking, any subsequent conviction for stalking is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for two, three or four
years. 9
Existing law provides that every person who unlawfully commits a
trespass is guilty of a misdemeanor.' ° Chapter 793 includes as an act
constituting trespass the refusal or failure to leave a battered women's
shelter after being asked to leave by the managing authority of the
shelter." Additionally, Chapter 793 gives the court discretion to order the
defendant to pay restitution to the battered woman in the amount of
relocation expenses of herself and her child.
12
Existing law provides that any person guilty of contempt of court
through the willful disobedience of any lawfully issued court process or
order is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be punished by imprisonment
in county jail for up to six months. 13 Under prior law, any person who
violated the stalking provision when there was a court order prohibiting
such behavior, was punishable by imprisonment in a county jail for not
more than one year, or a fine of up to $1000, or by imprisonment in the
state prison.'4
9. Id. § 646.9(c) (amended by Chapter 581).
10. Id. § 602 (amended by Chapter 793); see id. (specifying acts which constitute trespass).
11. Id. § 602(u) (enacted by Chapter 793); see id. § 602(u)(1) (enacted by Chapter 793) (providing that
punishment is imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one year); SENATE CoMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 284, at 4 (July 6, 1993) (setting forth findings that more than 600
families must be evicted from battered women's shelters each year because they have been located by the
batterer and are both endangered and endangering the other families at the shelter); see also id. at 3 (noting that
the San Mateo Battered Women's Shelter has had situations where battered women seeking refuge at the shelter
were followed and harassed by the person from whom they are trying to escape). See generally Eric Bailey,
State's Landmark Stalking Law Could Have Put Hilburn Behind Bars, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at A18
(detailing the recent stalking of a co-worker by a mail carrier which culminated in the Dana Point Post Office
shooting spree); Mareva Brown, State Anti-Stalking Law Shadows Lovers Who Won't Let Go, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Nov. 29, 1992, at Al (reporting that most stalking victims are women and in the vast majority of cases, the
stalkers are rejected husbands or boyfriends); Kevin Fagan, New Focus on Deadly Stalkers, S.F. CHRON., Jan.
11, 1993, at Al (describing the shooting of Yon Soon Choe at the hands of her ex-husband after she had sought
help from the law and sought the refuge of a women's shelter, and reporting on the inadequacy of such measures
as restraining orders in keeping obsessed stalkers at bay); David Holmstrom, Efforts to Protect Women From
Stalkers Gain Momentum at State, Federal Levels, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 22, 1992, at 1 (quoting
the Massachusetts Chief of the Victim Witness Service as stating that when a woman makes the effort to end
an abusive relationship, such as going to a women's shelter, she is at a potentially greater risk of danger at the
hands of her ex-husband).
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 602(u)(2) (amended by Chapter 793).
13. Id. § 166(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 583); see People v. Lindemann, 8 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 7, 10,
11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 889 (1992) (holding that when a person disregards an order issued by the court, such
disregard constitutes a contempt of court which may be prosecuted as a misdemeanor); McCann v. Municipal
Court for Los Angeles County, 221 Cal. App. 3d 527, 535, 270 Cal. Rptr. 640, 643 (1990) (defining contempt
as disobedience by action in opposition to the authority, justice or dignity of a court).
14. Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 627, sec. 1, at 2419 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9)
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Under Chapter 583, any person guilty of such contempt, by willfully
contacting a victim in person, by phone or mail, when that person has
previously been convicted of stalking, will be punished by imprisonment
in the county jail for not more than one year, or by a fine of $5000, or
both."
Existing law gives courts discretion to issue an order restraining the
defendant from contacting the victim for up to ten years. 16 Chapter 581
provides that any stalking violation committed while there is a temporary
restraining order, injunction, or other court order in effect is punishable by
imprisonment in the state prison for two, three, or four years. 7
Chapter 583 provides that any willful or knowing violation of a
protective order or stay away order 8 issued as a condition of probation
in a criminal action for domestic violence, or in the pending criminal
proceeding itself, shall constitute a misdemeanor contempt of court,
punishable by imprisonment in the county jail, a fine not exceeding $1000,
or both.19 If the violation of such orders results in physical injury, the
defendant will be imprisoned in the county jail for at least forty-eight
hours.20 A second or subsequent conviction for a violation of such orders,
which occurs within seven years of the prior conviction and involves an
act of violence or a credible threat of violence, may be punished as a
misdemeanor or a felony.2" As a condition of probation, the defendant is
required to participate in a batterer's treatment program unless, after
considering the facts and circumstances, the court determines that
participation would be inappropriate for the defendant. 2 As an additional
condition of probation, in lieu of a fine, the court may require that the
defendant make payments to a battered women's shelter, provide restitution
to the victim for reasonable costs of counseling and other expenses the
15. Id. § 166(b)(1) (amended by Chapter 583); see Mareva Brown, State Anti-Stalking Low Shadows
Lovers, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 29, 1992, at Al (describing that in a great many cases, the stalker never makes
an actual threat but bombards the victim with telephone calls, letters, gifts, flowers, and other forms of
harassment).
16. Id. § 646.9(h) (amended by Chapter 581).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(b) (amended by Chapter 581).
18. See id. § 136.2 (West Supp. 1993) (stating the requirements for issuing these orders).
19. Id. § 166(c)(l) (amended by Chapter 583). This includes orders: (1) Enjoining a party from molesting,
attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering, harassing, contacting repeatedly by mail with the
intent to harass, or disturbing the peace of the other party, or other named family and household members; (2)
excluding one party from the family dwelling or the dwelling of the other; or (3) enjoining a party from
specified behavior that the court determined was necessary to effectuate such orders. See id. § 166(c)(3)(A)-(C)
(amended by Chapter 583).
20. Id. § 166(c)(2) (amended by Chapter 583).
21. Id. § 166(c)(4) (amended by Chapter 583).
22. Id. § 166(d)(1) (amended by Chapter 583).
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court finds to be directly resulting from the defendant's conduct, or
both.
23
Existing law provides that no fees may be charged for the issuance of
an injunction, preliminary injunction, or a temporary restraining order,
unless the order has previously been dissolved three times. 24 Chapter 583
eliminates the filing fee for a petition or response regarding a protective
order, restraining order or a permanent injunction restraining violence or
threats of violence.'
Under existing law, there is no filing fee for a petition or response
regarding a protective order or a permanent injunction restraining violence
or threats of violence.26 Chapter 583 eliminates the filing fee for a
modification of a protective order against violence or threats of
violence.27
Under existing law, a willful2 8 and knowing violation of a protective
order2 9 is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of no more than $1000, by
imprisonment in the county jail for no more than one year, or both.3 °
23. Id. § 166(d)(2) (amended by Chapter 583); see id. § 166(d)(2)(A) (amended by Chapter 583)
(providing that such payments may not exceed $1000); id. § 166(d)(3) (amended by Chapter 583) (stating that
the court shall make a determination of the defendant's ability to pay the fine, make payments to a battered
women's shelter, or pay restitution). The court shall not order the defendant to make payments to a shelter if
it would impair the defendant's ability to pay restitution. Id. In cases where the victim is the spouse of the
defendant, the defendant may not use community property to pay restitution. Id. § 166(d)(4) (amended by
Chapter 583).
24. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527(a) (amended by Chapter 583).
25. Id. § 527(c) (amended by Chapter 583).
26. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6222(a) (amended by Chapter 583).
27. Id. (amended by Chapter 583); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB 284, at 4 (July 6, 1993) (suggesting that this bill is in response to the recent postal murders in Dana Point
due to a stalker's obsession and his victim's inability to afford the filing fee for a restraining order); see also
Eric Bailey, State's Landmark Stalking Law Could Have Put Hilburn Behind Bars, L.A. TIMES, May 7, 1993,
at A18 (reporting that Kim Springer, the victim of a stalker who went on a rampage in a Dana Point Post Office,
had attempted to obtain a restraining order but was unable to afford the $182 filing fee); Miles Corwin, When
the Law Can't Protect, L.A. TIrmEs, May 8, 1993, at Al (describing the stalking of Kim Springer by Hilburn
and reporting that Hilburn followed her, sent her obsessive notes, called her at home, and sent her a letter
threatening to kill them both).
28. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 1988) (defining willful as a purpose or willingness to commit
the act or make the omission referred to, and not requiring any intent to violate the law or to injure another or
to acquire any advantage).
29. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6218 (amended by Chapter 219) (defining protective order as an order
enjoining a party from contacting, molesting, attacking, striking, threatening, sexually assaulting, battering,
telephoning, or disturbing the peace of the other party, and, in the discretion of the court, upon a showing of
good cause, other named family and household members).
30. CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.6(a) (amended by Chapter 583).
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Chapter 583 adds temporary restraining orders, preliminary injunctions,
and injunctions to these requirements."
Existing law provides that if, in the opinion of the Department of
Corrections, 32  a defendant convicted of stalking would benefit from
treatment in a state hospital and the court deems it appropriate, the
defendant will be transferred to the appropriate hospital for treatment.33
Under Chapter 581, the court must also consider whether the defendant
would benefit from treatment in a state hospital, and if the court decides
that the defendant would so benefit, it shall make this recommendation to
the Director of Corrections.34 The Director must consider any
recommendation made by the court, and if the Director determines that it
is appropriate, the defendant will be placed in a state hospital for
treatment.35
JLM
Crimes; storage of firearms
Penal Code §§ 12020, 12071, 12285 (amended).
SB 180 (Hughes); 1993 STAT. Ch. 1139
Under existing law, a person selling firearms' must satisfy certain
31. Id.; see id. (providing that a willful and knowing violation of a protective order obtained under
California Family Code § 6218 [the Domestic Violence Prevention Law], California Civil Procedure Code § 527
[providing timing requirements for granting injunctions and temporary restraining orders] or § 527.6 [providing
injunctions and temporary restraining orders for those suffering harassment] is a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of no more than $1,000, by imprisonment in the county jail for no more than one year, or both).
32. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 5050 (West 1982) (creating the Department of Corrections).
33. Id. § 2684(a) (amended by Chapter 581); see id. § 2690 (West 1982) (authorizing the removal of
inmates); id. § 5080 (West 1982) (governing the transfer of prisoners); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7227 (West
1984) (allowing for the admission of mentally disordered prisoners to state hospitals for treatment).
34. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2684(b) (amended by Chapter 581).
35. Id.; see Telephone Interview with Deputy District Attorney Rhonda Saunders, Office of the District
Attorney, Los Angeles (May 28, 1993) (notes on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (relating this change to her
most recent stalking case and commenting that giving the court discretion to suggest a defendant be treated in
a state hospital almost assures compliance by the Department of Corrections).
I. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12001(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining firearm as any device, designed to
be used as a weapon, from which is expelled through a barrel a projectile by the force of any explosion or other
form of combustion); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) (1988) (defining firearm as: (1) Any weapon, including
starter gun, which will or is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a projectile by the action of an
explosive; (2) the frame or receiver of any such weapon; (3) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; or (4) any
destructive device); id. § 921(a)(4) (1988) (defining destructive device); United States v. York, 830 F.2d 885,
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requirements to qualify as a licensee or dealer,2 which includes the
requirement that the person only conduct business in buildings designated
in the license?
Chapter 1139 requires a lost or stolen firearm that is stored at the
licensee's place of business or a firearm that is part of the licensee's
merchandise, to be reported by the dealer to the proper law enforcement
agency within forty-eight hours of discovery.4 Chapter 1139 also requires
a dealer in certain areas5 to hold all firearms in the business establishment
in a secure manner using specified storage methods6  when the
establishment is not open for business.7 Chapter 1139 also requires the
licensing agency to require licensees to follow the same specified methods
891 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding a conviction for possession of a firearm on the grounds that the firearm need not
be operable, that it need only be designed to expel a projectile by action of an explosive); Emmons v. State, 546
So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that a flare gun is considered a firearm).
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(a)(1) (amended by Chapter 1139) (defining licensee or dealer as a
person who has a valid federal firearms license, any regulatory or business license or licenses required by local
government, a valid seller's permit issued by the State Board of Equalization and a certificate of eligibility issued
by the Department of Justice); cf. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129C (Law Co-op. 1993) (discussing restrictions
on ownership of firearms).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(b)(1)(A) (amended by Chapter 1139); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 923 (Supp. 1990)
(specifying licensing requirements).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 12071(b)(13) (amended by Chapter 1139); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 842(K) (1993)
(requiring a report of stolen or lost explosive materials within 24 hours of discovery); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-37b(a) (West Supp. 1993) (requiring that dealers provide trigger locks); id. § 29-37d (West Supp. 1993)
(requiring that those involved in the retail sale of firearms must install burglar alarm systems); id. § 53a-217
(West Supp. 1993) (establishing that the negligent storage of a firearm is a felony); FLA. STAT. ch. 790.174(2)
(West 1992) (stating that it is a misdemeanor of the second degree to fail to store a firearm in the required
manner thereby allowing a minor access to the firearm). See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 180, at 2 (June 29, 1993) (stating that SB 180 was written in response
to a suggestion by the Los Angeles Police Department, which believes that the theft of firearms from retail
outlets is a method by which gangs and criminals obtain firearms). In 1992, 25,023 guns were reported as stolen
in California, with 10,395 guns reported as stolen in Los Angeles County alone. Id.; John L. Mitchell, Easy
Access to Guns Fuels Epidemic of Youth Violence, L.A. TIMEs, March 29, 1993, at Al (discussing the
underground market by which youths acquire stolen guns); Sue Anne Pressly, When Tragedy Lurks an Error
Away, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1991, at Al (mentioning a county proposal to require dealers to sell trigger locks).
5. See CA.. PENAL CODE § 12071(b)(14) (amended by Chapter 1139) (specifying that in a city with a
population of 50,000 persons or more; a county or in an unincorporated area of county with a population of
200,000, storage requirements must be met).
6. See id. § 1207 1(b)(14)(A)-(C) (amended by Chapter 1139) (defining specified methods of storage of
firearms to include: (1) In a secure facility in the licensee's business premises; (2) securing each firearm with
a shielded or protected steel rod or cable of at least one-eight inch in diameter through the trigger-guard; or (3)
in a locked fireproof safe or vault in the licensee's business premises).
7. Id. § 12071(b)(14) (amended by Chapter 1139).
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in areas with smaller populations.8 Chapter 1139 authorizes the licensing
authority to allow exemptions from these standards. 9
TLS
Crimes; threats to public officials
Penal Code § 76 (amended).
SB 1042 (Beverly); 1993 STAT. Ch. 134
Existing law provides that an individual who knowingly' and
willingly2 threatens the life of an elected state official, exempt appointee
of the Governor,3 a judge,4 or the immediate family5 of such official,
appointee, or judge with the specific intent that the assertion be taken as
8. Id. § 12071(b)(15) (amended by Chapter 1139).
9. Id. § 12071 (d) (amended by Chapter 1139); see id. (granting requests for exemption if the licensee
is unable to comply because of local ordinances, covenants, lease conditions, or similar circumstances not under
control of the licensee).
1. See CAL. PENAl. CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining knowingly); United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d
1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that a threat is knowingly made if the person that made it comprehends the
meaning of the words uttered).
2. See Howell, 719 F.2d at 1260 (stating that a threat is willfully made if the maker voluntarily and
intelligently utters threatening words in an apparent determination to carry out the threat).
3. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1300 (West 1980) (stating that every officer, the mode of whose
appointment is not prescribed by law, shall be appointed by the Governor).
4. See id. § 75002 (West 1993) (defining judge as a justice of the Supreme Court, court of appeal, or
a judge of a superior court, municipal court or justice court); id. (distinguishing a retired justice of the court as
not acquiring the same status); cf 18 U.S.C. § I 15(c)(3) (1988) (defining United States judge as any judicial
officer of the United States).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 76 (amended by Chapter 134) (defining immediate family to include a
spouse, parent, child, or anyone who has regularly resided in the household for the past six months); cf 18
U.S.C. § 1 15(c)(2) (1988) (defining immediate family member as a spouse, parent, brother, sister, child, person
to whom the official stands in loco parentis, or any other living person in the official's household that is related
by blood or marriage).
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a threat, and who possesses the apparent ability6 to carry out that threat,
is guilty of a public offense.7
Chapter 134 expands this crime by adding to it the alternative act of
knowingly and willingly threatening serious bodily harm8 to these same
elected state officials, exempt appointees of the Governor, judges, or
immediate families of the same, with the specific intent that the statement
is a threat, and the person has the apparent ability to carry out that threat
by any means.9  TLS
6. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 76(c)(1) (amended by Chapter 134) (defining "apparent ability to carry out
a threat" as including the ability to fulfill the threat at some future date when the person making the threat is
an incarcerated prisoner with a stated release date); People v. Ross, 205 Cal. App. 3d 1548, 1554, 253 Cal. Rptr.
178, 182 (1988) (interpreting the statute's "present ability" limitation in its definition of assault to indicate that
the defendant could not be convicted of attempted assault if a factual impossibility prevented the commission
of the crime); Lamb v. State, 613 A.2d 402, 412 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (discussing the differing
perspectives of the victim and the assailant in perceiving apparent present ability). See generally ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1042, at 2-3, (April 28, 1993) (discussing an
example of the inadequacy of existing law when the provisions could not be used by the Los Angeles District
Attorney against an inmate who was incarcerated and, therefore under the statute, had no apparent ability to carry
out threats).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 76(a) (amended by Chapter 134); see id. § 217.1(a) (West 1988) (stating that
attempting to kill public officials is a criminal offense); cf. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:122.2 (West 1986) (stating
that threatening a public official is a public offense); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that alleged threats against a federal law enforcement officer must be considered using
an objective standard); People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 367, 371 (Ill. App. 1993) (reversing defendant's
conviction for threatening the mayor on the telephone, because the State did not sufficiently prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant made the threatening call).
8. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 76 (amended by Chapter 134) (defining serious bodily harm to include
serious physical injury or serious traumatic condition); cf. United States v. Fitzgerald, 882 F.2d 397, 398 (9th
Cir. 1989) (holding that "serious bodily injury," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 113(f), was not unconstitutionally vague
as used against a defendant who was charged with shooting an individual in the neck); Fleming v. State, 604
So. 2d 280, 293 (Miss. 1992) (holding that Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-7(2) which includes the term
"serious bodily injury" was not unconstitutionally vague even though the phrase was not defined by the
aggravated assault statute because this case involved brutal bone fractures). See generally ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE
ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMmIEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1042, at 2 (April 28, 1993) (citing specific examples of
credible threats of serious bodily injury to public officials by state prisoners which resulted in emotional trauma
to the victims).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 76 (amended by Chapter 134); see also 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (Supp. 1988)
(stating that it is a criminal offense to threaten to assault, kidnap, oi murder a United States official, United
States judge, federal law enforcement officer, or the immediate family of such a person); 18 U.S.C. § 871(a)
(1988) (defining the crime of threatening the President); ALA. CODE § 36-33-4(a) (Michie 1991) (stating that
whoever knowingly and willfully threatens to take the life or to inflict bodily harm upon the governor, governor-
elect, lieutenant governor, lieutenant governor-elect, attorney general, attorney general-elect or protectee of the
department of public safety shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 69 (West 1988) (providing that it is a crime to attempt, by means of threat or violence, to
deter an executive officer from performing the officer's duty); id. § 71 (West 1988) (providing that it is a public
offense to attempt, or to cause, a public officer, employee, or school official to engage in, or refrain from, an
act in the performance of that person's duties, by threatening that person); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.300
(Michie 1992) (stating that every person who directly or indirectly, addresses any threat or intimidation to a
public officer, juror, referee, arbitrator, appraiser or assessor or to any other person authorized by law to
determine any controversy with the intent to induce that person to act contrary to his duty will be punished);
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Crimes; unlawful sexual intercourse
Penal Code § 261.5 (amended).
SB 22 (Russell); 1993 STAT. Ch. 596
Prior law defined unlawful sexual intercourse as an act of sexual
intercourse with a female under the age of eighteen years who is not the
wife of the perpetrator.1 Chapter 596 redefines unlawful sexual intercourse
as an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with any person, male or
female, under the age of eighteen who is not the spouse of the
perpetrator.2
United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 711 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding the conditional nature of a threat against
the President is not dispositive, and may be considered an actual threat); Pierce v. United States, 365 F.2d 292,
294 (10th Cir. 1966) (holding that it is the making of the threat, not the intent to carry out the threat that is the
actual offense).
1. 1970 CAL. STAT. Ch. 1301, sec. 2, at 2406 (enacting CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5); see Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-76 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of California's gender-specific
statutory rape laws); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (holding that the law
properly may subject minors to more stringent limitations than are permissible with respect to adults); Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968) (holding that the well-being of children is a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate); Ferris v. Santa Clara County, 891 F.2d 715, 717-18 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding
that California statutes prohibiting certain sexual activities with minors does not violate any right of privacy
which individuals might have under the Fourteenth Amendment to engage in consensual sexual activities with
females between fourteen and eighteen years of age), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990); Liberta v. Kelly, 839
F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a statute containing a gender-based classification must be upheld where
the gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact that the sexes are not similarly
situated in certain circumstances), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 832 (1988); People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 531,
393 P.2d 673, 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 362 (1964) (stating that a minor female is presumed too innocent and
naive to understand the implications and nature of her act, and therefore is incapable of giving consent to the
act of sexual intercourse); see also Susan Andre Clark, IWhither Statutory Rape Laws: Of Michael M., The
Fourteenth Amendment, and Protecting Women from Sexual Aggression, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1933, 1952-59
(1992) (discussing the equal protection issues raised by Michael M.); Rita Eidson, Constitutionalit.' of Statutory
Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REV. 757, 762-815 (1980) (examining the history of statutory rape laws and how they
may be vulnerable to attack on both equal protection and due process grounds); Larry W. Myers, Reasonable
Mistake ofAge: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 105, 105 (1965) (stating that the nearly
uniform holding, in cases involving statutory rape, has been that mistake as to the age of the female is no
defense); Linda Sharpe Waits, Unlanftl Sexual Intercourse: Old Notions and A Suggested Reform, 12 PAC. L.J.
217, 217-19 (1980) (discussing the historical significance of gender specific statutory rape laws and how they
are outdated and flawed); David Wharton, California's Statutory Rape Law Applies Only to Female Victims. For
Underage Males, There is Less Legal Protection, L. A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1992, at 9A (discussing the issue of
whether underage males need protection under statutory rape laws).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5 (amended by Chapter 596). At least 30 other state legislatures have
revised their sexual assault statutes to make them gender neutral. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.410 to .440
(1989 & Supp. 1993); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404, 13-1405 (Supp. 1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-14-
106 to -108 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-403 to -404 (Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. §53a-71
(1985); F.A. STAT. ANN. §§ 794.011,794.05 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/12-13
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Chapter 596 revises the penalties for unlawful sexual intercourse to
reflect the ages and age differences of the parties
DMB
to -14 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE § 35-42-4-3 (1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709.1-709.4 (West 1993); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3503 (1988); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (Baldwin 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42
(Vest 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 253-54 (Vest. Supp. 1992); MD. CODE ANN., CRmI. LAW §§
463, 464A, 464B (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, § 23 (West 1990); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 750.520b-.520d (West 1§91); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.342-.345 (West Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 45-5-501 to -502 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-319, 28-320.01 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 632-A:2,
-A:3 (Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-9-11 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-03, -05, -
07 (1985 & Supp. 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.02, .04 (Anderson 1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
3122 (1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (Law Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 22-22-1 (Supp.
1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3252 (Supp. 1992); W.VA. CODE §§ 61-8B-2, -3, -5 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 940.225 (West 1993); WYO. STAT. §§ 6-2-302 to -304 (Supp. 1993); see also People v. Andersen, 604 N.E.2d
424, 430 (IIl. 1992) (stating that sexual statutes now provide for conviction of either males or females in Illinois
and that under earlier statutes, a female could be found guilty of rape only as an accessory, an aider, or an
abetter), appeal denied, 612 N.E.2d 516 (1993); Commonwealth v. Knap, 592 N.E.2d 747, 748-49 (Mass. 1992)
(holding that statutory rape is a strict liability crime and that reasonable mistake as to the age of the victim is
not a defense); State v. Bartlett, 792 P.2d 692, 695 (Ariz. 1990) (holding that under Arizona's gender neutral
statute, the fact that a minor under the age eighteen consents to sexual intercourse is not a defense), vacated by,
111 S.Ct. 2880 (1991). See generally, Frances J. Sulman, Constitutionality of Gender Based Statutes Ostensibly
Aimed at Males: hnplications of Michael M. v. Superior Court, 16 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 17, 58-60 (1983)
(discussing the problems with gender-based statutory rape laws and the need for legislative action); Veronica
T. Jennings, Legal Labyrinth: Woman is Charged With Rape, WASH. POST, July 11, 1992, at BI (discussing a
case of a woman being prosecuted for statutory rape under Maryland's sexual assault laws).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5(b) (amended by Chapter 596) (stating that any person who engages in an
act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is not more than three years older or three years younger
than the perpetrator, is guilty of a misdemeanor); id. § 261.5(c) (amended by Chapter 596) (stating that any
person who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor who is more than three years younger
than the perpetrator is guilty of either a misdemeanor or a felony); id. § 261.5(d) (amended by Chapter 596)
(stating that any person over the age of 21 years who engages in an act of unlawful sexual intercourse with a




Penal Code § 594.4 (new).
AB 68 (Alpert); 1993 STAT. Ch. 427
Under existing law, a person who maliciously' damages property is
guilty of vandalism. 2 Existing law also provides punishment depending
upon the amount of damage.3 Existing law sets forth a separate crime and
a penalty enhancement for vandalism motivated by bias.4
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(4) (West 1988) (defining maliciously as a wish to vex, annoy, or injure
another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act); 2 B.E. WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crines Against
Propery § 678(b) (2d ed. 1988) (stating that malice generally calls for more than mere intentional harm without
justification or excuse, but rather it must be a wanton and willful or reckless disregard of the plain dangers of
harm).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(a) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (providing that malicious defacement with
paint or any other liquid, or damaging or defacing any property not your own, constitutes vandalism); see also
People v. Kahanic, 196 Cal. App. 3d 461,466, 241 Cal. Rptr. 722, 725 (1987) (stating that "not his or her own"
in California Penal Code § 594, includes community property because the property is not wholly his or her
own); CALJIC 16.320 (West 1988) (stating that it is a misdemeanor for any person to maliciously deface,
damage, or destroy any real or personal property not the person's own).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 594(b)(1)-(4) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (providing that if the amount of damage
caused by the vandalism is $50,000 or more, the punishment is imprisonment for up to one year, a fine of not
more than $50,000, or both; if the damage is at least $5,000, but less than $50,000, the punishment is
imprisonment for up to one year, a fine not to exceed $10,000, or both; if the damage is at least $1,000, but less
than $5,000, the punishment is a fine not to exceed $5,000, up to one year imprisonment, or both; if the damage
is less than $1,000, the punishment is a fine up to $1,000, imprisonment not to exceed six months, or both).
4. Id. § 422.7 (West Supp. 1993); see id. (permitting a misdemeanor to be punished as a felony if the
crime is committed against the person or property of another for the purpose of intimidating or interfering with
the other person's free exercise or enjoyment of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of California, or
by the Constitution or laws of the United States, because of the person's race, color, religion, ancestry, national
origin, or sexual orientation); id. § 594.3 (West 1988) (providing that the crime of vandalism to a church,
synagogue, building owned and occupied by a religious educational institution, or other place primarily used for
worship and religious services is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year). If the act is committed by
reason of race, color, religion, or national origin, for the purpose of intimidating or deterring persons from freely
exercising their beliefs, the person is guilty of a felony. Id.; cf MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266, § 127A (West
1990) (prohibiting vandalism to a place of worship, or place used for the burial of the dead); see also Wisconsin
v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2202 (1993) (upholding a Wisconsin statute containing a penalty enhancement
aimed at bias-motivated offenses, which the Court held to be conduct unprotected by the First Amendment);
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2540 (1992) (invalidating an overly broad Minnesota statute
prohibiting expressions constituting "fighting words" because it attempted to impose special prohibitions on those
speakers who express views on disfavored subjects); In re Joshua H., 13 Cal. App. 4th 1734, 1746, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d 291, 298 (1993) (upholding the constitutionality of California's hate crime statute, stating that such statutes
do not regulate speech, but rather regulate acts of violence intended to interfere with the victim's protected
rights), review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 3412 (1993); Commonwealth v. DiPietro, 604 N.E.2d 1344, 1346
(Mass. 1992) (stating that the purpose of Massachusetts General Laws Annotated Chapter 266, § 127A is to deter
any physical attack of vandalism specifically against religious institutions, schools, and other facilities by
increasing penalties for such attacks), review denied, 609 N.E.2d 88 (1993); State v. Vogenthaler, 548 P.2d 112,
115 (N.M. 1976) (declaring that the role of religion in society as a whole is the reason that vandalism upon a
church is treated differently than criminal damage to other property). See generally Susan Gellman, Sticks and
Stones Can Put You In Jail, But Can Words Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of
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Chapter 427 adds that it is vandalism to maliciously deface, damage,
or contaminate any structure5 with butyric acid, or any other caustic or
chemical substance.6 Chapter 427 further provides punishment in the form
of a fine, imprisonment, or both.7
SAK
Ethnic Intimidation Laws, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 333, 334 (1991) (stating that those who oppose bigotry-related
crime statutes believe that these laws tread dangerously close to criminalization of speech and thought, and they
impermissibly distinguish among people based on their beliefs); Note, Protecting Religious Exercise: The First
Amendnent and Legislative Responses to Religious Vandalism, 97 HARV. L. REV. 547, 547 (1983) (stating that
in the last three years at least 14 legislatures have reacted to the increase in religiously motivated violence by
enacting statutes that provide stiffer penalties for violence directed at religious facilities); Susan Espinosa &
Benjamin Pimentel, Investigators: Arrests Foiled Mass Terrorism; White Supremacist Link Reported, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, August 14, 1993, at A14 (stating that July's rash of fire bombings at prominent black, gay, and
Jewish sites in California and Washington are believed to be part of a grand conspiracy by white supremacists
to stage terrorist style attacks from Los Angeles to Seattle); David Ferrell, Racist, Satanic Symbols Deface
Church 2nd Time; Vandalism: Commun.it), Groups Express Alann Over Rising Incidence of Hate Crime, L.A.
TIMES, April 1, 1992, at I (stating that hate crimes in Los Angeles have reached record levels for seven
consecutive years, numbering 672 last year).
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 594A(c) (enacted by Chapter 427) (defining structure as any house or other
building used at the time of the offense as a dwelling or for commercial purposes).
6. Id. § 594.4(a) (enacted by Chapter 427); see SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE
ANALYSIS OF AB 68, at 2 (June 22, 1993) (stating that the author's intent in introducing Assembly Bill 68 is
to deter acts of chemical vandalism committed on health clinics, and was introduced in response to five attacks
on San Diego Women's medical clinics on March 9, 1993); see also Susan D. Rice, Feds Won't Probe Attacks
on Clinics, DAILY J., May 28, 1993, at 2 (discussing the March 10 chemical attack on five San Diego medical
clinics, and stating that last year 48 medical facilities were sprayed with noxious chemicals). Id. The clinics were
sprayed with butyric acid, a toxic chemical that invades porous surfaces such as tiles and carpeting. Id. The
chemical is irritating to the eyes and respiratory system, can cause skin bums, with unknown long term effects.
Id.
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 594.4 (enacted by Chapter 427); see id. (providing for punishment by
imprisonment in the state prison or county jail, and imposing a fine of up to $50,000, or as low as $1,000,




Government Code § 13963.1 (amended).
SB 644 (Hart); 1993 STAT. Ch. 780
Penal Code § 1463.007 (amended).
AB 2211 (Committee on Judiciary); 1993 STAT. Ch. 589
Government Code § 13966 (repealed and new); §§ 13966.01,
13966.02, 13969.3 (new); Unemployment Insurance Code § 1095
(amended).
SB 774 (Leslie); 1993 STAT. Ch. 295
Existing law provides that crime' victims2 may apply for assistance.'
1. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(c) (West Supp. 1993) (defining crime).
2. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13960(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining victim); id. § 13960.2(a) (West 1992)
(excluding any person who is convicted of a felony from consideration as a victim as defined in California
Government Code § 13960(a) until that person has been discharged from probation, released from a correctional
facility, or has been discharged from parole); id. § 13960.5 (West 1992) (including nonresidents as victims in
certain circumstances); Cano v. State Bd. of Control, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1162, 1165, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 357
(1992) (providing that the sister of a murder victim qualified under the definition of victim in California
Government Code § 13960(a)(4), but that the sister's husband and children were not victims under the statute);
People v. Williams, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1520, 1523, 255 Cal. Rptr. 778, 779 (1989) (stating that an insurer which
had a contractual obligation to pay the victim did not also become a victim of the crime); cf People v. Gaytan,
542 N.E.2d 1163, 1170-71 (111. App. Ct. 1989) (providing that when determining whether a person is a victim,
a court will evaluate whether the person is a victim of a violent crime, whether property was taken or damaged,
and whether the person was injured). See generally Larry B. Kehl, Victhn Compensation and Restitution:
Legislative Alternatives, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 681, 683 (1985) (discussing the types of legislative
initiatives that may respond to the needs of victims).
3. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 13961(a) (West 1992); see id. § 13959 (West 1992) (stating that it is in the
public's interest to provide victims with assistance and that they may obtain compensation from the Restitution
Fund); id. § 13965(a)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that there are various types of assistance available,
including cash payments); see also Anne B. v. State Bd. of Control, 165 Cal. App. 3d 279, 285, 209 Cal. Rptr.
83, 87 (1984) (stating that a victim may be compensated even if the victim has not filed a criminal complaint
and a conviction has not been obtained); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (1989) (providing that the court may order
defendants to pay restitution to victims). Many other state statutes provide for victim compensation. ALASt;A
STAT. §§ 18.67.010 to .180 (1991 & Supp. 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-204 to -210 (West Supp,
1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 960.001(])(a), 960.04, 960.07 to .28 (West 1985 & Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-15-5 to -6, 17-15-8 to -13 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 351-13 to -17, 351-31
to -35, 351-51 to -52, 351-61 to -62, 351-62.5 to -67 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 74-7301 to -7321 (1992);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 346.010-.185 (Baldwin 1992); MD. CODE ANN. STATE GOV'T § 9-1701 to -1708
(Michie 1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258A, §§ 1-9 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 18.351 to .361 (West 1981 & Supp. 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 53-9-103 to -112,53-9-121 to -133 (1993);
NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 217.010 to .070, 217.090 to .350 (Michie 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. 9§ 52:4B-1 to -23
(West 1986 & Supp. 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-17-1 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 620-635
(McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-13-01 to -20 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2743.51 to .67 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 142.1 to .18 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-13-101 to -117, 29-13-201 to -208 (Michie 1980 & Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-
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Existing law also provides that hearings are conducted to review victims'
applications for assistance.4 Under current law, a victim of a sexual
assault is entitled to a closed hearing. Under prior law, this closed
hearing provision was only effective until January 1, 1994.6 Chapter 780
removes this January 1, 1994 date, and provides that closed hearings are
available to victims of sexual assault permanently. Chapter 780 also
provides that victims of domestic violence may have closed hearings.8
Existing law provides that there are various types of assistance
available to victims.9 Chapter 295 provides that a victim who is
368.1 to -368.18 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.68.015 to .915,7.68.035,7.68.060
to .090 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 14-2A-1 to -27 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 949.01 to .18 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993). See generally 1 B.E. WITKIN & RICHARD EPSTEIN,
CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW 2D § 4 (1988) (summarizing the law in California regarding compensation available
for private citizens who are victims of crime); Randall A. Schmidt, Crime Victim Compensation Legislation: A
Comparative Study, 5 VICTIMOLOGY 401 (Spring-Fall 1980) (providing an overview of victim compensation
legislation and suggesting that there should be a uniform act); Lori Ann Merrill, The 1981 Oklahoma Crime
Victim Compensation Act, 17 TULSA L.J. 260, 262 (1981) (comparing Oklahoma's victim restitution legislation
against similar legislation in other states); Review of Selected 1983 California Legislation, Criminal Procedure;
Victim of Crime Restitution 15 PAC. L.J. 411, 559-68 (1983) (discussing the implementation of the Crime
Restitution Program of 1983); Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Statutes Providing for Governmental Compensation
for Victins of Crime, 20 A.L.R. 4th 63 (1992) (analyzing state and federal cases involving government
compensation for the victims of crimes).
4. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13963 (West 1992); see id. (providing the function of hearings).
5. Id. § 13963.1 (amended by Chapter 780); see id. (providing that the State Board of Control may
exclude all persons other than board members, members of the staff, the victim, the victim's parents, the victim's
representative, witnesses, and other persons of the victim's choice if the victim is either a victim of a sexual
assault or a minor).
6. 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 245, sec. 1, at 1207 (enacting CALIFORNIA GOV'T CODE § 13963.1) (amended by
Chapter 780).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13963.1 (amended by Chapter 780); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 774, at 2 (June 22, 1993) (expressing the need for closed hearings for
victims of sexual assault, because it reduces the trauma that victims have to endure); SENATE RULES
COMMITrEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 774, at 2 (May 17, 1993) (noting that the State Board of Control had
not received any criticism regarding the closed hearings available to sexual assault victims); cf. HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 351-14 (1985) (providing for private hearings if the offender has not been convicted or if the person was a
victim of a sexual offense); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-27 (West Supp. 1993) (providing for private hearings
when it is in the interest of the victim or society or as required by justice); OR. REV. STAT. § 147.115(l)(a)-(d)
(1990) (providing for closed hearings for any of the following reasons: (1) The assailant has not been brought
to trial; (2) the victim was raped or sexually abused; (3) the victim is a minor, or (4) the interests of justice
would be frustrated); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 949.11(3) (West 1982) (providing that the examiner may hold the
hearing in private if the offender has not been convicted or if the victim suffered a sexual assault).
8. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13963.1 (amended by Chapter 780); see ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SAFETY, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 774, at 3 (June 22, 1993) (explaining that the trauma faced by victims
of domestic violence is intensified because they were victimized by someone with whom they had a close
personal relationship).
9. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13965(a)(1)-(5) (West Supp. 1993); see id. (providing that the State Board of
Control may take various actions including, but not limited to, cash payments); see also Webster v. State Bd.
of Control, 197 Cal. App. 3d 29, 34, 242 Cal. Rptr. 685, 687 (1987) (providing that victims are not to be
compensated for pain and suffering, emotional distress, or loss of consortium); Blazevich v. State Bd. of Control,
191 Cal. App. 3d 1121, 1127, 237 Cal. Rptr. 35, 38 (1987) (providing that the State Board of Control was
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overcompensated' ° is liable for the amount that was overpaid." Current
law also provides that the State of California shall be subrogated to the
rights of the victim.'
2
Existing law provides that if the victim or the victim's representative' 3
begins legal proceedings against the person liable for the victim's injury
or death and the State Board of Control (Board)'4 awarded the victim
cash, then the victim must notify 5 the Attorney General and the
Board.' 6 Chapter 295 requires that the victim also notify the Board if the
victim has reason to believe that the person against whom the victim is
seeking damages, is receiving a defense provided by an insurer or
carrier. 17 Chapter 295 provides that in an action prosecuted by the victim
alone, litigation expenses must be paid first from any award or judgment
that is won, and then the Board may place a lien on the judgment or award
for the assistance which was paid to the victim.' 8
justified in denying an award to the victim's son, because the Board was not required to speculate what the
unemployed mother might have earned if she had not been murdered); Fierro v. State Bd. of Control, 191 Cal.
App. 3d 735,740,236 Cal. Rptr. 516,518 (1987) (providing that not all victims of crime are to be compensated,
but only those victims with specific financial losses).
10. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, CoMMirrEE ANALYSIS OF SB 774, at 3 (June 22,
1993) (suggesting that overpayment may occur, through no fault of the victim, when emergency assistance is
given to a victim, because it is difficult to determine the financial impact on the victim).
1I. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 13969.3 (enacted by Chapter 295); see id. (providing that victims who have been
overpaid are liable for the amount of overpayment, unless (I) the overpayment was not due to fraud and (2) the
recovery of the overpayment would be against equity and good conscience). The State Board of Control may
authorize limits for the administration of this section in situations where victims were overcompensated in an
amount less than $2,000. Id. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 774,
at 3 (June 22, 1993) (indicating that the State Board of Control may be placed in the difficult position of trying
to collect money from victims that the Board was created to aid); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 960.17 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-15-13 (Michie 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-13-14 (1985); WASH. RI:V.
CODE ANN. § 7.68.120 (West 1992) (providing for repayment by victims who receive assistance).
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 13966.01(a) (enacted by Chapter 295); see id. (providing that the subrogation
rights shall be against the perpetrator of the crime or the person liable for the pecuniary loss).
13. See id. § 13966.01(e) (enacted by Chapter 295) (providing that if a victim, the victim's guardian,
personal representative, estate, or survivors bring an action, the State Board of Control must be notified).
14. See id. § 13963 (West 1992) (discussing the role of the State Board of Control during the hearing);
id. § 13964 (West 1992) (discussing the role of the State Board of Control during the application process).
15. See id. § 13966.01(e) (enacted by Chapter 295) (providing that notice shall include names and
addresses of parties or names and addresses of attorneys, and the nature of the claim, among other things).
16. Id. (enacted by Chapter 295).
17. Id. (enacted by Chapter 295); see id. (requiring that the notice shall include a statement of facts and
the name and address of the carrier); id. § 13966(a) (enacted by Chapter 295) (defining carrier).
18. Id. § 13966.02 (enacted by Chapter 295).
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Existing law provides for a comprehensive collection program."
Chapter 589 provides that a county that utilizes the comprehensive
program must share debt collection information with state agencies.2 °
TLS
Crimes; video recordings
Penal Code § 313.1 (amended).
AB 538 (Richter); 1993 STAT. Ch. 559
Existing law requires businesses that rent or sell video recordings of
harmful matter' to create an area designated "adults only" for the
placement of such recordings.2 Under existing law, a violation of this
provision is an infraction.3 Existing law also provides that a person4 who
19. CAL.. PENAL CODE § 1463.007 (amended by Chapter 589); see id. (establishing the components of
comprehensive collection programs).
20. Id. § 1463.007 (amended by Chapter 589).
1. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 313(a) (West Supp. 1993) (defining harmful matter to mean matter which
appeals to the prurient interest, depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value for minors); id. § 313(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining matter); cf. id. §
31 ](a) (Vest Supp. 1993) (defining obscene matter to mean matter which appeals to the prurient interest, depicts
sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value);
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining an obscene work as one which: (I) Taken as a whole, the
average person would find the work to appeal to the prurient interest by applying contemporary community
standards; (2) describes or depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way; and (3) lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (referring to
WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (Unabridged, 2d ed. 1949) and defining prurient material to mean
a material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts).
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(e) (amended by Chapter 559); see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 212-13 (1975) (stating that a state may apply stricter standards in regulating what minors may view,
but only in narrow, well-defined circumstances); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-40 (1968) (stating
that since the state has an interest in children's well-being, it may regulate material affecting children more
strictly than material affecting adults to aid parents in protecting their children). See generally J. Rex Dibble,
Obscenit y: A State Quarantine to Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 346 (1966) (expressing the need
for proper regulatory laws to protect children from obscenity to discourage community groups from going too
far in imposing their personal values upon others); Ann H. Coulter, Note, Restricting Adult Access to Material
Obscene as to Juveniles, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1681, 1683 (1987) (discussing whether state regulations which
restrict the access of minors to obscene material encroaches upon the First Amendment rights of adults);
Christopher W. Weller, Comment, See No Evil: The Divisive Issue of Minors' Access Laws, 18 CUMB. L. REV.
141, 142 (1987) (discussing the constitutionality of minors' access laws).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(e) (amended by Chapter 559); see id. (providing that this infraction is
punishable by a $100 fine).
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maliciously damages any personal property which is not owned by that
person is guilty of vandalism5 and will be punished according to the
amount of damage caused by that person.6 Chapter 559 provides that any
person who rents a video recording and adds harmful matter to the
recording before returning it is guilty of a misdemeanor.7 Chapter 559,
however, provides as a defense to prosecution the video rental store's
failure to post a reasonably visible sign informing its customers of this
provision.8
MDL
4. See id. § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
5. See id. § 594(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that any person who damages or defaces the real or
personal property of another is guilty of vandalism).
6. Id. § 594(b)(l)-(4); see id. § 594(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that if the amount of damage
is greater than $50,000, the person may be punished by imprisonment for a maximum term of one year in the
state prison or county jail, or by a maximum fine of $50,000, or both); id. § 594(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993)
(providing that if the amount of damage is between $5,000 and $50,000, the person may be punished by
imprisonment for a maximum term of one year in the state prison or county jail, or by a maximum fine of
$10,000, or both); id. § 594(b)(3) (Vest Supp. 1993) (providing that if the amount of damage is between $1,000
and $5,000, the person may be punished by imprisonment for a maximum term of one year in the county jail,
or by a maximum fine of $5,000, or both); id. § 594(b)(4) (West Supp. 1993) (providing that if the amount of
damage is less than $1,000, the person may be punished by imprisonment for a maximum term of six months
in the county jail, or by a maximum fine of $1,000, or both). See generally SENATE COMMITIEE ON JUDICIARY,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 538, at 2 (July 6, 1993) (stating that when a renter of a videotape alters the tape
by recording harmful matter onto the tape before returning it, the renter is committing an act of vandalism),
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(f) (amended by Chapter 559); see id. § 17(b) (West Supp. 1993) (defining
misdemeanor); SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 538, at 2 (July 6, 1993)
(stating there is no current law to charge persons who rent videotapes and return them with pornography
recorded at the end of the tapes); ASSEMBLY FLOOR ANALYSIS OF AB 538, at 1 (May 20, 1993) (stating that
this bill is aimed at preventing persons from recording pornographic material at the end of a rented videotape
before returning the tape); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (Supp. 11 1990) (providing that the owner of a copyright
has the exclusive right to reproduce the copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to transfer owner.,hip
of copies of the work, to publically perform the work, and to publically display the work); id. § 501 (Supp. II
1990) (stating that a violation of an exclusive right as provided in 17 U.S.C. § 106 is an infringement of the
copyright); id. § 504 (1988) (providing that copyright infringers are liable for the copyright owner's actual
damages and for specified statutory damages); id. § 505 (1988) (allowing a court to award costs and attorney's
fees for civil actions for copyright infringement); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d
Cir. 1951) (stating that a copyright owner has the exclusive right not to have others copy the copyrighted work);
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) (stating that an entire motion
picture does not have to be copied in order to constitute an infringement, but that the copying of a major
sequence is enough); cf United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that an alteration of
a sound recording on an unauthorized re-recording might constitute copyright infringement), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1040 (1977). But see Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480, 487 n.8 (2d Cir. 1946) (stating that
an unauthorized copy must be substantial or material in order to constitute an infringement, and the defendant
has a defense if it can be shown that the copying was too insubstantial to be wrongful); SENATE CO.It TrEE
ON JUDICIARY, COMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 538, at 2 (July 6, 1993) (reporting the opposing argument that it
would be virtually impossible to enforce this provision because it would be too hard to establish who was
responsible for the illicit recording).
8. CAL. PENAL CODE § 313.1(f) (amended by Chapter 559).
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Crimes; weapons
Penal Code § 417.4 (new); §§ 171b, 417.2 (amended).
SB 292 (Roberti); 1993 STAT. Ch. 598
Penal Code § 626.10 (amended).
SB 647 (Leslie); 1993 STAT. Ch. 599
Prior law provided that a person who used a "replica" of a firearm' in
a threatening manner, except in self defense,2 was guilty of a
misdemeanor.3 Chapter 598 changes this so that any person using an
"imitation" firearm,4 except in self defense, is guilty of a misdemeanor.5
Prior law provided that any person who sold, manufactured, or
distributed an imitation firearm would be liable for a civil fine.6 Prior law
provided that the fine would not be assessed if the imitation was sold,
manufactured, or distributed for export in interstate or foreign commerce,
theatrical productions, athletic events, military defense activities, or public
displays authorized by public or private schools.7 Chapter 598 amends this
so that any person who purchases, sells, manufactures, ships, transports,
distributes, or receives, by mail order or in any other manner, any imitation
firearms will be liable for a civil fine.9
1. See 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 950, sec. 1.5, at 3778 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 417.2) (defining
replica firearm as any device with the apparent capability of expelling a projectile which is reasonably perceived
by the person threatened to be an actual firearm). Imitation firearms do not include antique replicas for
presentation, commemorative replicas issued by a nonprofit organization used for presentation, or an instrument
that expels a metallic projectile through force of air pressure. Id.
2. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 692, 693 (West 1985) (explaining who is entitled to use self-defense and
the circumstances in which it may be used).
3. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 950, sec. 1.5, at 3777-78 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 417.2); see
People v. Moore, 224 Cal. App. 3d 234, 236, 273 Cal. Rptr. 680, 681 (1990) (rejecting the argument that §
417.2 is not a lesser related offense for a violation of § 12021 of the Penal Code, which makes it illegal for a
felon to possess a firearm).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 417.4 (enacted by Chapter 598) (defining imitation firearm as a replica of
a firearm that is substantially similar in physical characteristics to an actual firearm so as to cause a reasonable
person to conclude that the replica is a real firearm).
5. Id. § 417.4 (enacted by Chapter 598); see id. (providing that violation of this Code is punishable by
a term of not less than 30 days in a county jail); cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206c(c), (d) (West Supp.
1993) (prohibiting the brandishing of facsimile firearms); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.713 (West 1987 & Supp.
1993) (providing that anyone brandishing a replica firearm in a threatening manner may be imprisoned or fined).
6. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 950, sec. 1.5, at 3778 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 417.2). Prior law
provided that such distribution is illegal and subject to a maximum penalty of $10,000. Id.
7. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 950, sec. 1.5, at 3778 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 417.2).
8. See CAL. PENAL. CODE § 417.2(c) (amended by Chapter 598) (defining imitation firearm); see also
id. § 417.2(d)(l)-(5) (amended by Chapter 598) (providing that imitation firearms do not include antique replicas
for presentation, commemorative replicas issued by a nonprofit organization used for presentation, firearms
Selected 1993 Legislation
Crimes
Existing law prohibits any person,'0 except for a peace officer,"
from possessing any type of blade on the campus of a public school or
university. 2 Chapter 599 amends this to include any private university. 3
In addition, Chapter 599 makes it a public offense to possess without
permission of the school district superintendent, any instrument that expels
a metallic projectile by force of air pressure on or within a public or
private school or university. 4
Existing law provides that any person in possession of any firearm,
deadly weapon, knife, tear gas weapon, or stun gun within a courthouse or
at any meeting required to be open to the public is guilty of a public
offense.'5 Chapter 598 provides that an offense is committed within any
approved by the Secretary of Commerce, or instruments that expel metallic projectiles by air pressure); cf. 15
U.S.C. § 5001(c) (1988) (defining look-alike firearms).
9. CAL. PENAL CODE § 417.2(a) (amended by Chapter 598). Chapter 598 provides that the maximum
penalty shall not exceed $10,000. Id. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS
OF SB 292, at 4 (July 6. 1993) (stating that the purpose of adding purchases, ships, transports, and receives was
to close a perceived loophole in the prior law which only regulated the sale, manufacture, or distribution of an
imitation firearm); cf. 15 U.S.C. 5001(a)-(b) (1988) (providing that it is unlawful for any person to manufacture,
enter into commerce, ship, transport, or receive any type of imitation firearm unless it contains a marking
approved by the Secretary of Commerce); I(AN. STAT. ANN. § 12-16, 115 (1991) (assessing a civil penalty upon
anyone who sells, manufactures, or distributes an imitation firearm); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.81 (West Supp.
1993) (requiring that a warning label be placed on replica firearms intended for sale).
10. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 7 (West 1988) (defining person).
11. See id. § 626.10(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 599) (excepting peace officers as defined in chapter 4.5
of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, peace officers of another state or the federal government, or those
summoned by an officer to assist them).
12. Id. Existing law excepts those possessing the knife within the scope of their employment and those
who are using the knife for lawful food preparation upon a residential facility at a university. Id. § 626.10(d)-(e)
(amended by Chapter 599).
13. Id. § 626.10 (amended by Chapter 599); see id. § 626.1 0(a)-(b) (amended by Chapter 599) (stating
that a knife as defined in this statute may not have a blade longer than two and one-half inches); id. § 626.10(h)
(amended by Chapter 599) (defining dirk or dagger as a knife or other instrument that is primarily designed to
be a stabbing instrument capable of inflicting great bodily injury or death).
14. Id. § 6 26.10(a) (amended by Chapter 599). No offense is committed if the person has the written
permission of the school principal or designee. Id. § 626.10(0; see id. § 626.9 (West Supp. 1993) (providing
that no person, except a peace officer, may possess a loaded firearm on the campus of any public or private
school or university); see also Carlos Alcala, Fake Guns Mean Real Trouble When Toted by Kids at School,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 19, 1993, at BI (stating that imitation weapons look real to police officers and may
provoke a shoot out), Tom McQueeney, Triggering Alann; Fake Guns Posing Real Dangers at High Schools,
L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 8, 1993, at A3 (providing that the occurrence of imitation handguns at school is rising).
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 171b(a)(1)-(5) (amended by Chapter 598); cf. IDAHO CODE § 18-3302C(1)
(Supp. 1993) (stating that a licensed individual may not carry a concealed weapon in a courthouse); N.C. GrN.
STAT. § 14-269.4 (1992) (providing that it is unlawful for any person to possess or carry any deadly weapon
in any courthouse); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 22-14-23 (Supp. 1993) (stating that any person who knowingly
possesses a firearm or other dangerous weapon in any county courthouse is guilty of a misdemeanor); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-283.1 (Michie 1988) (providing that it is unlawful for any person to possess any gun or other
dangerous device in a courthouse).
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state or local public building.' 6 Chapter 598 adds that any person in
possession of an instrument that expels a metallic projectile by force of air
pressure is guilty of the offense.
17
Existing law also provides that a person who is a peace officer, has a
valid license to carry a firearm, has a valid tear gas weapon card, or
possesses an item to be used as evidence in a court of law is exempt from
this provision. 8 Chapter 598 provides that a peace officer authorized to
possess such weapons may not do so if the officer is a party to an action
pending in the court.' 9
SVB
16. CAL. PENAL CODE § 17lb(a) (amended by Chapter 598); cf. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-351(2)(a)
(1993) (providing that a county or other local government may restrict the carrying of concealed or unconcealed
weapons at any public assembly or publicly owned building); OR. REv. STAT. § 166.370(1) (1990) (providing
that any person possessing a loaded or unloaded firearm within a public building may be fined up to $500,
imprisoned for up to one year, or both); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-420 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1992)
(mandating that any person who carries a firearm of any kind into a public building is guilty of a misdemeanor);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.235(1) (West 1982) (providing that any person armed with a firearm within any building
owned or leased by the state or a political subdivision of the state is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 171b(a)(6) (amended by Chapter 598).
18. Id. § 171b(b)(l)-(4) (amended by Chapter 598).
19. Id. § 171b(b)(2)(B) (amended by Chapter 598). Chapter 598 also exempts persons possessing
restricted weapons with written authorization, persons that lawfully own or lawfully reside in the building, or
hired security guards. Id. § 171b(b)(5)-(7) (amended by Chapter 598).
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